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FOREWORD
In the United States, judicial biography has long
been popular in the field of public law.1 The quantity
and quality of American judicial biography is held in high
oregard in other parts of the world. The biographical 
approach has both limitations and advantages. Its great­
est limitation is that it is concerned with the particular 
rather than the general. However much information a judi­
cial biography may yield about a particular judge, it 
tells one nothing about judges as a whole. If the judi­
cial biographer infers a relationship between the 
subject’s background and his approach to the law, that 
relationship cannot be transferred to the judicial process 
generally. There remains the possibility that the judge
For example, see Edward S. Corwin, John Marshall and 
the Constitution (New Haven* Yale University Press, 1919); 
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution 
(Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1938)? Alpheus T. 
Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone* Pillar of the Law (New York* 
The Viking Press, 1956); J. Woodford Howard,Jr.
Mr. Justice Murphy* A Political Biography (Princeton* 
Princeton University Press, 1968).
2See Clifford L. Pannam, "Judicial Biography— A Pre­
liminary Obstacle," University of Queensland Law Journal. 
IV (1961), 57-72. The author laments the dearth of 
judicial biography in Australian legal and political 
literature and expresses the hope that the condition will be remedied.
* • •111
who is the subject of the biography represents a unique or 
a rare case in the judicial process. Because of this 
inability to generalize, judicial biography is not popular 
with behaviorally oriented political scientists.
As Peltason has pointed out, judicial biography tends
to be more popular with the "historical-philosophical-
legal school." Advantages of the biographical approach
are that it can be used as a medium of instruction for
those who do not normally read judicial opinions; it
serves as a framework for the study of ideas; and it
places judicial decisions in historical context. Moreover,
political scientists who are not inclined toward the
writing of judicial biographies sometimes find them useful
2as sources of data.
Between 1951 and 1954, numerous doctoral disserta­
tions in public law were biographical in character— over 
twenty-five per cent.^ Individual judges continue to be
T£ven studies which are broader in scope than biog­
raphies cannot always yield generalizations. Because of 
the complexity of the appointment process, Eisenstein was 
unable to make generalizations about the appointment of 
United States Attorneys. See James Eisenstein, "Counsel 
for the United States; An Empirical Analysis of the 
Office of United States Attorney" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale University, 1968), pp. II 32-33.
2See J. W. Peltason, "Supreme Court Biography and the 
Study of Public Law," Essays on the American Constitution; 
A Commemorative Volume in Honor of Alnheus T. Mason, 
ed. Gottfried Dietze (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice- 
Hall, 1964), pp. 215-219.
3Ibid.. 215-216.
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the subjects of numerous dissertations. During the 
period from i960 through 1969* the vast majority of 
biographies, case studies, and studies of judicial phi­
losophy have focused on Justices of the Supreme Court}1 
only two have taken lower federal court judges for
Walter Philip Kremm, "Justice Holmes on Constitu­
tionality and Evidence of His Influence Upon the Vinson 
Court, 19^6-^9" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni­
versity of North Carolina, 1961); Stephen Robert Mitchell, 
"Mr. Justice Horace Gray" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin, 1961); James Jerome Bolner,
"Mr. Chief Justice Vinsons His Politics and His Constitu­
tional Law" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Virginia, 1962); Joseph Richard Morice, "Justice Stephen J. 
Field and the Fourteenth Amendments A Re-Evaluation" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 
1962); Robert Hammon Birkby, "Justice Wiley B. Rutledge 
and Individual Liberties" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Princeton University, 1963); William Davis Eaton, "Douglas 
Dissentss An Interpretation of Judicial Philosophy" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1963); David Franklin Hughes,
"Salmon P. Chases Chief Justice" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton University, 1963); Morgan 
Daniel Dowd, "Justice Joseph Storys A Study of the 
Contributions of a Jeffersonian Judge to the Development 
of American Constitutional Law" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 196*0; James 
Paul McClellan, "Joseph Story and the American Constitu­
tion" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 196*0; 
Roy Lee Meek, "Justices Douglas and Blacks Political 
Liberalism and Judicial Activism" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Oregon, 196*0; Robert Edward 
Newton, "Judicial Self-Restraint in the Opinions of 
Felix Frankfurter in Non-Civil Liberties Cases Concerning 
Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Powers of 
Government" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic 
University of America, 1965)s Harold Marvin Hollingsworth, 
"The Confirmation of Judicial Review Under Taney and 
Chase" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Tennessee, 1966); Dorothy Buckton James, "Judicial 
Philosophy and Accession to the Court * The Cases of 
Justices Jackson and Douglas" (unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, Columbia University, 1966); Justine Staib Mann, 
"The Political and Constitutional Thought of John
v
their subjects.1 But the federal judges of the District 
Courts, the Courts of Appeals, and the specialized 
courts merit greater attention than they have received. 
As Judge Carl McGowan has pointed out, the effectiveness 
of the Supreme Court "depends in some considerable 
degree upon the supporting structure of inferior federal
pcourts . . . ." In spite of the greater visibility of
Archibald Campbell" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Alabama, 1966); Luther Wayne Odom, "Justice 
Holmes, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Reasonable Man 
Standard" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Texas, 1966); Brother E. Adrian Leonard, F.S.C., "Mr. 
Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame,1967); Leonard Boyne Rosenberg, "The Political Thought of 
William Patterson" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New 
School for Social Research, 1967); Eva Redfield Rubin,
"The Judicial Apprenticeship of Arthur J. Goldberg, 1962- 1965" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins 
University, 1967); Paul King Pollock, "Judicial Liber­
tarianism and Judicial Responsibilities; The Case of 
Justice William 0. Douglas" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, Cornell University, 1968); Janice B. Snook, "Judi­
cial Philosophy and Judicial Behavior; The Case of Mr. 
Justice Cardozo" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer­
sity of Maryland, 1969).
^William C. Burris, "John J. Parker and Supreme 
Court Policy; A Case Study in Judicial Control" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North 
Carolina, 1965); Robert Arthur Carp, "The Function,
Impact, and Political Relevance of the Federal District 
Courts; A Case Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Iowa, 1969). The subject of the latter 
dissertation is Judge William Francis Riley, who served 
on the Southern District of Iowa.
2The Organization of Judicial Power in the United 
States (Evanston. 111.; Northwestern University Press, 
I969T7 p. 1^. See also Walter F. Murphy, "Lower Court 
Checks on Supreme Court Power," American Political Science 
Review. LIII (December, 1959), 1017-1031; Richard J. 
Richardson and Kenneth N. Vines, The Politics of the
vi
Supreme Court Justices, it is these lower court judges
who dispose of the overwhelming majority of cases arising
in the federal judicial system. In 1968, the Courts of
Appeals terminated 8,264 cases, and the District Courts
terminated 98,365 cases.^ Obviously, the Supreme Court
is able to review relatively few of the cases decided by
lower court judges.
This dissertation focuses on a lower court judge,
It is a judicial biography of Judge J. Skelly Wright, who
is currently on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. Since Peltason has
rightly cautioned against the development of a "scholarly
one-upmanship" in which the lives of obscure judges are 
2researched, it is appropriate to ask, "Why Judge Wright?"
J. Skelly Wright is hardly disqualified by obscurity. 
He has been at the center of the controversy over school 
segregation. His handling of the segregation issue is
Federal Courts (Bostom Little, Brown and Company, 1970).
^U.S., Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, Annual Report of the Director. 1968, pp. 97, 105-
2Peltason, p. 216.
^See Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), 
in which he heldde facto segregation in the District of 
Columbia unconstitutional. That decision evoked caustic 
comment from_Carl Hansen, former Superintendent of Schools 
in the District, in his Danger in Washington! The Story 
of My Twenty Years in the Public Schools in the Nation's 
Capital (West Nyack. N.Y.i Parker Publishing Company,
1968). Segregation controversies were not new to Judge
• •vi 1
the only part of his lengthy public career to receive a 
significant amount of scholarly attention.1 And yet 
Judge Wright has decided a wide range of constitutional 
issues during his more than twenty years on the federal 
bench as a District Judge and as a Court of Appeals 
Judge. This dissertation examines those issues and 
Judge Wright’s approach to them.
Wright’s legal career has been even more diverse than 
service at two levels of the federal judiciary. He has 
also served as an Assistant United States Attorney 
and participated in the prosecution of the "Louisiana
Wright, for it was he who began the desegregation of 
public schools in Louisiana while he was a Federal Dis­
trict Judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
^ o r  commentary on Wright's role in the desegrega­
tion of Louisiana's public schools, see J. W. Peltason, 
Fifty-Eight Lonely Men* Southern Federal Judges and 
School Desegregation (New York* Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1961)? Edward L. Pinney and Robert S. Friedman, 
Political Leadership and the School Desegregation Crisis 
in Louisiana. Eagleton Institute Cases in Practical 
Politics, Case 31 (N.P.* McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963); 
Earlean M. McCarrick, "Desegregation and the Judiciary* 
The Role of the Federal District Court in Educational 
Desegregation in Louisiana," Journal of Public Law. XVI 
(1967), 107-1275 Morton Inger, Politics and Reality in 
an American City* The New Orleans School Crisis of i960 
(New York* Center for Urban Education, 1969). Inger is 
critical of Peltason's study insofar as it relates to 
desegregation in New Orleans. See Inger, p. 4-7. For 
commentary on Wright's District of Columbia desegrega­
tion decision, see Alexander M. Bickel, "Skelly Wright’s 
Sweeping Decision," The New Republic. July 8, 1967,
pp. 11-12.
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Scandals." He resigned his position as Assistant United 
States Attorney to go into private practice in 
Washington, D. C., during which time he argued two cases 
before the Supreme Court of the United S t a t e s I n  19*1-8, 
he returned to government service as United States 
Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana and 
served in that position until he was elevated to the 
federal bench. His experiences as prosecuting and 
defense attorney undoubtedly helped to shape his judicial 
approach.
Since Judge Wright probably has many productive 
years ahead of him, the author did not have the benefit 
of his papers. Without access to draft opinions, there 
is no way of knowing whether the Judge might have been 
less certain about the proper disposition of some cases 
than his published opinions indicate. This obstacle, 
however, has not prevented the writing of biographies of 
Supreme Court Justices while they lived, and it has not 
proved insurmountable in this case. If there is
^Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. ^59 
(19^7); Johnson v. United Sta'tes, 333 U.S. 10 (19*1-8). 
According to Erwin N. Griswold, lawyers in private prac­
tice rarely argue more than one case before the Supreme 
Court. He was undoubtedly referring to lawyers not 
located in Washington. See his "Practice Before the 
Supreme Court of the United States," Federal Bar Journal. 
XXIX (Summer, 1970), 150.
consistency in the Judge’s opinions, one may assume 
that he has resolved whatever initial doubts there might 
have been.^
Judge Wright's reported opinions are available in 
the Federal Supplement and the Federal Reporter. Second 
Series. His constitutional opinions have been examined 
through mid-1970— more specifically, through Volume ^29» 
Federal Reporter, Second Series. Constitutional cases 
in which he participated but did not write opinions 
were also examined. Newspapers, Senate Judiciary Sub­
committee hearings, and the Congressional Record are 
among the sources that have been used. The Judge's 
off-the-bench writings are numerous. Interviews with 
associates and members of the Judge's family provided 
other sources of information.
Following the procedure used by Leo Katcher for his
pbiography of Earl Warren, the author informed Judge Wright 
of the proposed biography, and he indicated that he had no 
objections to it. Persons who were interviewed were told
■̂ For a discussion of this problem, see Howard, Mr. 
Justice Murphy, p. 8̂4-. Also see his "On the Fluidity 
of Judicial Choice," American Political Science Review, 
LXII (March, 1968), p. 50. The problem is not unique 
to studies of the judicial process. Students of legis­
lative roll-call voting experience a similar problem and 
resolve it in much the same way. See Judson L. James, 
American Political Parties> Potential and Performance 
(New York1 Pegasus, 1969), pp. 152-153.
^Earl Warren1 A Political Biography (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967).
that Judge Wright was aware of what was being done and 
were shown his letter, if they indicated a desire to see 
it. The interviews were unstructured. Unlike Katcher, 
who did not interview Warren, the author requested and 
received an interview with Judge Wright.
Following Woodford Howard’s approach, this study 
emphasizes public career more than private life. It 
relies on Wright’s own words when possible "in order to 
flesh out the character," as Howard ptxt it, and provides 
the reader with a basis for making independent judgments.'1'
Garraty has suggested that biographies should be
chronological in form for the simple reason that a per-
2son's life unfolds chronologically. This study follows 
Garraty's suggestion, but with a modification. Although 
it treats the two phases of Wright's judicial career 
separately, within each phase of his career the study is 
concerned with his approach to constitutional issues; 
therefore, it departs from pure chronology and is organ­
ized around constitutional issues. Each issue, however, 
is considered chronologically in order to illustrate any
^Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy. pp. vii-viii. Arthur L. 
Goodhart also considered that "As a general rule it is 
best to leave a judge to speak for himself both inside and 
out of court." Quoted in John P. Reid, "Irresponsible and 
Unimaginative; The Lawyer and the Historian as Judicial 
Biographer," Law Library Journal. LVII (May, 196*0, 135.
2John A. Garraty, The Nature of Biography (New York; 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 257-
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changes in Judge Wright's constitutional approach over 
time. Where background information was necessary, the 
author followed the acceptable procedure of drawing upon 
sound secondary sources.^
The thesis of this study is that J. Skelly Wright 
has adopted the values of political liberalism and has 
been a policy-oriented judge. The term "liberalism” is 
used here in a manner similar to the way it is used in 
quantitative studies. A liberal judge is one who tends 
to be for the governmental agency in regulation of 
business cases; tends to favor the constitutional claims 
of individuals who raise civil rights issues in either 
criminal or noncriminal contexts; tends to favor ten­
ants as opposed to landlords; and tends to favor the
2federal government in disputes with the states. Walter 
Murphy's definition of a policy-oriented judge is 
adopted here. The term describes a judge "who is aware of
h l o i d . . p. 214.
2See Sheldon Goldman, "Politics, Judges, and the 
Administration of Justice; The Background, Recruitment, 
and Decisional Tendencies of the Judges on the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 1961-4" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1965)» PP* 37-38.
Goldman designates a "liberal" position in considerably 
more categories of cases than those mentioned above, but 
they are not applicable here because they are nonconsti­
tutional. Also, because of the nature of Goldman's study, 
he is concerned only with the way a judge votes. This 
study goes beyond Wright's voting position.
xii
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the impact which judicial decisions can have on public 
policy, realizes the leeway for discretion which his 
office permits, and is willing to take advantage of this 
power and leeway to further particular policy aims."1 
This dissertation attempts to illustrate Wright's 
liberalism and policy-orientation within the context of 
a judicial biography— a judicial biography of an eminent 
and controversial jurist on what has been termed the
pnation's second most important court.
Walter P. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 4.
2See James E. Clayton, "The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia," Constitutional Law in the 
Political Process, ed. John R. Schmidhauser (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Co., 1963), p. 133.
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The dissertation is a judicial biography of Judge 
J. Skelly Wright. It is based primarily on newspaper 
sources, Judge Wright's judicial opinions and off-the- 
bench writings, and personal interviews with the Judge's 
associates, members of the Wright family, and Judge Wright 
himself. The thesis of the dissertation is that Judge 
J. Skelly Wright has adopted the values of political 
liberalism and has been what Walter Murphy has called a 
"policy-oriented" judge; that is, a judge "who is aware of 
the impact which judicial decisions can have on public 
policy, realizes the leeway for discretion which his 
office permits, and is willing to take advantage of this 
power and leeway to further particular policy aims."'1"
Since the dissertation is a biography, its organiza­
tion is basically chronological. The first chapter deals 
with Wright's background and pre-judicial career. It 
suggests that his liberal outlook has sprung from his 
working-class background, his pre-judicial experiences in 
the United States Attorney's office, and his defense of
Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 
(Chicagoi University of Chicago Press, 19^), p.
xvi
civil rights before the Supreme Court while in private 
practice. The next five chapters examine the substance 
of Judge Wright's constitutional law as a District Judge, 
his elevation to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, and the substance of his constitutional 
law while on the latter court. The dissertation examines 
Wright's approach to economic regulation, the Bill of 
Rights, and voting rights. It also examines the segrega­
tion controversies in which he has been involved, both in 
Louisiana and in the District of Columbia. The discussion 
of his constitutional law is interspersed with illustra­
tions of how Wright has attempted to influence policy* 
openly reluctant application of law with which he dis­
agrees coupled with pleas that the law be reconsidered; 
eloquent opinions in support of policy with which he 
agrees; suggesting in his opinions arguments which counsel 
might test in future litigation; use of the Court of 
Appeals' supervisory power; attempting to influence public 
opinion through off-the-bench activity.
The dissertation concludes with an evaluation of 
Judge Wright's more than twenty years of judicial service. 
His service is evaluated from the standpoint of technical 
competence, his interpretation of the judicial function, 
and the values he has promoted. Using the success of his 
opinions in surviving appeals and professional respect as 
criteria, the dissertation concludes that Judge Wight has
xvii
indeed been technically competent. The dissertation also 
makes the normative judgment that Judge Wright's policy- 
oriented interpretation of the judicial function is a 
valid one and that the values he has promoted are consis­
tent with democratic theory.
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CHAPTER I
THE ROAD TO A FEDERAL DISTRICT 
JUDGESHIP
The Early Years
James Skelly Wright, b o m  January 1^, 1911, and 
destined thirty-eight years later to put on the robe of 
a Federal District Judge, did not emerge from the economic 
and social elite of his native New Orleans. If one looks 
to paternal occupation, as Schmidhauser did in his study 
of Supreme Court Justices,'*'one finds that James Edward 
Wright, the father of the future judge, was a plumber 
by trade, James E. Wright had only an elementary school 
education, but he steadily provided for his large family. 
There were eight children b o m  to the Wrights. James 
Skelly, known to family and friends as Skelly, was the 
third.2
Skelly was Mrs. Wright's maiden name, and it was 
from the Skelly side of the family that Skelly got the
■*\John R. Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court: Its
Politics. Personalities. and^rocedures (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, 19&0V PP. 31-33.
2Personal interviews: James Edward Wright, Jr.,
New Orleans, La., September 2, 1970, and Edward F. Wright, 
New Orleans, La., May 1^, 1973.
2
political connections that were important in his early 
career. Mrs. Wright came from a politically active 
family. Her father, Jim Skelly, was a member of the 
Louisiana House of Representatives. Her brother,
Joseph Patrick Skelly, served as Commissioner of Prop­
erty on the New Orleans Commission Counsel and was one 
of the leaders in the Regular Democratic Organization, 
the political machine that controlled New Orleans 
politics. Although Mr. Wright stuck to his plumbing 
and was not active in politics, Mrs. Wright was always 
politically active. She served on the Parkway Com­
mission, the Playground Commission, and was a Democratic 
ward leader in the Twelfth Ward, where the Wrights 
lived.1
Their home was on Camp Street near Napoleon
pAvenue, which was "a neighborhood of working people." 
Skelly and the other Wright children attended the neigh­
borhood public school. Their mother, in addition to her 
political activity, was active in the Mothers' Club of 
the school and played Santa Claus for the children each 
year.-^ After elementary school, Skelly went on to Warren 
Easton High, a public school for boys, and, according
•hibid.
2J. Skelly Wright, quoted in William E. Giles, 
"Integration Storm— Judge Wright: In the Center of New
Orleans Controversy," The Wall Street Journal 
(November 16, i960), p. 16.
•^Interview: James E. Wright, Jr.
3
to his older brother, always got good grades without much 
effort.^" While at Warren Easton, he was elected a City 
Commissioner for Boys' Day, the only "elected office" 
for which he ever ran.
When his high school days were over, Skelly attended 
Loyola University on a scholarship, where he majored in 
philosophy.^ He was also involved in school activities, 
serving as business manager of the school newspaper, 
chairman of the dance committee, and editor of the year­
book. Obviously not lacking in social skills, the 
personable young man became national president of his 
fraternity, Alpha Delta Gamma. His graduation in 1931 
did not end his association with Loyola. He enrolled in 
law school at that institution. His legal education, 
however, was obtained mainly in night classes because he 
had a daytime job as a teacher at Fortier High, a public 
school for boys. At Fortier, he taught algebra and 
English history and had the distinction of winning a 
new hat by being elected most popular teacher. Among 
his students were his own younger brother, Jim, and, 
when he substituted for an English teacher, Russell Long, 
who would later be elected United States Senator from
■^Interview: Edward F. Wright.
2Personal interview with the Hon. J. Skelly Wright, 
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, Washington, D. C., July 12, 
1973.
"Interview: Edward F. Wright.
Louisiana.'1' Wright continued to teach even after his 
graduation from law school in 193 .̂
During these early years, Skelly Wright was always 
interested in politics but was never active in even a 
minor capacity. In view of the political orientation of 
his family, one might have expected at least some politi­
cal activity, and yet it did not happen. Although his 
older brother, Eddie, sometimes took Mrs. Wright to the
polls and to political meetings, Skelly was not involved
2even to that extent. As a boy, however, he was close to 
the Skelly family, often staying with them at their house 
in Long Beach, Mississippi.-^ His first political appoint­
ment was due to the backing of his uncle, Joe Skelly.
In 1937 • there were some vacancies in the United 
States Attorney's office. Although Assistant United 
States Attorneys are formally appointed by the Attorney 
General, at that time appointments in the Eastern Dis­
trict of Louisiana were effectively made by United 
States Senator Allen J. Ellender. Commissioner Skelly
recommended his nephew to Senator Ellender, and Wright
Lgot the appointment.
■^Interview: James E. Wright, Jr.
2Interviews: Edward F. Wright, Hon. J. Skelly
Wright.
■^Personal interviews with Mrs. Margaret Hotard and 
Mrs. Joseph P. Skelly, New Orleans, La., August 29, 1970.
JkInterview: Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
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The new Assistant United States Attorney, fresh from 
the high school classroom, had a rather inauspicious 
beginning, losing the first case he ever tried.^ Unde­
terred by a disappointing start, he was an ambitious
young man who often spent his spare time reading the
2United States Code Annotated. Wright worked hard and 
performed well in the job.-̂  Initially, he was assigned 
to the narcotics docket. He had a place to sleep at the 
office, and when he was working on a case, he would
£lsometimes be there for days at a time. One narcotics
case which he successfully prosecuted in 1938 involved
the alleged racketeer, Carlos M a r c e l l o . A s  a result of
the narcotics conviction, Marcello would later be
ordered deported from the United States, and Wright, as
a District Judge, would uphold the constitutionality of
£the deportation order.
1Ibid.
2Personal interview with Kathleen Ruddell, May 21, 
1971* Miss Ruddell was secretary to Rene Viosca, United 
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
-'Rene Viosca, his former superior, retained a highly 
favorable impression of the quality of Wright's service. 
Personal interview with the Hon. Rene A. Viosca, Judge 
(retired), Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans,
July 20, 1971.
kInterviews Edward F. Wright.
^James E. Wright, Jr., letter of September 10, 1970 
to the author.
£See United States ex rel. Marcello v. Ahrens.
113 F.Supp. 22 (E.D. La. 1953)i aff'd sub nom.
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Narcotics prosecutions, of course, were not the 
extent of Wright's service as Assistant United States 
Attorney. He assisted United States Attorney Rene Viosca 
in prosecuting the case of United States v. Classic.1 The 
case involved election fraud in the Democratic primary 
for the United States House of Representatives and was 
prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act of 1870. When the 
District Judge decided that Congress' power over elec­
tions did not extend to primaries, the Government took 
the case to the Supreme Court on direct appeal, and the 
Court reversed the decision, asserting that the primary 
was an integral part of the election process. Indi­
rectly, the Classic decision had a fatal effect on white 
3primaries.v
In reviewing Wright's years as Assistant United 
States Attorney, it is impossible to overlook the 
"Louisiana Scandals," the prosecution of members of Huey 
Long's organization after the death of the "Kingfish." 
During the most intense periods of activity, the United
Marcello v. Bonds. 3^9 U.S. 302 (1955)*
135 F.Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 19^0).
^United States v. Classic. 313 U.S. 299 (19^1).
^ln Smith v. Allwright. 321 U.S. 6k9 (19^*0» the 
Court extended the principle that primaries are an 
integral part of the election process and held that the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from denying par­
ticipation in primaries on the basis of race.
States Attorney's office worked night and day. Week­
ends were especially busy because indictments were pre­
sented to the grand jury on Monday. The United States 
Attorney's staff was a closely knit group. Members of 
the staff came from opposing political factions, some 
were even helping to prosecute friends and acquaintances, 
and yet they worked well together. During this time, 
Wright, like the other Assistants, was kept busy per­
forming such tasks as helping to draft indictments and 
taking witnesses before the grand jury.1 Wright himself 
has said*
The high point of my service as Assistant U. S. 
Attorney was during the Louisiana Scandals. It 
was a time of high excitement— for prosecutors, 
anyway. I guess for defendants, too. For a young 
man still in his twenties, I was, more or less, 
thrust into a relatively important position, where 
I was able to learn about people as well as law.2
The Louisiana Scandals prosecutions went on almost until
World War II.
Wright became involved in war-related activity 
even before the United States formally entered the War 
when the United States seized Axis vessels in American 
ports in the spring of 19^1. Two Italian ships, the 
Ada 0 . and the Monfiore, were then docked at Chalmette, 
Louisiana. Shortly before they were seized, their crews,
■^Interview* Kathleen Ruddell.
2Interview* Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
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acting on instructions from Rome, damaged the machinery 
and left the ships to obstruct the harbor. Consequently, 
the United States Attorney’s office took action against 
them. Assistant United States Attorney Wright charged 
the officers and crewmen with conspiracy to commit 
sabotage, and the grand jury returned indictments. The 
emotional climate was such that convictions were 
inevitable.̂
In December of 1941, Wright exchanged his position 
as Assistant United States Attorney for that of 
Lieutenant, j. g., in the United States Coast Guard. 
Initially, he did communications work in Louisiana, but 
eventually he got sea duty and was assigned to the 
Coast Guart cutter Thetis. On his first day on board, 
the Thetis, while on an escort run, sank a German sub­
marine off the coast of Florida. Approximately eighteen 
months later he was transferred to England, where he 
served on the legal staff of Admiral Stark. While in 
England, in 1945. he married Helen Patton, a native of 
Washington, D. C. She was then employed by the Govern­
ment and was assigned to London in connection with the
■^Interviews* Hon. J. Skelly Wright, Kathleen 
Ruddellj New York Times. March 31i 19^1, p. 1? Times- 
Picavune. March 31. 19*H. p. 1, and April 5, 1941, p. 2. 
On Roosevelt’s policy toward Axis ships, see William L. 
Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War: 
1940-1941 (New York? Harper & Brothers, 1953)* pp. 424- 428.
9
Lend-Lease Program. When Wright, hy that time a Lieu­
tenant Commander, was discharged from the Coast Guard 
in November of 19^5* he and Mrs. Wright returned to 
New Orleans, where he resumed his position as Assistant 
United States Attorney. They were there, however, only 
until May of 19^6, when Wright resigned his position in 
order to go into private practice in Washington, D. C.1
Skelly Wright's Washington law practice was rela­
tively brief, lasting less than two years. It occurred 
during the immediate post-war period; therefore, many 
wartime rules and regulations were still in effect and 
giving rise to a plethora of legal questions— questions 
relating to such matters as wage and price controls, 
rationing of commodities, and recovery of excess profits. 
Among Wright's clients were a shipbuilder and a steam­
ship company, both based in New Orleans, and a Louisiana-
2based oil interest. Most of his clients, in fact, were
Interviewst Edward F. Wright, James E. Wright, Jr.; 
Times-Picavune. October 16, 19^9* p. 1; State-Times 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana), August 31* I960, pp. 1A, 12A 
(hereafter cited as State-Times); U. S. Senate, Subcom­
mittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, "Hearings, 
Nomination of J. Skelly Wright to be U.S. Circuit Judge 
for the District of Columbia Circuit," (February 28, 1962), 
p. 11. (Stenographic transcript in files of Senate 
Judiciary Committee.) Hereafter cited as Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee, "Hearings, Nomination to D. C. Circuit." 
oJohn L. Ingoldsby, Jr., letter of December 28, 1970, 
to the author. Mr. Ingoldsby, a Washington attorney, is 
a former law partner of Judge Wright.
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Louisiana interests that were having problems with the 
Federal Government. By his assessment, he was operating 
at a relatively low level of importance.^
Although he did not have a prominent place in the
legal establishment, his Washington location provided
the opportunity for him to approach, as an advocate, the
very pinnacle of the American legal structure, the
Supreme Court. As a public service, without fee, he
espoused the cause of Willie Francis, a seventeen year
old black male, whom Louisiana intented to electrocute
for murder. It was to be the State's second attempt, the
first having aborted due to the mechanical failure of a
2portable electric chair. In his brief and supplemental 
brief to the Supreme Court,bright argued that a second 
attempt at electrocuting Francis would be a denial of 
equal protection of the law, since other condemned murder­
ers sit in the chair only once, and that it would also 
constitute double jeopardy, violating the due process
^"Interviews Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
^The facts of the Francis case are set out in 
detail in E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Death and the 
Supreme Court (New Yorks Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961),
pp. 90-128.
-'The source for the following references to 
attorneys* briefs is Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 374 (1947). U.S. Supreme Court Briefs 
and Records (Microfilm), October Term 1956, Roll 8,
Vol. 329, filmed by the University of Chicago Library.
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At an earlier stage 
in the legal struggle over Willie Francis' life,
Bertrand De Blanc, the attorney who handled his appeal 
to the Louisiana Supreme Court, unsuccessfully argued 
that another execution attempt would violate the State 
constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Wright picked up the reference to cruel and unusual pun­
ishment and tied it to the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee of due process of law. John L. Ingoldsby, Jr., 
who was Wright's law partner, has saids
I think that he started off by not believing that 
the theory had any merit and that it was nothing 
more than a desperation move because nothing else 
could be thought of, but by the time he appeared 
to argue it in the Supreme Court, he had convinced 
himself that actually a "cruel and unusual punish­
ment" was involved, or was threatened.1
The brief itself amounted to a two-pronged attack. 
Wright attacked the fairness of Francis' trial, noting 
that it had taken only eight days to try, convict, and 
sentence him. Francis' appointed trial lawyer had 
introduced no evidence in his client's behalf, nor had 
he appealed the conviction or moved for a new trial. 
Precisely what happened at the trial was unknown because 
there was not even a stenographic record. These charges 
were cogently answered, however, in the State's opposing 
brief. The State replied that no evidence had been
■^Ingoldsby letter.
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introduced in Francis' behalf because there was none. 
Defense counsel had no obligation to manufacture any.
He did not move for a new trial or appeal because there 
were no grounds. As for the lack of a stenographic 
transcript, that was the case in thousands of Louisiana 
criminal trials because under the Louisiana Constitution 
there could be no appeal on the facts.
Wright's other line of attack was aimed at the second 
attempt to execute Francis. It contained a judicious 
mixture of intellectual and emotional appeal. Wright 
did not argue that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated 
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment or the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amend­
ment. He considered that Willie Francis' case went 
beyond any theory of incorporation. The double jeopardy 
and cruel and unusual punishment involved in the Francis 
case contravened fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice, which were protected by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue, as he framed it, 
was whether an individual had a right to an instant and 
humane death at the hands of the State, or whether the 
State might prolong his physical or mental suffering, 
either intentionally or through a blunder. If the 
individual did indeed have a right to an instant and 
humane execution, then the fact that it was prolonged 
through error rather than malice was irrelevant, since
the individual's suffering was the same in either case.
Wright was well aware that the psychological make-up of
Supreme Court Justices includes the emotions, so he
described the first attempt to electrocute Francis.'1' He
said, in an unabashed appeal to the emotionst
The petitioner jumped. The chair moved. His lips 
puckered and swelled. What effect that current of 
electricity had on this man's mind or upon his soul 
no one will ever know. No one on this earth can 
tell how close to the hereafter Willie Francis 
actually was at the time that current of electri­
city was applied to his body. No living being can 
appreciate the suffering, the torture, both physical 
and mental, that Willie Francis has already under­
gone. No other living being has been so close to 
death and through no fault of his own brought back
into this life so that the State of Louisiana may
give a repeat performance.2
While there is little doubt that the condemned man 
underwent mental suffering, it was not so clear that he 
underwent physical suffering. Whereas Wright argued 
that Francis received electric current and experienced
More recently, he described it in a documentary on 
capital punishment produced by Truman Capote but which 
the television networks considered too controversial to 
telecast at a time when cases challenging the constitu­
tionality of capital punishment were pending before the 
Supreme Court. See Dwight Whitney, "I Want It on the 
Air!" T V Guide. XVIII (July 4, 1970), pp. 5-9.
2Appellant’s brief at 8, Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 374 (1947). U.S. Supreme 
Court Briefs and Records (microfilm), October term 
1946, Roll 8, Vol. 329» filmed by the University of 
Chicago Library.
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physical pain, the State denied that any current had 
reached him. Both sides had supporting affidavits from 
witnesses. But uncertainty about the facts did not 
affect Wright’s oral argument. On November 18, 1946, 
he stood before the nine Justices and argued his case 
well. Some of the Justices questioned him at length, 
and he responded with competence and conviction.^
The decision was not rendered until January 13,
1947, the day before Wright's thirty-sixth birthday.
The result was that he lost his first Supreme Court case 
by a close vote of five to four, and ultimately Willie 
Francis lost his life. Justices Reed, Vinson, Black, 
and Jackson rejected the double jeopardy argument because 
they considered the case no different in principle from
retrying an individual due to an error of law and
2governed by Palko v. Connecticut. Cruel and unusual 
punishment was not threatened because the State was not 
employing cruel methods of execution. As for the mental 
anguish, that was present in any death sentence. There 
was no denial of equal protection of the law because 
Francis was not singled out for the treatment he 
received; it was an accident. The charges of an unfair 
trial were simply unsupported by the record. The re­
maining vote against Francis and Wright was cast by
"^Ingoldsby letter. Mr. Ingoldsby was present in 
Court during the argument.
2302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Justice Frankfurter, who did not believe a second attempt 
to execute the petitioner would violate standards of 
civilized decency.1
Wright's only other appearance before the Supreme 
Court occurred in December, 19^7. It was a search and 
seizure case and, unlike the majority of cases he handled, 
did not originate in Louisiana. The case originated as 
a narcotics prosecution in the Western District of 
Washington and reached the Supreme Court when the 
defendant, a hotel proprietor, challenged the validity 
of the search through which the evidence against her was 
obtained.
The Government's position was that the search was 
incident to a valid arrest. The arresting officers 
asserted that they could smell opium when they entered 
the hotel hallway and that the odor came from the petition­
er’s apartment. Without obtaining an arrest warrant or a 
search warrant, they knocked on the petitioner's door.
When she answered their knock, a police detective tes­
tified that he said, "I want you to consider yourself 
under arrest because we are going to search the room."
The Government argued that since the search was 
incident to a valid arrest, a search warrant was not 
required. Although the officer told the woman that she
•̂Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber. 329 U.S. 374 
(1947). The four dissenters, Justices Burton, Douglas, 
Murphy, and Rutledge, would have remanded the matter to 
resolve the question of whether Francis got any current.
was under arrest because he was going to search the room, 
the Government contended that it was simply his inartful 
way of informing her that she was under arrest and that 
he did not consider the legal implication of his choice 
of words. Wright's answer was that there had been ample 
time to get a warrant. Since the officers did not do so, 
the search was unlawful, and the fruits of the search 
inadmissible as evidence. Nor could the search be jus­
tified as incident to a valid arrest. While arrests with­
out warrants were permissible in some circumstances,
Wright argued that standards were more stringent when a 
person's home was involved.’1'
This time the decision was in favor of Wright’s 
client by a margin of five to four. The opinion of the 
Court by Justice Jackson noted that the only reason for 
failing to get a search warrant was inconvenience and 
slight delay. That was not sufficient to justify the 
search of a permanent residence when flight was 
unlikely. He agreed that the search had been incident 
to an arrest, but not a valid arrest. The officers had 
no probable cause to make an arrest until they entered 
the apartment and saw that the defendant was the only 
person present; however, without a warrant, the entry 
itself was unlawful. "Thus,” said Jackson, "the
“̂ Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10 (19^8),
U.S. Supreme Court Briefs and Records (Microfilm),
October Term 19^7» Roll 1, Vol. 333f filmed by the 
University of Chicago Library.
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Government is obliged to justify the arrest by the search 
and at the same time to justify the search by the arrest. 
This will not do."'*' The result of the decision was that 
the Department of Justice had to change its manual of 
instructions for United States Attorneys throughout the
pcountry in regard to searches and seizures.
Shortly thereafter, Wright returned to the Eastern 
District of Louisiana and himself became a United States 
Attorney. The vacancy arose in early 19*1-8, when Herbert 
Christenberry was appointed to the federal bench. Since 
President Truman was not expected to win reelection in 
November, there were few candidates for what appeared to 
be a job without a future. For a combination of nostal­
gic and practical reasons, Wright decided that he would 
like to have the job for a short time. Before he left 
New Orleans, he had been First Assistant and thought he 
would like to take the next step. On the practical side, 
he thought it would help his Washington practice, to 
which he had every intention of returning. Since he had 
primarily represented New Orleans interests, a short 
period of service as United States Attorney would give 
him an opportunity to renew old contacts and establish
1Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (19^8).
2Ingoldsby letter.
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new ones. Consequently, he informed Senator Ellender of 
his interest in the position, and he got it.'L
While Wright was United States Attorney, he bacame 
involved, in a gingerly fashion, in the investigation of 
attacks on the civil rights of blacks, particularly 
voting rights. At the time, there was not much that he 
could do because juries would not convict and grand 
juries would not indict. But he presented the cases to 
the grand jury, more as a matter of education for the 
jurors than with the expectation that the law would take 
its course. He had grown up in a segregated society, 
but his years in the Coast Guard had exposed him to 
racial practices in other parts of the United States, 
as well as in other countries. His military service and 
his exposure to cases involving attacks on the civil 
rights of blacks all played a part in the lengthy and 
generally indeterminate process by which his own racial 
attitudes were transformed.
For the most part, however, his short term as 
United States Attorney was uneventful. Wright has des­
cribed it as "undistinguished." He had assistants who 
were willing and eager to work, and he let them.3 In a 
case involving the sale of bonds for the construction 
of the New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal, he did
interview* Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
2Ibid. 3Ibid.
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manage to generate some animosity towards himself which 
resurfaced at the time of his appointment to the hench.
Judicial Nomination and Confirmation
When Harry S. Truman confounded the experts and won 
the 19^8 presidential election, it was not immediately 
apparent that the turn of events would benefit Wright.
He still wanted to return to Washington and had indica­
ted as much to Senator Allen J. Ellender and other 
political leaders. He withheld his resignation while 
they searched for a successor.
A replacement for Wright was not immediately forth­
coming, and while the search went on, a vacancy devel­
oped on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The 
vacancy resulted from the death of Judge Elmo Pearce Lee, 
a Louisianian. It was expected that he would be replaced 
by another Louisianian; therefore, Louisiana's Senators 
submitted a list of acceptable replacements to the 
Department of Justice. The list included the name of 
J. Skelly Wright. The nomination, however, went to a 
man whose name was not submitted by the Senators. On 
October 151 19^9* the Senate received the nomination of 
Judge Wayne G. Borah of the Eastern District of
-hlbid.
T̂imes-Picayune. October 16, 19^9» p. 1.
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Louisiana for elevation to the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit. Skelly Wright was nominated to replace 
him as Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana.^
Both nominations were recommended by the American 
Bar Association, but Judge Borah's party affiliation 
made his nomination something of a surprise. He was 
a Republican who had received his judicial appointment 
from Calvin Coolidge in 1928.2 Such an "out-party" 
nomination represented a deviation from the normal prac­
tice of making judicial appointments from the President's 
party. J But there are usually political reasons for such 
deviations, and so there was in this instance.
Louisiana's Senators had not supported Truman in 
19^8, but rather had supported the Dixicrat candidacy 
of Strom Thurmond, and thus found themselves without 
much influence on the administration. Wright had not 
campaigned for Thurmond and had made no enemies in the
^.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
19%, XCV, Part 2, 14706.
2Times-Picavune. October 16, 19%, p. I t  New Orleans 
Item. October 17» 19%» p. 5* hereafter cited as Item.
3-'See Joel B. Grossman, Lawyers and Judges: The ABA
and the Politics of Judicial" Selection (New York» John 
Wiley and Sons, 1965)» pp. 30-31; Jack W. Peltason, 
Federal Courts in the Political Process (New Yorks 
Random House, 1955). pp. 31-32} Hugh Scott, "The Selec­
tion of Federal Judges: The Independent Commission
Approach," Judicial Selection and Tenure: Selected
Readings, ed. Glenn R. Winters (Chicago: American
Judicature Society, 1967), pp. 16%165.
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administration. He informed people he knew in the
Justice Department of his interest in the vacant judge-
ship^and was seriously considered for the position. His
age, however, was an impediment. He was then thirty-
eight years old* which was considered young for an
2appellate judge.
While in Washington for a Judicial Conference, Judge 
Joseph Hutcheson, then Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, 
recommended to Attorney General Howard McGrath that in 
view of Judge Borah’s years of distinguished service on 
the District "bench he be promoted to the Fifth Circuit, 
Court of Appeals. Judge Hutcheson’s recommendation was 
acceptable for a number of reasons, not the least of 
which was that it gave the administration an opportunity 
to ignore the recommendations of Louisiana's Senators.
The appointment of Judge Borah also permitted the admin­
istration to make a bipartisan gesture without actually 
increasing the number of Republicans on the bench. His
"^Normally, an individual with any hope of a Federal 
judicial appointment must make at least this minimal 
effort in his own behalf of announcing his availability. 
See Grossman, pp. kZ, 205; Harold W. Chase, "Federal 
Judges; The Appointing Process," Minnesota Law Review.
LI (December, 1966), 205-207. For an exception, see 
Robert Arthur Carp, "The Function, Impact, and Political 
Relevance of the Federal District Courts: A Case Study,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 
1969)t PP. 39-^2.
interview; Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
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elevation to the Fifth Circuit created a vacancy on the
District Court which was filled "by a Democrat— J. Skelly
Wright.1 The United States Senators from Louisiana
acquiesced in the arrangement, and, in a matter of days,
2the Senate routinely confirmed Borah's nomination.
Wright's nomination was not handled so expeditiously. 
Congress adjourned before the Senate took action on 
several of Truman's judicial nominations, with Skelly 
Wright's among those that were deferred.-^ He had to be 
Content with a recess appointment.^ That appointment made 
him the youngest Federal Judge in the United States in 
19^ 9 .5
Not until March of the following year did the Senate 
take up the question of Wright's confirmation. The nom­
inee had an impressive array of endorsements: Senators
1Ibid.
?Item. October 17» 19^9» p. 5; U.S., Congressional 
Record. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 19^9» XCV, Part 18, 
p. D718.
% e w  York Times. October 18, 19^9» p. 30*
I IU.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, "Hearings, Nomination of Hon. J. Skelly Wright 
to be U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana," (March 1, 1950), unnumbered page between p. 1 
and p. 2. (Stenographic transcript in files of Senate 
Judiciary Committee.; Hereafter cited as Senate Judi­
ciary Subcommittee, "Hearings, Wright Nomination to 
E.D. La."
^State-Times, August 3I1 i960, p. 1A.
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Ellender and Long; all the Congressmen representing the 
Eastern District of Louisiana; the American Bar Associ­
ation; the Federal Bar Association; the Louisiana Bar 
Association; the New Orleans Bar Association; the Baton 
Rouge Bar Association; the Law Schools of Louisiana State 
University, Tulane University, and Loyola University; the 
Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court; and indiv­
idual lawyers. Although many of his supporters would 
later forsake him, at the time the Senate considered his 
nomination to the District Court, only a single voice 
was raised in opposition.'1'
Wright's confirmation was opposed by one Maurice R. 
Woulfe, a New Orleans attorney. He said that Wright, 
while serving as United States Attorney, had persecuted 
him by causing him to be indicted for conspiracy to 
commit offenses against the United States in connection 
with his suit to prevent the marketing of bonds for the 
New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal. He argued that 
the Grand Jury that returned the indictment was under 
Wright's influence. The subcommittee did not place much 
credence in Mr. Woulfe's charges, and Senator McCarran, 
the chairman of the subcommittee, expressed the opinion 
that Woulfe's quarrel should be with the grand jury and 
not with Wright.2
■^Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, "Hearing, Wright 
Nomination to E.D. La.," p. 2.
2Ibid., pp. 2-^2.
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Judge Wright was present at the hearing and was 
given an opportunity to answer the charges leveled 
against him. He did this by reading a report which he 
made to the Department of Justice in August of 19^9.
In his report, he noted that the City of New Orleans 
and the railroads had been acting pursuant to an order 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in constructing 
the terminal and that Woulfe conspired to prevent free 
and fair competition among those desiring to bid on the 
bonds in violation of Title 15, Section 20 of the United 
States Code.'*'
When, on the day before the bids were to be opened, 
a suit was filed raising issues that had already been 
fully litigated, the Mayor, the City Attorney, and the 
attorney for the Union Station Terminal Board called on 
Wright and showed him a telegram from a New York bond 
attorney which reads "Suggest you consider indictment 
under Title 15 Section 20 USCA on grounds action brought 
for sole purpose of preventing bidding on bonds of 
common carrier." Wright said he agreed to do it but 
gave Woulfe and others involved an opportunity to 
explain their position to the grand jury. Most of the 
other plaintiffs testified that they had been duped by 
Woulfe into signing what they thought was only a petition
1Ibid., pp. 53-5*1'.
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regarding the location of overpasses and underpasses.
They withdrew from the suit when they found out what they 
had really signed.'1'
According to Wright's version, the grand jury was 
so incensed by what it heard that it immediately voted 
for the indictment even though he had counseled delay. 
Rather than persecuting Woulfe, he had actually been a 
restraining influence, since one member of the Justice 
Department had suggested broadening the indictment, and 
the General Counsel of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
hoped for a successful prosecution. Eventually, however, 
the indictment was nol prossed when Woulfe's suit was 
withdrawn.
The hearing concluded when, after a short recess 
during which he consulted with his lawyer, Woulfe with­
drew his objection to Wright.-^ Three days later, the 
Judiciary Committee voted in executive session to report
itfavorably on the nomination. On March 8, 1950, Wright 
was confirmed as District Judge for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana.-*
^ b i d .. pp. 55-57. 2Ibid.. pp. 57-60.
^Ibid., pp. 6^-66.
kU.S., Congressional Record. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 20, p. D142.
cU.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, XCVI, Part 3, p. 3034.
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When Skelly Wright received his judicial appoint­
ment, he brought with him to the federal bench the influ­
ences of his earlier years. His working class origin, his 
student years during the Great Depression; his advocacy of 
civil rights cases before the Supreme Court, and his 
exposure while in the United States Attorney's office to 
attacks on civil rights all coalesced to produce a lasting 
concern for the "have-nots" of society. As a judge, he 
could give expression to that concern through the pol­
icies he promoted in both the civil rights and the econo­
mic spheres.
CHAPTER II
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE: ECONOMIC REGULATION
As a Federal District Judge, Skelly Wright presided 
over a number of controversies involving economic regu­
lation by various governmental units. By their very 
nature, such regulations work to the greater advantage 
of some interests than others. The "losers” in other 
public policy arenas often try to have adverse decisions 
reversed by ther federal judiciary. But Wright generally 
approved of governmental regulation of the economy, con­
sidering it necessary to prevent chaos that would hurt 
all parts of society. He usually exercised his dis­
cretion to support the decisions of other policy-makers, 
and the trend of the law simplified his task. Insofar 
as economic matters were concerned, the Supreme Court 
had adopted what was essentially a legitimizing role 
since 1937» and Wright followed the lead of the Supreme 
Court.
When there is little ambiguity in Supreme Court 
pronouncements, a policy-oriented judge must comply with 
Supreme Court policy, even that which is contrary to his 
own preferences, or risk reversal and consequent damage
2?
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to his professional reputation. Should a policy-oriented 
judge fall into professional disrepute, his ability to 
influence public policy would be seriously impaired.
Judge Wright attempted to solve this dilemma by using 
his judicial opinions to express vehement disagreement 
with public policy he deemed objectional, even while he 
upheld its constitutionality. He used his opinions to 
bolster the authority of the governmental unit being 
challenged— national, state, or local— when he had no 
objection to that governmental unit's policy.
Defender of Economic Regulation
The regulation of transportation by state and local 
government was an area in which Judge Wright consis­
tently bolstered the authority of the policy-making 
agency. During his first year on the bench, he was 
called upon to adjudicate a dispute in which the plain­
tiff sought protection in the Contract Clause of the 
Federal Constitution against an exercise of police power 
by local government. The plaintiff was a railroad that 
leased a railroad station from the City of New Orleans. 
The railroad interpreted its lease as conferring a right 
to grant a parking monopoly to Yellow Cabs and sought an 
injunction against the use of the parking area by other 
cab companies. A City ordinance, however, permitted all 
taxi cabs to park outside the station to pick up and
^Illinois Central R. Co. v. City of New Orleans.
89 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. La. 1950).
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discharge passengers. Since the United States Constitu­
tion prohibits the impairment of contracts, it was up to 
Wright to determine whether the ordinance impaired the 
contract of lease between the City and the railroad.
Had the monopoly prevailed, one of its consequences 
would have been the denial of taxi service to the rail­
road's black patrons. Public accomodation laws did not 
exist, and Yellow Cabs were "white" cabs. Wright pre­
vented this denial of service by supporting the City's 
right to exercise its police power. He looked to the 
specific terms of the lease and found that the City had 
reserved its police power over the station. Whatever 
else the police power might include, it
includes the right and obligation of keeping public 
streets and areas adjacent thereto free and open 
to lawful competition between taxicabs. It is also 
part of the police power of the city to make avail­
able to incoming passengers at railroad stations 
adequate transportation, including taxicabs.1
Another railroad was party to a case in the Baton
Rouge Division of Louisiana's Eastern District, and
Wright exercised his discretion by refusing to take jur- 
oisdiction, thus supporting the decision of a state admin­
istrative agency. The railroad had discontinued passenger 
service between Slidell, Louisiana and New Orleans without 
the permission of the Interstate Commerce Commission or
1Ibid., 771.
2Gulf. M. & 0. R. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service 
Comm'n, 120 F.Supp. 250 (E.D. La. 195^).
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the Louisiana Public Service Commission. The latter 
agency ordered the service restored.
The railroad sought an injunction restraining the 
Public Service Commission from enforcing its order. It 
was their argument that enforcement of the order would 
result in deprivation of railroad property without due 
process of law. The railroad, however, had abandoned 
four and a half miles of track in New Orleans without the 
authorization of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which 
the law required it to have. "Certainly the railroad's 
position in a court of equity is a very unhappy one," 
remarked Wright. "It is praying for a federal injunction 
while standing in violation of a federal statute."1 Since 
the railroad had the facilities to perform the services 
in question, the Public Service Commission had authority 
to make such decisions regarding intrastate commerce. If 
the Commission's decision in any way infringed upon fed­
eral rights, those rights should be defended in the state 
2courts. The Judge showed no inclination to undercut the 
institutions of state government, either administrative 
or judicial. The Federal District Court "though having 
jurisdiction, must refuse to exercise it as a matter of 
equitable discretion," said Wright.-*
1Ibid., 253.
2Ibid. As his authority, he cited Alabama Public 
Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 3^1 U.S. 3*H (I951).
h 20 F.Supp. 250, 252.
Undoubtedly the federal courts did have jurisdiction 
when constitutional questions were raised, and state 
experimentation in solving problems created by the 
increasing mobility of Americans often raised such con­
stitutional questions. Judge Wright's court was the 
forum in which such legislation was placed under judicial 
scrutiny. The laws were the Louisiana Watercraft Statute,1 
which was modelled on the Louisiana Nonresident Motorist 
Statute of 1928, and the Nonresident Motorist Statute as 
amended in 1956. In dealing with these laws, the Judge 
proved to be responsive to state needs and disinclined to 
hamper the state with legal doctrines which may once have 
had some basis in fact but which the passage of time had 
transformed into legal fictions.
The Watercraft Statute made nonresident operators 
of vessels in Louisiana waters subject to suit in state 
courts should the vessels be involved in accidents or 
collisions while within the State. In upholding the con­
stitutionality of nonresident motorist statutes, the 
United States Supreme Court had read into a nonresident's 
use of a state's highways an implied consent to suit in 
the courts of that state. The Court reasoned that a 
state would not have permitted nonresidents to use its 
highways in the absence of such consent. This line of
^According to Wright, this was the first law of its 
kind in the United States. See Tardiff v. Bank Line.
127 F.Supp. 9^5* 9^6 (E.D. La. 1 9 5 ^
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reasoning was necessary because once the nonresidents went 
home, they were no longer personally within the jurisdic­
tion of the courts of other states, and in 1878, the 
Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff,~Hiad required that a 
state court have personal jurisdiction over the parties to 
a suit before legal action could be taken in that state's 
courts. Building upon Supreme Court reasoning in nonres­
ident motorist cases, the Watercraft Statute equated the 
operation of a vessel by nonresidents within Louisiana 
waters with appointment of the Louisiana Secretary of 
State as attorney for service of process regarding any 
suit brought against the nonresidents in Louisiana courts. 
The Secretary of State would then notify the nonresidents 
of the suit against them.
pIn Tardiff v. Bank Line, a British corporation was 
being sued under the terms of the Watercraft Statute. The 
Bank Line admitted the constitutionality of the Nonresi­
dent Motorist Statute but attacked the constitutionality 
of the Watercraft Statute by attempting to distinguish it 
from nonresident motorist statutes. Nonresident motorist 
statutes were said to derive their force from a state's 
power to bar nonresidents from its highways. Bank Line 
denied, however, that one could infer any consent to being 
sued in state courts from the operation of a watercraft
195 U.S. 714 (1878).
2127 F.Supp. 9^5 (E.D. La. 195*0.
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in the state's waters, since no state can exclude non­
residents from its navigable waters. This was said to be 
precluded by the constitutional grant of legislative 
power over foreign and interstate commerce to Congress'1'
and the extension of the judicial power of the United
2States to all admiralty cases.
In Judge Wright's estimate, these constitutional 
provisions did not stand in the way of a state's reason­
able exercise of its police power over its waterways.
The real question was whether process might be served on 
nonresidents through the Secretary of State because they 
were no longer present in the State. This Wright 
answered affirmatively. If the defendant had sufficient 
contact with the State, traditional notions of fair play 
were not violated.-^
Wright denied that there was any real distinction 
between the Nonresident Motorist Statute and the Water­
craft Statute. It was, he said, a mere fiction that a 
state could exclude nonresidents from its highways. He 
expressed the view that the Supreme Court had only taken 
that position so that it could sustain state nonresident 
motorist statutes without having to overrule Pennover v. 
Neff.
^Art. I, Sec. 3. 2Art. Ill, Sec. 2, cl. 1.
3127 F.Supp. 9^5» 9*1-7.
/ lIbid.
3k
The question resurfaced when the Louisiana Legisla­
ture amended its Nonresident Motorist Statute in 1956 and 
made it applicable to insurance companies covering non­
resident motorists. The constitutionality of the amend­
ment was questioned in Judge Wright's court by an 
insurance company which did not do business in Louisiana 
but which had written liability insurance for a nonresi­
dent of Louisiana who became involved in a traffic acci- 
dent while in the State.
The Judge's opinion reflects his continuing belief 
that law should be responsive to social change. He began*
This case involves another attempt via state 
statute further to whittle down the once revered 
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .  Like most 
similar attempts, it succeeds because the consider­
ations which gave rise to the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff are no longer valid.
Rather than physical presence in the state, all that was
necessary was "minimal contacts plus 'reasonableness,'
o'justice,' and 'fair play.'" In support of this, Wright 
quoted from an opinion in which Justice Frankfurter 
brushed aside the doctrine of implied consent as the basis 
of state court jurisdiction in such cases. It was not 
consent to be sued that justified legislation of this type
^Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
159 F.Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1956).
2Ibid.. 155-156.
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but rather "the inroad which the automobile has made on 
the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff . . .  as it has on so 
many aspects of our social scene.
Since the automobile insurer in the case then before
the court did not do business in Louisiana, Wright was
left with the question of whether there was sufficient
contact with the State to warrant state jurisdiction. He
decided that the contact was sufficient because the test
is qualitative not quantitative. In unequivocally
defending the legitimacy of the State's action, he saidi
If the defendant insurer harbored any doubt in the 
matter, it should have excluded Louisiana from the 
coverage of its policy. Having agreed to cover 
Louisiana risks, it cannot deny Louisiana courts 
the right to determine its liability on claims 
arising from accidents occurring in this state. . . . 
The interest of the state in the safety of her high­
ways, the care and hospitalization of persons injured 
thereon, the availability within the state of wit­
nesses to the accident, the provision in the statute 
for actual notice to the non-resident insurer by 
registered mail, all combine to make certain that 
the maintenance of the suit within the state does 
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice."2
Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co.. 3^6 U.S. 338, 
3^0 (1953) quoted at Ibid.. 156. n. 1. Preceding Wright 
and Frankfurter by many years, Justice Brandeis said,
"And in view of the speed of the automobile and the habits 
of men, we cannot say that the legislature of New Jersey 
was unreasonable in believing that ability to establish by 
legal proceedings within the state, any financial liabil­
ity of nonresident owners, was essential to public 
safety." Kane v. New Jersey. 2^2 U.S. 160, I67 (1916).
2159 F.Supp. 155, 159.
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Wright’s decision was clearly motivated by recog­
nition of the state's interest in the welfare of its 
people rather than by a policy orientation hostile to 
insurance companies. In a later case,^he permitted an 
insurance company that would have been subject to numer­
ous suits in Louisiana courts arising out of the same 
accident to remove the case to the Federal District Court 
under that court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction 
and utilize a civil procedure called interpleader whereby 
all claimants were required to make their claims in one 
suit. It was not a case of following an unambiguous 
Supreme Court pronouncement because there was no prece­
dent in the federal courts for granting interpleader in 
such a situation. The case was hardly visible to the 
general public, but it provides evidence of Wright's 
competence as a judge. The Pan American Fire & Casualty 
Company v. Revere opinion is cited in one of the leading
reference works on federal procedure as a very careful
• • 3opinion. J
~h?an American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere.
188 F.Supp. 474 (E.D. La. i960).
2Ibid.. 482.
^See William W. Barron and Alexander Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure With Formst Rules Edition. 
Revised by Charles Alan Wright (St. Paul* West Publish- 
ing Co., 1961), Vol. II, Rule 22, Sec. 55It p. 229, 
n. 9.2.
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Numerous controversies relative to transportation 
were decided in Judge Wright's court, but it was not the 
only area in which he supported State economic decisions. 
He firmly supported the Louisiana Supreme Court's author­
ity to decide who held title to valuable oil land.'*' A 
disappointed litigant attempted to have a decision of 
the State Supreme Court reviewed in the Federal District 
Court, while denying that "review" was its object. It 
took the position that the District Court should exer­
cise its diversity jurisdiction and permanently enjoin 
enforcement of the State Supreme Court's judgment because 
that court had acted in violation of the Louisiana Con­
stitution and laws, thereby denying the litigant property 
in violation of the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Federal Constitution. This was an argu­
ment which Wright found totally unacceptable. He 
observed that the case was
not based upon allegations of lack of notice, or 
hearing, or perjury, or other fraud in the state 
court proceedings. Plaintiff here simply alleges 
that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has misapplied 
the Louisiana law in reaching its result. If this 
is not seeking a review of a state court decision 
it represents a distinction without a difference.2
He acknowledged that under some circumstances, the idea
of sitting in judgment on another court could be
Manufacturers Record Publishing Co. v. Lauer.
169 F.Supp. 234 (E.D. La. 1959).
2Ibid., 237.
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appealing. "But," he added, "absent a compelling juris­
dictional basis, it is a temptation which should be 
resisted."1 And he did resist, just as he did when state 
legislators and administrators engaged in economic 
regulation.
Considering Wright's support for state policy makers 
in economic matters, one would hardly expect him to be 
less sympathetic to the national government in anti-trust 
prosecutions, nor was he. When a group of insurance 
agencies formed the New Orleans Insurance Exchange and 
attempted to control the market by boycotting insurance 
companies that sold through nonmembers of the Exchange, 
the United States Attorney took action against them. The 
members of the Exchange found Judge Wright not at all 
persuaded by their arguments that their boycott did not 
unreasonably restrain trade and that they were not engaged 
in interstate commerce. He merely cited the Supreme 
Court's holding in United States v. Southeastern Under­
writers Association^that insurance across state lines is 
interstate commerce. Even though the challenged activity 
was local, it affected interstate commerce and so was
ksubject to regulation. Since the members of the Exchange
^bid., 2**0.
2United States v. New Orleans Insurance Exchange.
1^8 F.Supp. 915 (E.D. La. 1957).
3322 U.S. 5 ^  ( 1 9 W .
^ 8  F.Supp. 915. 921-922.
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policed one another to see that the boycott was main­
tained, Wright considered th group
in reality a private super-governmental agency 
which prescribes rules for the regulation and 
restraint of interstate commerce, provides extra­
judicial tribunals for determination and punish­
ment of violations, and thus trenches beyond the 
power of the national and state legislatures, in 
addition to violating the Serman Act.l
To Wright, federalism stood as no barrier to con­
gressional regulation of the American economy or to 
prosecutions for violation of Congress' regulations, 
even when those -v iolations did not extend across state 
lines. His view of the commerce clause was an expansive 
one. Nor has his view of the commerce clause diminished. 
More recently he has said:
The new reach of the commerce clause results in 
part from the transfiguration of American economic 
life during the past century. Innovations in 
communications and transportation, incapsulated in 
the concept of an ongoing, accelerating "industrial 
revolution," have succeeded in nationalizing our 
commercial system.2
This is not to suggest that considerations of federalism 
meant nothing to Wright. Federalism meant that the states 
were free, under their police power, to regulate the 
economy within their political boundaries. As his deci­
sions illustrate, he lent strong support to exercises of 
police power by the State of Louisiana.
1Ikid-» 920.
2"Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State 
Law," Wavne Law Review. XIII (Winter, 1967), 330.
*K)
Critic of Limitations on Competition
In marked contrast with his general support for 
policy makers in economic matters was Judge Wright's 
vigorous condemnation of governmental decisions which 
had the effect of limiting competition and placing a 
burden on the "little man." As a policy-oriented judge, 
he used his discretion to hamper public policy that 
limited competition. He was not always free to obstruct 
the objectionable policy, but even when he was not, he 
was free to criticize.
The case of Seismograph Service Corporation v.
Offshore Ravdist1gave Wright an opportunity to do more 
than criticize. The real culprits were some unscrupu­
lous businessmen who took advantage of an independent 
inventor and secured a patent on his invention. But 
the case was also part of a broader conflict between the 
courts and the Patent Office, which took place during 
the 19^0*s and 1950's.2
The conflict between courts and Patent Office re­
volved around the standard of patentability. As Wright 
stated the issue*
The elusive concept of patentable novelty or 
invention stands at the threshhold of every patent
1135 F.Supp. 3^2 (E.D. La. 1955).
2See Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Admin­
istrative Agencies (New York* The Free Press, 1968), 
ch. 3» "The Supreme Court and the Patent Office."
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application. Unless it tends "to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts" it does 
not meet the standard of invention set up in 
the Constitution itself. U. S. Const, art. 1, 
sec. 8.1
Wright asserted that the Supreme Court had long taken 
the position that the Constitution contemplates the 
issuance of a patent as a reward only for discovery or 
invention which adds to our knowledge and makes advances 
in useful arts possible. The purpose of granting patents 
has never been to stifle creativity and competition and 
create a class of speculative schemers who make no con­
tribution to the advancement of useful arts. "In spite 
of the insistence on the part of the courts that this con-* 
stitutional standard be met before a patent monopoly is 
recognized," said Wright, "the Patent Office has contin­
ued to patent ’every trifling device, every shadow of a
pshade of an idea* which is presented to it."
In the case immediately before Judge Wright, the 
Patent Office had granted a patent to Seismograph Service 
on a system for determining, by the use of radio waves, 
the exact location of vessels engaged in tidelands oil 
exploration. The owner of Offshore Raydist, one Hastings, 
had been working on such a system for some time, and 
Seismograph was able to acquire the information necessary 
for securing its patent only by approaching Hastings and
1135 F.Supp. 342, 350.
2Ibid.
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leading him to believe tha;t they were interested in a 
joint venture. During the negotiations, they extracted 
his knowledge. Seismograph found out also that Hastings 
needed to acquire the rights to a patent held by someone 
else in order to perfect the system and was then negoti­
ating to purchase those rights. Through Seismograph's 
patent counsel in Washington, one of his associates, and 
an unwitting employee of the Patent Office— termed by 
Wright, "a very sordid part of this case"— Seismograph 
was able to learn specifically which patent rights 
Hastings was attempting to acquire. Acting independently 
of Hastings, Seismograph secured the necessary rights, 
patented the system, and petitioned the court for an 
injunction to bar Hastings from infringing the patent.
In denying the request for the injunction, Wright's
opinion veritably bristled with moral indignation. "And
now," he said, after scathingly summarizing the facts,
"Seismograph has the effrontery to come into a court of
equity to ask that its patents, so obtained, be used to
2enjoin the work of the very man who gave them life." He 
made it clear that any patent obtained through fraud and 
dishonest dealings would not be enforced in a court of 
equity.3 Each case would have to be decided on its own 
merits. Said Wright*
^ b i d .. 349. 2Ibid., 355.
3Ibid.. 354.
No single test can be applied in all cases where 
improper acquisition of business information is 
charged. The inventiveness of the devious mind 
staggers the imagination. It is simply the dif­
ference between right and wrong, honesty and 
dishonesty, which is the touchstone in an issue 
of this kind.
Wright declared that the patent was invalid. In 
his view, the Patent Office should never have granted it. 
The process was already being used in other fields, such 
as electronic engineering. Applying a known process in 
another field did not meet the constitutional standard 
of invention;"2that is, it did not meet the stricter 
standards of the courts as opposed to the less stringent 
requirements of the Patent Office. Wrights felicific 
conclusion was that enforcement of the constitutional 
standard would reinstitute competition between the liti­
gants, right the wrong done to Hastings, and free the oil 
industry and the general public from "the tender mercies 
of a monopolist."-^
Wright*s preference for competition was not merely 
an idiosyncrasy. Since the late nineteenth century, the
1Ibid., 353-35^. 2Ibid., 352-353.
^Ibid.. 356. Seismograph appealed the decision on 
grounds that Jkdge Wright had exhibited prejudice 
against the company. The Court of Appeals, however, 
affirmed the decision. In language no less cutting than 
Wright's, Judge Rives accused the plaintiff of "erroneous 
concepts of fair play in business morals and ethics" and 
of being guilty of "deception, knavery, and misrepresen­
tation." Seismograph Service Corp. v. Offshore Ravdist. 
263 F.2d 5, 21 (5th Cir. 1956).
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law has promoted competition in this country to a greater
extent than it has in Europe, although it can hardly be
said that the United States economy approximates the
model of laissez-faire prescribed by Adam Smith. In 1890,
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.^which outlawed
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of interstate and foreign commerce. This was followed
2some years later by the Clayton Act, which prohibited any 
price discrimination which might have the effect of 
diminishing competition. With the exception of the 
1920*s, the courts fostered competition and looked upon 
price-fixing with hostility. During the Great Depres­
sion of the 1930's, business survival assumed greater 
importance than competition, and Congress acted to per­
mit states to fix prices through state "fair trade" laws.-^
Like others of its kind, the Louisiana Fair Trade 
Act permitted producers and retailers to enter into con­
tracts under which the producers retained the right to
126 Stat. 209.
238 Stat. 730, chap. 323 (191^).
^For discussions of the extent of concentration in 
various segments of the American economy, see Walter 
Adams, ed., The Structure of American Industry» Some 
Case Studies. 3d ed. t (New Yorki The Macmillan Co..
1 9 6 1 ) . For a discussion of American antitrust law from 
the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of I890 to 
the congressional sanction of state fair trade laws, see 
Eugene V. Rostow, Planning for Freedom1 The Public Law 
of American Capitalism (New Haven; Yale University 
Press, 1959), pp. 275-291.
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set minimum prices at which their products could be sold.
In the 1950's, the Fair Trade Act was attacked by 
Schwegmann Brothers, a chain of super markets in the 
New Orleans metropolitan area. Schwegmann had met with 
some success when the Supreme Court decided that those 
parts of state fair trade laws applying to ninsigners of 
fair trade contracts were not exempt from the provisions 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.1 This decision was typical 
of the courts* lack of sympathy for fair trade acts as 
compared with Congress, which is more accessible to 
retail lobbies. In order to exempt fair trade acts, even 
as they applied to nonsigners of fair trade contracts, 
from the provisions of the Sherman Act, Congress passed
pthe McGuire Act, thus nullifying Schwegmann*s earlier 
victory in Court.
Nevertheless, Schwegmann continued to sell pro­
ducts at less than fair trade prices. Eli Lilly &
Company, a manufacturer of drugs, sought an injunction 
in the Federal District Court enjoining Schwegmann from 
selling Lilly's products below the fair trade minimum.^
Schwegmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
3^1 U.S. 38*T (1951).
^66 Stat. 631 (1952). See also Rostow, p. 291.
% l i  Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super 
Markets. 109 F.Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 195*0. Lilly was 
represented by the law firm of John M. Harlan, whom 
Eisenhower would appoint to the Supreme Court. John 
Minor Wisdom, subsequently appointed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, represented Schwegmann.
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Schwegmann's response was to attack the constitutionality 
of both the McGuire Act and the Louisiana Pair Trade Act.
In Wright, Schwegmann found a Judge who was oriented 
toward the consumer and was, therefore, sympathetic to 
his, Schwegmann's, position. Wright referred to the 
defendant as an efficient merchant who permitted the 
public to reap some of the benefits of that efficiency 
in the form of lower prices.1 But the Judge's personal 
sympathies did not control his disposition of the case.
He felt constrained by the law, and so he rejected 
the defendant's arguments. Precedent was clear to him, 
and he followed it. In 19391 "the Supreme Court had 
decided that fair trade acts were constitutional in Old
Dearborn Distilling Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corpora-
2tion. According to the rationale of the Supreme Court, 
manufacturers did not sell their trade-marks, brand 
names, or the good will attached to them when they sold 
their products to retailers. Fair trade laws were said 
to be appropriate means for enabling the manufacturer 
to protect the good will attached to his trade-mark.
Such laws did not violate due process or permit private 
interests to exercise legislative power. According to 
the Court, private interests were merely protecting what 
was theirs.^
^ b i d .. 270. 2299 U.S. 183.
3109 F.Supp. 269, 271.
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Having disposed of the question of the constitution­
ality of the laws, Wright was still left with the question 
of whether the plaintiff's petition for an injunction 
against Schwegmann should he granted. This was dependent 
upon a showing that continued violation of the Fair Trade 
Act would result in irreparable injury to Eli Lilly & 
Company. Although it would appear that Schwegmann's 
cheaper prices would result in a greater quantity of Lil­
ly's products being sold, that company produced affidavits 
in evidence to show that other retailers would take 
Lilly's products off their shelves rather than compete 
with Schwegmann*s lower prices. They would sell the 
products of Lilly's competitors— products on which they 
could make higher profits under fair trade agreements.
Wright reluctantly concluded that "as long as state fair 
trade laws are safe from constitutional attack, the manu­
facturer is not safe from the wrath of the retailer," and 
issued the injunction.^
Wright did not have to be omniscient to know that 
his decision would be appealed. Schwegmann had already 
experienced some success in Supreme Court litigation. It 
was a near certainty that he would carry his fight against 
the state fair Trade Act up the judicial ladder. Conse­
quently, Wright, a policy-oriented judge, produced an
^[bid.. 272.
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opinion liberally salted with footnotes containing 
material which might be used by a higher court, should 
it decide to reverse his decision.
His opinion certainly did not reflect neutrality.
He noted that Schwegmann was not selling Lilly's products 
at a loss to attract customers. Schwegmann was making 
ten to fifteen per cent profit. Selling at the fair 
trade price would have produced a profit of thirty-five 
to forty per cent. Wright pointed out that although 
fair trade acts were rationalized with the argument that 
they were a means by which a manufacturer could protect 
the good will attached to his trademark, it was actually 
retail dealers, not manufacturers, who had been lob- 
bying for legislation of this type. He even went so far 
as to cite a British command paper on the favorable 
economic effects of price competition.-^
It is reasonable to assume that lower court judges 
try to avoid rendering decisions that would be reversed 
by a higher court, since a reversal amounts to a 
public statement that the judge was incorrect, and
■^Ibid., 270, n. 6. In a statement to the press 
after the adverse decision in the District Court, John 
Schwegmann, Jr. stated that in some cases he would be 
forced to make a profit in excess of fifty per cent. He 
called it "profiteering at the expense of the sick."
Times-Picayune (January 1^, 195*0* p. 3.
2109 F.Supp. 269, 270, n. 7.
3Ibid., 271, n. 11.
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judges share the common human characteristic of aversion 
to public reprimand. In the Eli Lilly case, the sanc­
tion of reversal by a higher court undoubtedly affected 
Wright's decision. But through the opinion in which he 
explained the decision, Wright succeeded in structuring 
the issue in such a way that reversal on the proper 
grounds would mean not that he was wrong, but that he 
was correct.
In the Eli Lilly case, Wright almost pleaded to be
reversed. He indicated that it might be time to
re-examine critically the economic implications of
fair trade legislation. In his words:
Perhaps after twenty years of experience under 
fair trade acts, the Supreme Court may conclude 
that the real purpose of these acts is not to 
protect the good will of the manufacturer, and 
that price-fixing under these acts is not an 
appropriate means to that perfectly legitimate 
end, but is in fact an end in itself. In other 
words, it may well be found that the real purpose 
of fair trade legislation is to protect the 
retailer from competition with another retailer 
who, because of his efficient merchandising 
methods, is able to reduce his distributive 
costs and consequently his retail prices. That 
is a matter, however, which addresses itself to 
the Supreme Court.2
Schwegmann, as expected, announced that he would appeal.-*
•falter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy.
p. 10^.
2109 F.Supp. 269, 271-272.
-̂ Times-Picavune. January 1^, 1953» p. 3.
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A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed Wright's decision, hut not unanimously.1 
Judge Edwin Holmes, the dissenter, relied heavily on 
Wright's opinion hut was less concerned with precedent 
than with the hurden placed on the consumer hy fair trade 
legislation. Like Wright, he referred to Schwegmann as
pan efficient retailer. The majority, however, agreed 
that Old Dearborn was still controlling and that any 
changes in its status could emanate only from the Supreme 
Court.-' The Supreme Court itself declined the invitation
Lto re-examine the issue, and Wright got less satisfac­
tion than usual from one of his decisions surviving 
appeals. An economic policy of healthy competition would 
have heen more satisfying.
But when competition is healthy and when it is 
destructive often depends upon one's vantage point. To 
the small dairies in the state, the Louisiana Orderly 
Milk Marketing Act of 1958, which closely regulated the 
dairy industry and permitted the Agriculture Commission 
to set minimum prices with the approval of two-thirds of 
the producers, was considered legislation to prevent chaos
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 205 F .2d 788 (1953).
2Ibid.. 793. 3Ibid.. 792.
Sert. denied 3^6 U.S. 856 (1953); reh. denied 
3^6 U.S. 905 (1953).
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in the industry and prevent business failures on the part 
of small dairies. But Wright’s policy orientation was 
toward the interests of the unorganized consumer, which 
made the arguments of the large processors and distribu­
tors who attacked the Orderly Milk Marketing Act appeal­
ing. They argued that the Act impeded healthy competi­
tion, causing consumers to pay higher prices, and. 
depriving them, the large producers, of property without 
due process of law. As with the Fair Trade Act, the issue 
of the delegation of legislative power to private inter­
ests was also raised. The large producers sought to 
have a three-judge District Court declare the Act uncon­
stitutional. 1
In an opinion in which he was joined by Judges 
Wisdom and Christenberry, Wright declined to overturn 
the legislation, but neither did he sustain it. Since 
similar litigation was in the state courts, the Federal 
District Court would wait until Louisiana's highest tri-
pbunal had interpreted the Act. The court struck a small 
blow for competition by granting a temporary injunction 
enjoining enforcement of the Act until the State courts 
could decide the issue on the merits. The injunction 
was justified on grounds that it would prevent irrepa­
rable damage to the plaintiffs while the matter was




being litigated in the State courts. Under State law, 
enforcement could not have been enjoined pending appeals; 
therefore, Wright and his colleagues acted.1
But the kinds of action taken by Judge Wright when 
dealing with price-fixing did not include the assignment 
of constitutional status to the policy of price competi­
tion that he favored. He did not have the law on his 
side as he did when dealing with the Patent Office. It 
was established law that State governments might fix 
prices and might also permit private interests to parti­
cipate. It was constitutional public policy but, in 
Wright's opinion, unwise policy which would place on the 
consumer the burden of higher prices.
This does not mean that his only alternative was 
passive acquiescence. It does mean that he was con­
strained by his judicial role to resort to less spec­
tacular forms of judicial activity than declaring acts 
unconstitutional. His preference for an economic policy 
fostering lower consumer prices was expressed by attack­
ing the premise on which price-fixing in the form of 
fair trade acts had been based— that they were a means 
by which manufacturers could protect the reputation of 
their products. He pointed out that they were really 
devices by which retailers raised their prices to arti­
ficially high levels. He was, in effect, sending out
1Ibid.
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a message to his judicial superiors on the Supreme Court 
requesting that they redefine the bounds within which 
he, as a lower court judge, was required to work."*"
When newly enacted state legislation would have 
decreased price competition in the dairy industry, there 
was the temporary injunction to maintain the status quo 
pending state court interpretation of the statute. 
Although Wright and his colleagues disavowed any such 
intention, there was, of course, a possibility that state 
court interpretation would be influenced by federal 
judges* attitudes toward price-fixing. But the possibil­
ity was not realized.-^
In his economic decisions as a District Judge,
Wright found one overriding principle grounded in the 
Constitution: That all levels of government might legit­
imately regulate the economy. Federalism meant that 
state and local government might enforce economic
Martin Shapiro has discussed Supreme Court activity 
in terras of messages directed to lower court judges, 
administrators, and lawyers in The Supreme Court and Admin­
istrative Agencies (New York: The Free Press, 1968). 6b-
viously, messages may also move in the opposite direction.
2169 F.Supp. 197, 199.
■̂ The act was upheld in Schwegmann Bros. Giant. Super­
markets v. McCrorv. 112 So.2d 606 (1959). Oddly enough, 
some years later the State Supreme Court found the price- 
fixing provisions of the Liquor Control Act unconstitu­
tional. It was called an "ignoble flight from competi­
tion," which was not related to "the general health, 
morals, or welfare of the people." Reynolds v. Louisiana 
Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control. 185 So.2d 79^,
812 (1966).
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regulations within their political boundaries. The 
concept of federalism, however, stood as no barrier to 
the national governments prosecution of activity which 
was entirely local, if that activity affected interstate 
commerce. As the following chapter illustrates, fed­
eralism was even less a barrier to the judicial protec­
tion of civil rights.
CHAPTER III
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE: CIVIL RIGHTS
While J. Skelly Wright gained professional stature 
through his disposition of cases involving economic regu­
lation, he became visible to a larger public through his 
civil rights decisions. This chapter examines his com­
mitment to the values of fairness in criminal procedure 
and equal access to the ballot, as well as his growing 
commitment to rarial equality in schools and public 
facilities.
Criminal Procedure
When Skelly Wright took his seat on the Federal 
District bench, his position required him to decide 
considerably fewer constitutional cases involving 
questions of criminal procedure than would face him 
later in the District of Columbia Circuit. But some 
such cases were brought before him, and his early career 
gave him a balanced background from which to judge these 
constitutional claims.
While his experience in arguing appeals before the 
Supreme Court made him sensitive to the procedural 
rights of defendants, his prosecutorial background made
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him aware that not all constitutional claims raised by 
criminal defendants were valid ones. He defined the 
judicial role as that of guardian of constitutional 
guaranteesi but he weighed each case on its merits. He 
could set aside the sentence of a young man who, with­
out assistance of counsel and before an information was 
drawn up against him, had agreed to plead guilty to a 
crime. There had been a violation of the defendant's 
"constitutional right to be represented by counsel at 
every stage in the proceeding . . . . But Wright could 
also reject the due process claims of two convicted 
rapists when only one of several witnesses later changed 
his story. Said Wright*
This court has, in effect, retried the petitioners 
for the offense of which they have been convicted. 
While it must be owned that the conviction of a 
Negro of rape of a white female in this state 
should be subjected to the severest scrutiny, on 
the basis of the record made here, this court 
cannot say that„these petitioners were denied due 
process of law.
His rejection of some constitutional claims hardly 
reflected insensitivity to matters of criminal procedure. 
He was, in fact* highly critical of existing practice 
and constitutional interpretation regarding interroga­
tion, confessions, and the right to counsel, though his
•̂ United States v. Wilson, 133 F.Supp. 66^, 665 
(E.D. La. 1955).
2Labat v. Sigler. 162 F.Supp. 57^» 576 
(E.D. La. 1958).
position as a lower court judge denied him the degree of 
freedom in making new law that Supreme Court Justices 
have. When a black man convicted in the state courts 
of murder sought to relitigate certain issues in habeas 
corpus proceedings, Wright was constrained by the state 
of the law to decide against him.'*' The conviction was 
based upon an allegedly coerced confession made without 
assistance of counsel while being held in custody pending 
investigation of some robberies. The defendant did not 
obtain counsel until the court appointed a lawyer to 
defend him— a lawyer whom Wright described as "a good 
one."
At the trial, the judge heard testimony from the 
defendant and the police officer who was said to have 
coerced him. The judge ruled that the confession was 
not the product of coercion and was admissible. Wright 
permitted the ruling to stand, but it was clear that he 
was not at all satisfied with the law which he had to 
apply. His opinion was as critical of the Supreme 
Court as of the police. Said Wrighti
•̂United States ex rel. Goins v. Sigler. 162 F.Supp. 
256 (E.D. La. 1958) aff’d, 272 F.2d 1^8 (Sth Cir. 1959). 
This was the second hearing on the matter. The first 
hearing was oral; there were no written responses. At 
its conclusion, Judge Wright dismissed the petition for 
habeas corpus and vacated the stay of execution. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered 
a new hearing with written responses. 250 F.2d 128 (1957). 
The new hearing did not change the result.
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Unquestionably, Goins did not receive all 
the constitutional protection a court sworn to 
uphold the Constitution would have liked him to 
have received. He should have had a lawyer sooner 
than he did. He should not have been subjected, 
while in custody, to examination by police at odd 
hours of the night. In spite of the fact that 
definite progress is being made in the protection 
of constitutional rights, much is vet to be 
accomplished. Police do not insist on having a 
lawyer represent an accused from the moment of 
his arrest and some persons accused of crime 
unfortunately have no way of obtaining counsel 
until the court appoints one to represent them.
In the interim, violation of constitutional rights 
remains an ever present possibility. . . . Here 
petitioner's failure to obtain counsel earlier 
cannot be attributed to the State of Louisiana. . . . 
The state court transcript shows he had a fair trial 
and a vigorous defense. . . .  He has had due process 
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment as that clause 
is currently being interpreted.1 (Emphasis added).
Obviously, Wright would not be lax in protecting 
the procedural rights to be defined by the "Warren 
Court." When he became a Circuit Judge and a much greater 
proportion of his work involved constitutional questions 
related to criminal procedure, he often spoke out 
against procedures leading to unequal swearing contests 
between defendants and police over the circumstances 
surrounding confessions.
Voting Rights
As with criminal procedure, Wright's exposure to 
voting rights cases began early in his judicial career.
1l62 F.Supp. 256, 260.
\
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His initial response to racial discrimination in the 
registration of voters was a brief, eight-paragraph 
opinion in which he simply noted that the complaining 
blacks possessed all the qualifications to vote under 
Louisiana law, and he enjoined the offending registrar 
from further refusing to register eligible blacks.1 The 
registrar publicly stated that he would abide by the 
decision.
Several years later, in the turmoil following the 
desegregation decisions, Citizens Council members and 
the Registrar of Voters collaborated to purge the rolls 
of eighty-five per cent of the blacks registered to vote 
in Washington Parish. The United States sought injunc­
tive relief for them under the Civil Rights Act of
-a1957. The defendants admitted that they were acting 
under color of state law, but they took the position 
that the section in question was unconstitutional because 
it could be interpreted as permitting the United States 
to take action against private individuals and thus
iLexceeded the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment.
1Desui v. Thomas, 93 F.Supp. 129 (E.D. La. 1950)*
2Era -Leader (Franklinton, La.), July 27, 1950, p. 1.
\ z  U.S •C.A., sec. 1971 (c).
^United States v. McElveen. 177 F.Supp. 355 
(E.D. La. 1959).
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Wright found this so lacking in merit that he would 
have simply dismissed it without saying more if it were 
not for the fact that another District Court had accep­
ted such an argument and held the same section unconsti­
tutional.1 That court’s decision was, of course, not
binding on Judge Wright, and he exercised his discretion
2by refusing to follow it. He noted that although the 
statute did not use the specific words "under color of 
. law," it used words having the same meaning. He did not 
stop there; he took the opportunity to lecture the 
defendants:
In a democratic society there is no greater 
offense than illegally depriving a citizen of his 
right to vote. Such discrimination strikes at the 
very foundation of constitutional government.
This offense is compounded when, as alleged here, 
it is committed under the guise of enforcing the 
law. The United States has made the solemn charge 
that these defendants have committed such an 
offense. Instead of challenging the constitution­
ality of the Civil Rights Act of 1957* these 
defendants should be searching their souls to see 
if this charge is well f o u n d e d . 3
The Judge found that the charge was indeed well 
founded. He ordered the stricken names replaced on
United States v. Raines, 172 F.Supp. 552 
(M.D. Ga. 1959).
2It was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court. 
United States v. Raines. 3^2 U.S. 59 (19^0).
h ? ?  F.Supp. 355. 360.
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the voting rolls. Persons whose names were stricken 
were not required to reregister.1
The disfranchisement scheme had been a form of 
retaliation against civil rights activity and court 
decisions aimed at erasing racial barriers in various 
public facilities, particularly the schools. Judge 
Skelly Wright was one of the leading actors in the 
desegregation controversy.
The Desegregation Controversy
Wright's part in the desegregation controversy pre­
ceded the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of 
2Education. Only six months after the Senate confirmed 
his nomination as District Judge, a black took legal 
action to gain admission to the law school of Louisiana 
State University.-^ Since the case preceded Brown,
Judges and opposing counsel operated within the con­
fines of the "separate but equal" doctrine. But that 
doctrine ceased to be very confining when the Supreme
United States v. McElveen. 180 F.Supp. 10 
(E.D. La. i960), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Thomas, 
362 U.S. 59 (I960).
2347 U.S. 483 (1954).
% o m i n g  Advocate. September 14, 1950, p. 1; 
Times-Picavune. September 14, 1950, p. 36. The black 
litigant was represented by local counsel, A. P. Tureaud, 
as well as by Thurgood Marshall, then general counsel for 
the NAACP.
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Court, in Sweatt v. Pain ter ,ca se which also dealt 
with legal education, looked beyond the comparison of 
physical facilities and took intangibles, such as the 
reputation of schools, into consideration.
Still, "separate but equal" remained the rule, and 
Roy Wilson's attorneys did not challenge it. Nor did 
they attack the admission policies of the University as 
a whole, stating at pretrial conference that their suit 
applied to the Law School only. In court argument 
revolved around the Sweatt case with the attorney for 
the University attempting to distinguish the two cases.
He pointed out that the State of Louisiana provided legal 
education for blacks at the Law School of Southern 
University. It was an established institution, not one 
hastily constructed, as in the Sweatt case, simply to 
avoid having to admit a Negro applicant to the state 
university. Thurgood Marshall, counsel for Wilson, 
responded that Southern, although available to blacks, 
was inferior to the Law School of Louisiana State Uni­
versity. He argued that the physical facilities were 
inferior and that none of the Southern law professors
1339 U.S. 629 (1950).
^imes-Picayune. September 30, 1950, p. 11; Morning 
Advocate, September 30, 1950, p. 1, and October 8, 1950,
p. 1.
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advanced degrees or the previous teaching experience of 
law professors at Louisiana State University.1
Judge Wright, the junior memher of the three-judge
2court, wrote the unanimous opinion. It was a very dif­
ferent kind of opinion from those he would write later.
It consisted almost entirely of a listing of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. He did not question 
that the State had acted in good faith, but among the 
findings was the fact that Southern Law School, although 
not the product of a desperation effort to keep from 
having to admit Wilson to Louisiana State University, was 
only three years old, while the law school at Louisiana 
State had been in operation since 1906. The plant of the 
latter school greatly exceeded the plant value of 
Southern. When Southern’s law school was established, 
the State Board of Education declared that it was inten­
ded to meet the highest possible standards. "However,” 
observed Wright, "the policy of the State Board of 
Education has not in this comparatively short period of 
time been effectuated and the Law School of Southern 
University does not afford to plaintiff educational 
advantages equal or substantially equal to those that he
^Morning Advocate. September 30, 1950» p. 1; Times- 
Picavune. September 30, 1950, p. 11.
Wilson v. Board of Supervisors. 92 F.Supp. 986 
(E.D. La. 1950).
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he would receive if admitted to the Department of Law 
of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and 
Mechanical College."1 The court held that the equal pro­
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that 
Wilson he admitted to the law school of Louisiana State 
University.2
The opinion provides no evidence that Wright dis­
approved of the "separate but equal" doctrine. He 
applied it without a hint of criticism, although on other 
occasions he did not hesitate to express disapproval of 
the law which his position required him to apply. One 
may speculate as to why Wright did not exhibit the same 
degree of resistance to the "separate but equal" doctrine 
as he did to the Fair Trade Act (see preceding chapter), 
for example.
A number of possibilities suggest themselves. One 
significant factor is that the Wilson case occurred 
during Wright's "freshman" year on the bench and, as a 
new judge, he may have been reluctant to provoke con­
troversy, especially since the plaintiff did not question 
"separate but equal." There is also the fact that in the 
Wilson case he was not writing only for himself as he was 
in the "Fair Trade" case. In Wilson, he had to take into 




other two members of the court. Another possibility 
(and, in fact, Judge Wright's own explanation1) is that 
he got what he considered a just result and so felt no 
need to question established constitutional doctrine.
And, finally, there is the possibility that the opinion 
contains no evidence of disapproval of "separate but 
equal" simply because Wright did not disapprove of it 
and only assigned constitutional status to the value of 
desegregation after the Supreme Court did.
If that was the case, it would not be long before 
the Supreme Court would reject "separate but equal". 
Louisiana officials, however, were unprepared. In 
commenting on impending Supreme Court action, the 
Governor of Louisiana indicated that the State would 
be unaffected by the decision. He said that the State 
had provided "adequate" facilities for Negroes, given 
equal salaries to Negro teachers, and greatly improved 
the Negro schools.2
Segregation cases continued to be litigated within 
the context of "separate but equal." The rule was binding 
on federal judges until the Supreme Court decided other­
wise, and the Supreme Court had not yet acted when 
A. P. Tureaud, Jr. sued in Wright's court claiming that
interview: Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
2Times-Picayune. June 9» 1953» p. 18.
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he was denied admission because of his race to the six- 
year arts and sciences and law program^at Louisiana 
State University. As in the Wilson case, Wright found 
that Southern University and Louisiana State University 
were not substantially equal. He held that "in con­
formity with the equal protection clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment, that the plaintiff and all others sim­
ilarly qualified and situated are entitled to educational 
advantages and opportunities available within the state, 
at the same time, upon the same terms and substantially 
equal to those which the state provides and makes avail-
pable to other residents and citizens of the state."
What followed Wright's decision in Tureaud v. Board 
of Supervisors, in 1953» vividly illustrates how the 
ambiguities of law often allow different alternatives to 
lower court judges. Before the Supreme Court rendered 
its decision in Brown, Wright's Tureaud decision was 
reversed by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Richard Rives dissenting.-^
■̂ In this program, a student spends three years in 
the College of Arts and Sciences and three years in Law 
School, with the first year of Law School serving to 
complete requirements for an arts and sciences degree.
pTureaud v. Board of Supervisors. 116 F.Supp. 2*1-8, 
251 (E.D. La. 19537
-̂Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud, 207 F.2d 807 
(5th Cir. 1953).
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The basis for the reversal was not that Wright had erred 
in his finding of inequality, but that he had exceeded 
his jurisdiction by acting alone rather than convening a 
three-judge court as the law requires when the constitu­
tionality of a state statute or state constitutional 
provision is at issue.^ Judge Rives not only expressed 
his disagreement with the majority but was lavish in his 
praise of Judge Wright for "commendably . . . shoul- 
der/ing7 "the responsibility imposed upon him by law."2 
Rives denied that the constitutionality of any of 
Louisiana'a statutes or constitutional provisions was 
involved, and so there was no need for a three-judge 
court. The Louisiana Constitution required "separate 
free public schools." Rives assumed that meant "separate 
but equal," leaving Wright with only the factual deter­
mination of whether the schools were equal. He said:
The learned district judge, himself a distinguished 
Louisiana lawyer, assumed that the State Constitu­
tion would be given that reasonable construction 
of which it was susceptible so as not to be viola­
tive of the Federal Constitution. I think the 
district judge was right.3
The matter did not end there; it went to the Supreme 





after the first Brown decision, the Court said:
The petitions for writs of certiorari are 
granted. The judgments are vacated and the cases 
are remanded for consideration in the light of 
the Segregation Cases decided May 1?, 195^»
Brown v. Board of Education . . . and conditions 
that now prevail. 1
The final four words of that per curiam opinion provided
fuel for continuing the obstruction of Wright's decision.
The Fifth Circuit Court sent instructions to Wright 
which were simply a paraphrase of the Supreme Court's 
per curiam opinion. Without further hearings, Wright 
again enjoined the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana 
State University, and the Board of Supervisors again 
appealed. The appeal was heard by Judges Rives and 
Cameron of the Fifth Circuit and Judge Dawkins of the 
Western District of Louisiana. Writing for himself and 
Judge Dawkins, Rives said that Wright's decision was 
affirmed. The fact that it had been based upon "separate 
but equal" did not invalidate the result, even though the 
Supreme Court had since rejected "separate but equal."
The Brown decision itself was the precedent. That case 
involved more than Oliver Brown's appeal. One of the 
cases included under the title Brown v. Board of Education 
was an appeal from a state court decision which had
^Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 3^7 U.S. 971 
(195*0.
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granted relief to black litigants under the "separate but 
equal" doctrine. In Brown, the Supreme Court affirmed 
that decision.
Judge Cameron, in dissent, expressed the opinion
that Wright had disobeyed the mandates of the Fifth
Circuit Court and the Supreme Court in failing to hold
further hearings. He seized upon the final words of the
Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion. As Cameron put its
It is not conceived that the District Court could 
escape the duty to consider "conditions that now 
prevail" on so technical a ground as that mentioned 
in the majority opinion. The order of the Supreme 
Court and its mandate made it clear that it was 
introducing an entirely new ingredient into the 
case and was commanding that the District Court 
consider evidence with respect to it. The 
District Court had no jurisdiction to dispose of 
the case in any manner except in strict obedience 
to the2command of the Supreme Court and of this 
court.
Judge Rives responded to this by taking the rather 
unusual step of writing a concurring opinion, even though 
he had himself written the majority opinion. Speaking 
solely for himself, he noted that the Supreme Court had 
vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals (from which 
Rives had dissented) and not the District Court's judg­
ment.^ While it was perfectly clear to Cameron that the 
Supreme Court required Wright to hold new hearings, it
1Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud. 225 F.2d ^3^ 
(1955). See also Blaustein and Ferguson, pp. ^8-^9.
2225 F.2d 1*3̂ . ^37.
3Ibid., M*6.
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was equally clear to Rives that he was not so required.
"If such facilities are actually unequal in other ways 
in addition to being separate," he pointed out, "then we 
judicially know, certainly in the case of a college as 
distinguished from the grade public schools, that there 
are no 'conditions that now prevail' which would autho­
rize denying equal opportunities to all students, 
regardless of race."1
When it appeared that the matter had finally been 
settled, Judge Dawkins decided to change sides. He 
went over to Cameron's side and, on rehearing, Wright 
was again reversed. Rives, apparently feeling that he 
had already said it all, dissented without opinion.
Wright and Rives were finally vindicated when the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
reversed the most recent decision and reinstated the 
previous one, adopting Rives' reasoning.^ The litiga­
tion, which was begun before the first Brown decision, 
was not concluded until 1956, almost a year after the 
second Brown decision, when the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.
1Ibid., ^ 7.
2Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud, 226 F.2d 71^ (1955).
^Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud. 228 F.2d 895 (1956).
LlBoard of Supervisors v. Tureaud. 351 U.S. 92^ (1956).
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It was in that same year that a frenzy of segrega­
tionist activity took place throughout the South. In 
response to the Brown decisions, the Louisiana legisla­
ture, like that of numerous other Southern states, passed 
a resolution of interposition.'1' The doctrine of inter­
position rests upon the theory that the Federal Union 
was formed by a compact among the states, and that each 
state may determine for itself when the compact has been 
violated. The Supreme Court’s disposition of the Brown 
cases was said to be such a violation, and the State of 
Louisiana resolved to place its authority between the 
Supreme Court and the people.
The legislature followed the interposition resolu­
tion with a number of segregation acts which, according 
to the Times-Picavune, dealt "with everything from square
pdances to law suits." In attempting to maintain segrega­
tion in Louisiana colleges, the legislature made a
Louisiana H. R. Con. Res. No. 10 (1956), Race 
Relations Law Reporter, I (August, 1956), 753-55. Seven 
other states proposed interpositiont Alabama, Act No.
42 (Special Sess. 1956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I 
(April, 1956), 473j Arkansas Res. of Interpos. (proposed), 
Race Relations Law Reporter. I (June, 1956), 591-592; 
Florida S. Con. Res. No. 17-XX (1956), Race Relations Law 
Reporter. I (October, 1956), 948-953; Georgia H. R. Res. 
No. 185 (I956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I (April, 
1956), 438-440; Mississippi S. Con. Res. No. 125 (195©)1 
Race Relations Law Reporter. I (April, 1956), 440-443; 
South Carolina Interpos. Act (1956), Race Relations Law 
Reporter, I (April, 1956), 443-445; Virginia S. Res. No. 
137 (1956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I (April, 1956),44.7-44.8.
2July 15, 1956, p. 23.
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certificate of eligibility and good moral character 
signed by an applicant's high school principal and the 
State Superintendent of Education a requisite for admis­
sion to a state institution of higher learning. The 
legislature also provided that any public school prin­
cipal who signed such a certificate for a black student 
would lose his job. Wright referred to this legisla­
tion as
another attempt by the Louisiana Legislature to 
preserve, by law, segregation in the educational 
institutions of the state. This attempt, while 
more subtle than its predecessor, nevertheless 
fails because the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution "nullifies sophisticated as well as 
simple-minded modes of discrimination.1
Compliance with decisions ordering the desegrega­
tion of institutions of higher education and other 
public facilities did not come quickly or easily. But 
Wright did what he could to hasten the process. Usually 
a person who objects to an administrative decision must
^Ludlev v. Board of Supervisors. 150 F.Supp. 900,
901 (E.D. La. 19T?T.
2Judge Wright enjoined enforcement of state laws 
requiring segregation in public transportation. Davis v. 
Morrison. Civil No. 6*H8 (E.D. La. May 2 k, 1957)» Race 
Relations Law Reporter. II (October, 1957)* 996 aff'd,
252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958). He also enjoined the 
enforcement of laws denying blacks the use of New Orleans 
City Park. Detiege v. New Orleans City Park Improvement 
Assoc., Civil No. 2601 (E.D. La. May 27j 1957)* He joined 
Judges Wisdom and Christenberry in holding unconstitu­
tional a statute prohibiting interracial athletic con­
tests. Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission. 168 F.Supp. 
1^9 (E.D. La. 1958Ti He joined Judges Wisdom and West in 
enjoining interstate bus companies from complying with a 
state court order requiring segregation in their terminal 
facilities. United States v. Pitcher. Civil No. 2516
exhaust administrative remedies before taking his com­
plaint to the courts. But Wright decided that it would 
be useless for a black denied admission to Louisiana 
State University to exhaust administrative remedies when 
he already had a letter from the Registrar advising him 
that it was against the Board of Supervisors' policy to 
admit blacks.^ Nor did Judge Wright require that blacks 
break laws requiring segregated public transportation 
before the laws could be tested. He said, "It is not the 
Court's view that in our civilization it is necessary to
have incidents requiring arrests to have the rights of
2people declared."
Decisions banning segregation in public facilities 
and in state colleges were very unpopular, but the 
desegregation of public schools below the college level 
produced the most intense resistance. After a three- 
judge court decided that three judges were not required,-^ 
the desegregation of Orleans Parish public schools was 
primarily under the direction of Judge Wright. He 
assigned constitutional status to the equal treatment of
(E.D. La. March 19* 1962), Race Relations Law Reporter. 
VII (Spring, 1962), 223.
^Unreported. The decision was affirmed in Board 
of Supervisors v. Fleming. 265 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1959).
2Quoted at 252 F.2d 102, 103.
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 138 F.Supp.
336 (E.D. La. 1956).
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public school children, regardless of race, and vigor­
ously exercised the powers of his office to promote that 
policy.
Had Wright been at all inclined to frustrate the 
integration of the schools, the arguments of the School 
Board gave him ample opportunity, but he was not 
inclined to permit technicalities to obscure the merits 
of the case.'1' He was particularly impatient with the 
School Board's argument that the suit should be dismissed 
because the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative 
remedies. They argued that one of the 195^ segregation 
laws provided the opportunity to obtain a hearing from 
the Superintendent of Schools and the School Board, if 
the school assignment of any particular child was not 
satisfactory. Wright replied that the Act was invalid 
because it was part of the unconstitutional scheme to 
preserve segregation. Even when considered alone, the 
Act was invalid because it delegated legislative autho­
rity without any standards on which to base the assign­
ment of children. He noted that the Board had, in fact, 
been asked on three occasions to assign children to
^The School Board won only a minor point when 
Wright agreed that the new Orleans Parish Superintendent 
of Schools had not been properly made a defendant. He 
added, "The objection to the balance of the amended 
complaint, however, is highly technical in nature, and 
even if well taken, would not result in a dismissal of 
the action, but only in giving the plaintiffs time to 
amend." Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 138 F.Supp. 
337, 3^0 T O .  La. 1956) .
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nonsegregated schools. The Board had refused and 
indicated that it would resist desegregation. Wright 
said*
To remit each of these minor children and the 
thousands of others similarly situated to 
thousands of administrative hearings before this 
Board, to seek the relief to which the Supreme 
Court of the United States has said they are 
entitled, would be a vain and useless gesture, 
unworthy of a court of equity. It would be a 
travesty in which this court will not participate.
Judge Wright issued a decree which could hardly be 
described as radical. He followed the "all deliberate 
speed" formula of the second Brown decision and gave 
the School Board considerable leeway in determining how 
to meet its constitutional responsibilities. The decree 
merely enjoined the School Board from permitting or 
requiring segregation after the time required to make
1Ibid., 3^1.
2In the early stages of the controversy, he also 
gave the state courts opportunity to fulfill their 
responsibilities voluntarily. When a state court 
illegally enjoined the NAACP from conducting activities 
in Louisiana, Wright instructed the organization to use 
state appellate procedure. See Lewis v. Louisiana ex rel. 
Leblanc. Civil No. 1678 (E.D. La. April 1956), Race 
Relations Law Reporter. I (June, 1956), 576. When the 
state courts would not protect the rights of the NAACP, 
the federal district court finally acted. See 
Louisiana ex rel. Le Blanc v. Lewis, No. 55*899 (19th 
Jud. Dist. Ct. , Parish of East Baton Rouge, La., April 2̂ -, 
1956), Race Relations Law Reporter. I (June, 1956), 571f 
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP. (Ct. of Appeal of 
La., 1st Cir., November 26, 1956). Race Relations Law 
Reporter. II (February, 1957)* 185; Times-Picayune. 
November 27, 1956, p. 1; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP. 181 F.Supp. 37 (E.D. La. i960).
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arrangements for desegregation "with all deliberate
speed," as required by the Supreme Court. But the
language of Wright's opinion provided a clue that although
he was cogniznat of the problems attendant desegregation,
he did not consider the "all deliberate speed" formula a
license for inaction. His words were*
The problems attendant desegregation in the deep 
South are considerably more serious than generally 
appreciated in some sections of our country. The 
problem of changing a people's mores, particularly 
those with an emotional overlay, is not to be 
taken lightly. It is a problem which will require 
the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and 
forbearance from all of us, of whatever race. But 
the magnitude of the problem may not nullify the 
principle. And that principle is that we are, all 
of us, freebom Americans, with a right to make our 
way, unfettered by sanctions imposed by man because 
of the work of God.l
Wright retained jurisdiction of the matter. The 
"all deliberate speed" decree was not the end of the 
desegregation controversy but only the beginning. The 
State legislature took control of the Orleans Parish 
schools and gave to a legislative committee the power to 
classify schools according to race. The committee's 
classification was subject to confirmation by the full 
legislature. Unlike his first Bush decision, Wright 
did not write a lengthy opinion when this latest issue 
was presented to him. He noted that litigation in the 
Bush controversy was long-standing and simply said that 
segregation by law is a violation of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. "Any legal artifice, however cleverly contrived,
1Ibid.
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which would circumvent this ruling, and others predi­
cated on it, is unconstitutional on its face. Such an 
artifice is the statute in suit."1
By mid-July of 1959» the Orleans Parish School 
Board had taken no action towards implementing the "all 
deliberate speed" decree. Noting that the Board's only 
action had been to appeal his decision,bright ordered 
the Board to produce a plan and suggested, but did not 
order, a grade-a-year plan. Although the NAACP wanted 
an order that would require desegregation by September, 
1959» Judge Wright gave the Board until March, i960, to 
produce its plan and hopefully generate some support.
He realized that the peaceful desegregation of the 
schools was not solely in the hands of the School Board. 
"Our news media, our public and private leaders, our 
church men, and the public generally will share the 
responsibility for that decision," he said, and he 
expressed confidence that they would be on the side of 
law and order.^
The campaign in the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary indicated that Wright's confidence was not well
^ush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 163 F.Supp.
702 (E.D. La. 1958).
2The decision was affirmed in Orleans Parish School 
Board v. Bush. 2^2 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957)> cert, denied 
921 (1957).
q
-̂ Times-Picavune. July 16, 1959» pp. 1* 3? New York Times. July 16. 1959. p. 1^.
well placed. Jimmie Davis, the ultimate victor at the 
polls, stressed his past support for segregation and 
"separate but equal." Another leading contender was 
de Lesseps S. Morrison, Mayor of New Orleans, who was 
considered a "moderate" on the issue of race. He too 
extended segregationist credentials to the public. As 
evidence that he could handle the race problem, he said 
that there had been no racial trouble and no integration 
in New Orleans.1 The following spring, Attorney General 
Jack Gremillion pledged to preserve "our Southern Way 
of Life" at a convention of the Louisiana Peace Officers'
pAssociation. The School Board got no support from City 
or State political leaders. It was equally lacking in 
support from the economic elite of New Orleans.-^
A week before the Board's desegregation plan was 
due, Gerald Rault, special attorney for the School Board, 
moved that Wright vacate his earlier orders. In denying 
the motion, Wright said:
I will tell you now publicly what I have 
already told you in chambers. I am not going to 
hold any member of the school board in contempt 
if they do not present a plan by May 16, but if
^imes-Picavune. October 9, 1959* pp. 6, 13.
2Morning Advocate. April 28, i960, p. 11.
^See Inger, Politics and Reality. See also Robert L. 
Crain, The Politics of School Desegregation: Comparative
Case Studies of Community Structure and Policy-Making 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, I969), pp. 250-322.
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they do not present a plan, I will come up with
one. There will be a plan.l
He was sympathetic to the Board's lonely position, but 
he would yield no further. The School Board's conscien­
tious implementation of a plan it had itself devised 
would undoubtedly have been a more effective way to 
desegregate the schools, but even if that were not forth­
coming, Wright was determined that the process begin.
On May 16, the Board informed Wright that it had no
desegregation plan and that only the legislature could 
desegregate the schools consistent with state law.
Within a matter of hours, Judge Wright filed his own 
2plan. The order was as follows*
It is ordered that beginning with the opening 
of school in September, i960, all public schools 
in the City of New Orleans shall be desegregated in 
accordance with the following Plant
A. All children entering the formerly all 
white public school nearest their homes, or the 
formerly all Negro public school nearest their 
homes, at their option.
B. Children may be transferred from one 
school to another, provided such transfers are 
not based on consideration of race.3
•̂Times-Picayune. May 17, i960, p. 3.
2Ibid.; New York Times. May 17» I960, p. 1.
^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. Civil No.3630 (E.D. La. May 16, i960). The text of the order
is printed in Race Relations Law Reporter. V (Summer,
I960), 379, and in New York Times. May 17* i960, p. 1.
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The School Board's response to Wright's order was 
ambivalent. A majority of the members recognized the 
inevitability of integration and hoped to keep the 
schools open. The President of the School Board called 
upon civic organizations for assistance in preparing 
the public so that violence might be avoided. But the 
unpopularity of cooperating too closely with the federal 
court led the School Board to create an impression of 
resisting. The Board passed a motion calling on the 
Governor to interpose the sovereignty of the State 
between itself and the federal court. It was hoped 
that the Governor would invoke the doctrine of inter­
position during the summer so that the matter could be 
settled by the time the schools opened.1
The Governor was then pledging open and segregated 
schools in September, but he did not say how he would 
accomplish the feat. The Attorney General took the 
matter into the state court system, and a state district 
court enjoined the School Board from complying with 
Judge Wright's desegregation o r d e r . T h e  activity of
^imes-Picayune. June 15» I960, p. 1; June 16, i960, 
p. 2; June 21, i960, p. 1; and June 23» I960, sec. 2,
p. 21.
^Ibid., July 6, i960, p. 1; July 8, i960, p. 1.
^State v. Orleans Parish School Board. No. 382,6^6, 
Docket No. 5 (Civ. Dist. Ct. for Parish of Orleans,
July 29, i960). See Times-Picavune. July 30, i960,
PP. 1. 3.
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the Governor and the Attorney General prompted the NAACP 
to move that those officials he made defendants in the 
Bush case. Their motion was granted by Judges Rives, 
Christenberry, and Wright, and a hearing was set for 
August 23.^ The following day, Governor Davis took con­
trol of the schools, and some white parents joined the 
suit seeking an injunction to enjoin the closure of the 
schools.2
Following a postponement resulting from the federal 
marshal's inability to serve notice on Davis and 
Gremillion, a stormy hearing took place. During the 
proceedings, Gremillion called the court a den of 
iniquity and a kangaroo court. His performance, which
he concluded by flinging down a law book and walking
out of the courtroom, resulted only in a contempt 
citation. The three-judge court rendered a decision 
unfavorable to the Attorney General and the segregation­
ist cause. In this latest phase of the Bush litigation, 
the court held unconstitutional a plethora of segregation 
statutes. The Governor, the Attorney General, the State 
Treasurer, and the State Superintendent of Schools were 
all enjoined from enforcement of the unconstitutional
^Times-Picayune. August 17, i960, p. 1.
oIbid., August 18, i960, pp. 1, 3.
■^Ibid., August 27, i960, pp. 1, 2; Race Relations
Law Reporter. V (Fall, i960), 608-669.
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statutes and from further interference with the opera­
tion of the schools. The court also enjoined the Orleans 
Parish Civil District Court Judge from enforcing his 
injunction against the School Board. The School Board 
was ordered to comply with Judge Wright's decree.’*'
Shortly thereafter, Wright met with School Board 
and NAACP attorneys. The School Board asked for a one- 
year delay in implementing the desegregation order. The 
NAACP opposed any delay at all in desegregating the 
schools. Wright took a middle course. He indicated 
that he was impressed by the good faith of the School 
Board and agreed that intervention by the Governor and 
the Civil District Court made orderly compliance with 
the desegregation order by the time the schools opened 
virtually impossible. He, therefore, granted a delay of 
nine and a half weeks, during which time the Board could 
determine how many blacks desired to be transferred and 
could plan their course of action with the Judge. Accord­
ing to the delay order, the schools would be integrated
pon November 1^, i960.
The NAACP was not pleased with the delay. Thurgood 
Marshall and A. P. Tureaud attempted to have Judge Richard
~*~Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 18? F.Supp. k2 
(E.D. La. I960), aff'd 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
2State Times. August 31» i960, p. 1; Times-Picavune. 
August 31, I960, pp. 1, 3.
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Rives, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, set aside the 
delay order. For that purpose, they phoned Rives at his 
home in Montgomery, Alabama. When Rives denied their 
request, they filed no formal motion and acquiesced in 
the delay.1
The School Board finally began to prepare for 
integration, while at the same time attempting to hold 
the number of black children admitted to predominantly 
white schools to a minimum. Since the schools would be 
segregated when classes began, blacks would have to take 
the initiative and request that their children be trans­
ferred. In determining which requests to grant, school 
administrators considered an elaborate list of factors 
taken from the Louisiana Pupil Placement Act, which was 
enacted during the regular legislative session of i960.
The Board also determined that racially integrated
oclasses would be segregated according to sex.
As a result of the elaborate transfer procedure 
used by the Board, only five black children were to 
attend previously all white schools, and state officials 
attempted to block even that. The Governor called the 
legislature into special session (four others would 
follow), and the legislature proceeded to pass an
•̂Times-Picavune. September 1, i960, p. 1.
pIbid., September 27, i960, p. 1; October 13, i960,
p. 1; Crain, pp. 2?2-279.
Interposition Act and an administration-sponsored seg­
regation "package." Some New Orleans legislators 
resisted, not because they favored integration, but 
because they wanted to keep the schools open and because 
the segregation measures jeopardized New Orleans home 
rule status.'1' Nor were legislators the only State 
officials to take action. The State Superintendent of 
Schools, Shelby Jackson, declared November 1^ a state­
wide holiday in order to interfere with the desegrega- 
2tion schedule.
There was nothing subtle about the actions of state 
officials, and Judge Wright's reaction was equally 
lacking in subtlety. When New Orleanians picked up 
their morning newspapers on Monday, November 1^, they 
found bold-print headlines across the front paget 
"U.S. Judge Enjoins Legislature." In his office late 
Sunday night, Wright had issued an injunction against 
the entire legislature, the Governor, Lieutenant Gov­
ernor, Attorney General, State Superintendent of Schools 
and numerous other officials. His temporary restraining 
order forbade the use of sergeants-at-arms at the 
integrated schools to prevent integration. It forbade 
any action taking control of the schools from the
^Times-Picavune. November i960, p. 1; November 5 
i960, p. 1; November 8, i960, pp. 3, 8, 20; New York 
Times. November 9, i960, p. 14-.
2Times-Picavune. November 13» i960, p. 1.
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elected School Board, including dismissal of the local 
superintendent of schools or the School Board's attorney. 
The temporary restraining order also enjoined the execu­
tion of Shelby Jackson's declaration of holiday or any 
action "interfering with Dr circumventing the orders of
this c o u r t . J a c k s o n  himself was cited for contempt of 
2court. When on Monday the legislature passed a resolu­
tion addressing the School Board out of office, Wright 
enjoined the legislature for the second time within 
twenty-four hours.^
On November 18, Judges Rives and Christenberry joined 
Wright to conduct hearings on the constitutionality of the 
Interposition Act and the "segregation package" which 
followed it. At the hearing, the attorney for the School 
Board and the attorney for the NAACP agreed that inter­
position had no validity.^ In the per curiam opinion 
which followed, the Judges rejected the State's contention 
that the legislature was beyond the federal courts' 
injunctive power. The court noted that neither the legis­
lature nor any of its members had been enjoined from the 
performance of legislative functions, but when they 
attempt to act as administrators of local schools, they
^Times-Picavune. November 1^, i960, p. 1.
2Ibid., p. 17.
-̂Ibid.. November 15# i960, p. 1.
AIbid., November 19, i960, pp. 5»
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can be restrained from implementing unconstitutional
measures.1 As for the Interposition Act, it had been
on the books in resolution form since 1956. That the
legislature gave it statutory form in i960 did not
change its character. According to the courts
It neither requires nor denies. It is a mere 
statement of principles, a political polemic, 
which provides the predicate for the second 
segregation package of i960, the legislation 
in suit. Its unconstitutional premise /that a 
state legislature may overrule a Supreme Court 
decision/ strikes with nullity all that it would support.^
What the Interposition Act attempted to support 
was the reenactment, with slight changes in wording, of 
statutes previously held unconstitutional. The court 
considered it all part of a general scheme to deny 
rights and so was unconstitutional. When the School 
Board requested another delay because of its precarious 
legal and financial status, the court refused. In the 
court's view, there had been too much delay already, and 
there was no evidence that further delay would do any 
good. J
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 188 F.Supp. 
916, 922“7e.D. La. I960) aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
2188 F.Supp. 916, 926-927.
^Ibid., 928-930. For full text of the Interposition 
Act, see Ibid., 930-936. For a summary of the acts and 
resolutions held unconstitutional, see "Appendix B,"
Ibid., 936-938.
The School Board's precarious financial situation 
resulted from House Concurrent Resolution No. 2 of the 
second special session of i960. The resolution advised 
the banks that the Board had no authority to withdraw, 
borrow, or spend money. The State disavowed any 
responsibility for the debts of the School Board, and 
the City of New Orleans, which collects taxes due the 
School Board, decided to withhold that money until it 
was ascertained who was running the schools.1 The 
legislature's position, in spite of federal court action 
was that it was itself running the schools. It trans­
ferred the funds of the Orleans Parish School Board to 
the legislative account and warned the banks that they 
dealt with the School Board at their own risk. Since 
the School Board was in the untenable position of being 
under court order to integrate while lacking the funds 
with which to do so, it took its problem to Judge Wright
Initially, Wright dismissed the petition that four 
New Orleans banks be enjoined from refusing to honor 
School Board checks because the matter had not been 
brought within the framework of the Bush case.-^ Taking
^imes-Picayune. November 17» i960, p. 5» sec. 3, 
p. 2. On the financial relationship between the Orleans 
Parish School Board and the City, see L. Vaughn Howard 
and Robert S. Friedman, Government in Metropolitan New 
Orleans. Tulane Studies in Political Science, VI 
(New Orleans* Tulane University, 1959)* pp. 12*1— 125.
pTimes-Picayune. December 3, i960, p. 1.
o-ubid.. December 6, i960, pp. 3 ,̂ .
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the cue, the Board filed the complaint as a part of the
Bush case, asking that a three-judge court enjoin the
City of New Orleans from failing to turn over taxes
levied by the Board and collected by the City and enjoin
the banks from refusing to honor School Board checks.'*'
At the subsequent hearing, Governor Davis was in court
for the first time in the long course of the litigation.
Also present was United States Attorney M. Hepburn Many,
defending the United States’ interest in maintaining
the integrity of the judicial process. Although the
legislature had fired the School Board's attorney, the
court permitted him to stay in order to facilitate an
orderly presentation of the case. When the hearing was
concluded, the court took under advisement the petition
to enjoin the banks, as well as petitions by the NAACP
and the United States Attorney that the court enjoin
enforcement of the legislature's latest attempt to set
2up a new school board.
Shortly thereafter, the court issued the requested 
injunctions, noting that ever since the School Board 
had belatedly attempted to comply with court orders, it 
had been harassed by the legislature and other state 
officials. During this harassment, it sought, through
•*~Ibid.. December 7, i960, p. 8.
2Ibid., December 17, i960, pp. 1, 16.
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its counsel, the aid of the court in fulfilling its 
responsibilities. By firing the School Board's attorney, 
the legislature attempted to prevent the Board's seeking 
court aid and thus was one of the "less sophisticated 
attempts" to preserve segregation.'1'
As the desegregation controversy continued into
I96I, Shelby Jackson, the Superintendent of Schools,
continued to ignore requests of the Orleans Parish School
Board for funds, textbooks, supplies, and certification
of teachers. As a result, United States Attomy
M. Hepburn Many moved that contempt charges against
Jackson be expanded. At the contempt hearing, Wright
was not vindictive and probably hoped to avoid creating
a martyr for the segregationist cause. Many, who has
been described as "a longtime Republican who reputedly
hated Louisiana Democrats more than he hated integra- 
otion," appeared to want nothing less than a jail sentence 
for Jackson.
During the proceedings, Wright asked Jackson 
whether his attorney's statement that he intended to 
comply with court injunctions and not interfere with 
the operations of the elected School Board was correct. 
Jackson replied, "I cannot legally recognize the dismissed
^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 190 F.Supp.
861, 8^7lE.D. La. 19^0), aff’d 3 6 6  U.S. 212 (I96I).
2Crain, p. 288.
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Orleans parish school board because I am forbidden by 
the legislature, but I am not interfering and will not 
interfere."'1' His answer satisfied no one, least of all 
Many, who wanted to proceed with the case. Wright, 
however, pressed Jackson for a more definite answer. 
Jackson replied that he would have to comply with in­
junctions of the court until they were changed.
Addressing the United States Attorney, Wright said*
Mr. Jackson has stated that he intends to 
comply with the injunctions and that he will not 
interfere. It is obvious that Mr. Jackson has 
experienced some emotional strain. Wouldn't we 
be justified in persevering in the hope that he 
will be faithful? Let’s not stir the water.
What this situation needs is calmness, not agita­
tion. That might be better than assuming that he 
will not comply. Regardless of his actions in 
the past, I am inclined to give him a chance, 
even if you think it is a small chance, and I 
think it is a small chance.2
Many remained dissatisfied with Jackson's answers, but
the other two members of the judicial threesome supported
Wright. Jackson was given three weeks to purge himself
of civil contempt.^ Without officially recognizing the
School Board, he did begin to provide needed financial
kresources for the Orleans school system.
As the 1960-61 school year drew to a close, the 
NAACP attacked the School Board's pupil placement plan
^imes-Picayune. March 1961, p. 6.
2Ibid. 3Ibid.
hIbid., March 8, 1961, p. lj March 21, 1961, p. 1.
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as inconsistent with Judge Wright’s desegregation order. 
The NAACP sought to have all New Orleans public schools 
integrated when the schools opened the following 
September. The plan put into effect by the School Board 
had not softened resistance to integration, but had 
resulted in the integration of only two schools in close 
proximity to one another, thereby permitting segregation­
ists to concentrate their opposition.^ But Wright did not 
immediately move in the direction that the NAACP desired. 
The School Board had the opportunity to move forward with 
desegregation on its own initiative but chose instead to 
move backward. It resolved to resegregate one of the 
previously integrated schools by designating it an all­
black school and transferring the white students, but 
not the few black children enrolled, to other schools.
The Board's justification for the action was that it 
would permit 1,350 blacks' to be taken off a platoon 
system. In other words, "separate” was the price of 
"equal." In response to a petition by the NAACP on behalf 
of the black children who would be denied the right to a 
desegregated education, Wright granted a temporary re­
straining order, and the Board rescinded its resolution.2
A later hearing investigating the complaint that the 
School Board was using complex administrative procedure
T̂imes-Picavune. May 9» 1961, p. 1.
2Ibid., January 2b, 1962, p. 1.
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to limit desegregation revealed that the Board's efforts 
were indeed half-hearted ones. In his testimony, the 
Superintendent of Schools for Orleans Parish admitted 
that the School Board had no plans for accelerating the 
pace of integration for the 1962-63 school year even 
though over 5*000 black children and no white children 
were being platooned on a part-time schedule.1 The 
School Board attributed these conditions to lack of money, 
noting that taxes to produce revenue for the schools had 
been voted down in two recent elections.
If the parents of a black first grader attempted 
to transfer their child out of these crowded conditions 
and into a white school, they were required to file an 
application for transfer. In deciding whether to permit 
the transfer, school administrators evaluated the child's 
health, home environment, and score on the aptitude test 
which the Pupil Placement Act required of all first grade 
children, but not of children in the grades not immedi­
ately affected by desegregation. If the transfer took 
place but the child did not make a satisfactory adjust­
ment, the Board could transfer him back to his original 
school. The School Board justified the addition of this 
procedure to Wright's desegregation plan as a measure to
Louisiana Weekly (New Orleans, La.), April 7,1962, p. 1.
2See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 20^ F.Supp. 
568, 571 (E.D. La. 1962).
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see that the children were "intellectually and psycho­
logically acceptable" in the schools to which they sought 
to be transferred.
In one of his last decisions as a District Judge,
Wright rejected the rationalization proffered by the
School Board and held that the Pupil Placement Act was
unconstitutional as applied. In Wright’s wordss
This failure to test all pupils is the constitu­
tional vice in the Board's testing program. How­
ever valid a pupil placement act may be on its 
face, it may not be selectively applied. Moreover, 
where a school system is segregated, there is no 
constitutional basis whatever for using a pupil 
placement law. A pupil placement law may be 
validly applied in an integrated school system, 
and then only where no consideration is based on 
race. To assign children to a segregated school 
system and then require them to pass muster under 
a pupil placement law is discrimination in its 
rawest form.2
But he mitigated his criticism of the School Board 
somewhat by his sympathetic understanding of the plight 
of its members. He pointed out that
The School Board here occupies an unenviable 
position. Its members, elected to serve without 
pay, have sought conscientiously, albeit reluc­
tantly, to comply with the law on order of this 
court. Their reward for this service has been 
economic reprisal and personal recrimination from 
many of their constituents who have allowed hate 
to overcome their better judgment. But the plight 
of the Board cannot affect the rights of school 
children whose skin color is no choice of their own. 
These children have a right to accept the constitu­
tional promise of equality before the,, law, an 




He knew from his own experience the kind of abuse the 
members of the School Board were undergoing. He and some 
of his relatives received abusive and anonymous telephone 
calls. His home was under police protection for a time,'*' 
and at one point a cross was burned on his lawn.
Judge Wright's part in the controversy over the 
desegregation of the Orleans Parish School System came to 
an end in April, 1962. He amended his grade-a-year order 
to require the desegregation of grades one through six 
when the schools opened in September, 1962. His amended 
order prohibited the application of the Pupil Placement 
Act as long as a dual school system continued to exist.^  
The Times-Picavune predicted that Wright's order would 
result in an exodus of whites from the public schools, 
leaving an almost total black enrollment as in the
kDistrict of Columbia.
The order, however, was not implemented. When 
Judge Wright left New Orleans to take his seat on the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
his successor, Judge Frank Ellis, retreated from this
■^Personal interviews: Mrs. Margaret Hotard; James E.
Wright, Jr.
^New York Times. June 1, 1958, p. *H.
^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. 20^ F.Supp.
568, 57TTE.D. La. 1962).
^April 5, 1962, p. 16.
position.^ This retreat was called the School Board's 
"biggest victory in the prolonged fight to preserve 
segregation.2
While some fought to preserve the system of segre­
gated education, others fought to dismantle it, and all 
of the fighting was not over the Orleans Parish public 
schools. Four years after his order to the Orleans 
Parish School Board to desegregate with all deliberate 
speed, Wright conducted hearings on petitions to enjoin 
the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, the St. Helena 
Parish School Board, and trade schools operated by the 
State from continuing to operate on a segregated basis.^ 
Over the objections of blacks who wanted him to require 
submission of desegregation plans by a specific date and 
of whites who wanted no integration, Judge Wright issued 
"all deliberate speed" orders and allowed these officials 
the same opportunity to live up to their constitutional 
responsibilities that he had allowed the Orleans Parish 
School Board.^
^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 205 F.Supp 893 (E.D. La. 1962T:
2New York Times. May 24, 1962, p. 21.
M̂orning Advocate. March 15. i960, p. 1A
4Ibid., May 25. I960, pp. 1A, 6A; Times-Picavune.May 25, i960, p. 1.
^Angel v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 
1658 (E.D. La, May 24, i960), aff'd 287 F.2d 33 (5th Cir.1961); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board.
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The reaction of the St. Helena Parish School Board 
was to attempt to close the schools pursuant to a refer­
endum authorized by an act of the legislature. Before 
rendering a decision on the constitutionality of the 
act, Judges Wisdom, Christenberry, and Wright invited 
opinions from the Attorneys General of all the States 
on two questions: (1) Would a state deprive children
of due process of law or equal protection of the laws if 
it ceased to provide public education? (2) Would the 
answer be the same if it were done on a local option 
basis following a vote reflecting the consent of the 
electorate?^" The court also ordered opposing counsel to 
supplement the record with additional evidence on the 
act's legislative history, the private school facilities 
available to both races in St. Helena Parish, the amount 
and source of funds expended on education in the Parish, 
and any other facts pertinent to the question of consti- 
tutionality.
Oral argument was held on August 4, 1961. In pre­
senting the State's case, Attorney General Gremillion
Civil No. 1662 (E.D. La. May 2^, i960), aff'd 287 F.2d 
380 (5th Cir. 1961); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School 
Board. Civil No. 1068“ (!7d. La. May 24, I960), aff’d 
287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961).
T̂imes-Picayune. April 26, I96I, p. lj Ibid.,
May 19. 1961. p. 7: Ibid.. June 17, I96I, p. 6; New 
York Times. April 28, I96I, p. 12.
^imes-Picavune. May 2, 1961, p. 12.
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took the position that public education was a privilege, 
not a right. Harold Greene, from the Civil Rights 
Division of the Department of Justice (The United States 
participated as amicus curiae.), argued that closure of 
the schools in St. Helena Parish would constitute 
denial of equal protection based upon race and geography. 
He also urged that denial of voting rights would be 
involved, since Louisiana had a literacy requirement.1
On August 30, 1961, Judges Wisdom, Christenberry,
pand Wright held the school closing law unconstitutional. 
They considered it an obvious attempt to deny constitu­
tional rights to blacks, and, as long as public schools 
were in operation in other parts of the State, the 
legislation denied equal protection of the laws to all 
citizens of St. Helena Parish. The Judges commented on 
the poverty of the Parish, which made it unlikely that 
accreditable private schools could operate without state 
financial support. "It would be a miracle," they said,
if a single accreditable private school for Negroes 
could be established in St. Helena within the for- 
seeable future. To speak of this law as operating 
equally is to equate equal protection with the 
equality Anatole France spoke of1 "The law, in 
its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as 
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the 
streets, and to steal bread. j
1IMd. , August 5, 1961, pp. 1, 3.
2Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board. 197 F.Supp. 
6k 9  (E.D. La. 19^1).
3Ibid.. 655.
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The court made it clear that the local option 
provision was irrelevant. No political subdivision 
might do what the state itself is prohibited from doing, 
and a majority may not lawfully invade the constitu­
tional rights of a minority even if it first holds a 
referendum. A school board could not evade the require­
ments of the Brown decisions by closing the public 
schools under its jurisdiction.1
A case involving a private school, Tulane Univer­
sity, indicates that a fundamental change in Wright’s 
attitude toward segregated education had taken place 
since his uncritical acceptance of the "separate but 
equal" doctrine during the pre-Brown years. Apparently 
the Brown decisions provided the needed spark. The 
determined application of those decisions in the face 
of obstruction and defiance by state and local officials 
then pushed him to a position in advance of the Supreme 
Court.
pThe Tulane case grew out of the University's com­
pliance with the provision of Paul Tulane's will that 
his money be used for the education of "white young 
persons." Two blacks who had been denied admission to 
Tulane because of their race charged that they had been
1Ibid., 658-659.
2Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University. 
203 F.Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
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denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, 
prohibits discriminatory state action; it does not reach 
discrimination by private individuals or private insti­
tutions.1
Tulane insisted that it was a private institution 
and, therefore, immune from the requirements of the 
equal protection clause. The administrators of the 
University would have been perfectly happy, however, to 
have the racial restriction in Paul Tulane's will 
declared unenforceable so that they might voluntarily 
admit blacks. Their motives were not particularly 
egalitarian. Some of their applications for foundation 
grants had been rejected because of their admissions 
policy.2
Judge Wright gave the Tulane administrators only
■5half of what they wanted. Citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 
he held that the racial restriction in the bequest was 
unenforceable in the courts, as the administrators had 
hoped he would, but he did not find that Tulane was 
beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, although 
they had hoped he would do that too. The University had
"̂ See the Civil Rights Cases. 108 U.S. 3 (1883).
2203 F.Supp. 855. 858.
h i 1* U.S. 1 (19^8).
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been originally a state institution called the University 
of Louisiana. As a result of an arrangement with the 
State, the administrators of the Tulane Fund took over 
the operation of the university, but, as late as 1944, 
the legislature instructed the university to award 
scholarships without regard to sex, indicating to Wright 
that the State had not completely abandoned control.
Tulane still had a unique tax exemption, revenue from 
certain land not relinquished by the State, and had the 
Governor, the State Superintendent of Education, and the 
Mayor of New Orleans on its governing board.'1' Wright held 
that all of this indicated enough state involvement to 
make the Fourteenth Amendment binding on the administra­
tors of Tulane University.
Although Wright's judgment was vacated by his suc- 
cessor, it can be reconciled with the concept of "state 
action" being developed by the Supreme Court.^ It was 
what he said rather than what he held that went beyond 
the existing state of the law. Wright questioned 
whether any school could be so "private" as to be immune 
to the equal protection clause. He viewed education as
1203 F.Supp. 855. 859.
2See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Educ'l 
Fund, 207 F.Supp. 55^ (E.D. La. 1962)} 212 F.Supp. 674 
TeTd. La. 1962).
-̂ See Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948)j Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See 
also the white primary cases, Smith v. Allwright. 321 U.S. 
649 (1944); Terry v. Adams. 3^5 U.S. 461 (1953).
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a matter of great public interest. The magnitude of that 
interest was such that the state bore responsibility for 
the conduct of all educational institutions. When the 
state chose to carry out a part of its educational respon­
sibilities through nongovernmental agencies, it passed on 
to those agencies the constitutional prohibitions binding 
on the state. He said*
Reason and authority strongly suggest that the 
Constitution never sanctions racial discrimination in 
our schools and colleges, no matter how "private" 
they may claim to be. But the special circumstances 
of this case do not require us to go so far.1
The change in Wright's approach to the segregation 
issue becomes even more apparent when the above statement 
is contrasted with a statement of Justice William 0. 
Douglas on the same subject. Justice Douglas is generally 
conceded to be the most liberal and activist member of the 
United States Supreme Court. He said, "If a testator 
wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race 
only and in no way implicated the State in the supervi­
sion, control, or management of that facility, we assume
arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be 
2encountered."
Judge Wright had advanced beyond prevailing constitu­
tional interpretation regarding racial discrimination as 
he had in matters of criminal procedure. In dealing with
1203 F.Supp. 855, 859.
2Evans v. Newton. 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966).
102
criminal procedure, he attempted to influence opinion by 
openly criticizing prevailing policy from the bench. In 
dealing with voting rights, more efficacious action was 
open to him. Since equal access to the ballot was a 
value to which Wright assigned constitutional status, he 
rejected a decision by another court that would have 
obstructed the Government's ability to protect voting 
rights. His committment to the value of racial equality 
in schools and public facilities grew with the law, but 
at a faster rate. He began by accepting the "separate 
but equal" doctrine uncritically, although always applying 
it in favor of complaining blacks. After the Supreme 
Court rejected "separate but equal," Wright gave state 
and local officials the opportunity to fulfill their con­
stitutional responsibilities voluntarily but refused to 
accept defiance wrapped in the rhetoric of state sover­
eignty. To further the policy of desegregation, he went 
so far as to issue injunctions against the entire State 
legislature. When his role in the controversy came to 
an end, his interpretation of the equal protection require­
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment had advanced beyond that 
of the Supreme Court. The political support and political 
opposition which he generated directly affected the course 
of his judicial career.
CHAPTER IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CONTROVERSIES 
OVER RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Because of the manner in which he exercised the 
discretion of his office to promote the value of racial 
equality during the desegregation controversy in Louisiana, 
J . Skelly Wright became a standard with which to compare 
other members or prospective members of the federal judi­
ciary. The closer a judge approached the "Wright model," 
the easier became the work of Justice Department lawyers 
in the Civil Rights Division.'*' The further a nominee to 
the federal bench departed from the "Wright model,” the 
more likely he was to win the approval of Senator James 
Eastland of Mississippi, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Eastland asked Judge Frank Ellis, who 
succeeded to Wright's District Judgeship, whether he
^In referring to Judge Ben C. Dawkins, Jr. of the 
Western District of Louisiana, a Civil Rights Division 
lawyer said, "We knew we didn't have a Skelly Wright or 
a Frank Johnson." Quoted in Charles V. Hamilton,
"Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rightss The Judicial 
Approach to Controversial Social Problems." Wisconsin Law 
Review. CMLVI (Winter, 1965). 88.
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l(ty
intended to pattern himself after Wright. The same ques­
tion had been put to Judge Robert Ainsworth at the hearing 
on his nomination.'1'
Those who disapproved of the manner in which Wright 
discharged his duties during the desegregation contro­
versy in Louisiana used all the political leverage at 
their disposal to prevent his elevation to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Because the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit hears appeals from the 
District Courts in the states of the deep South, appoint­
ment to that court would have considerably broadened 
Wright's influence over desegregation policy. He was 
elevated instead to the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. In the District of Columbia, he 
continued to act against racial discrimination, although 
he did so as much through his off-the-bench activity as 
through his decisions. The blocked promotion to the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not completely 
remove Wright from racial discrimination cases, but they 
were far less numerous in the District of Columbia Circuit 
than in the Fifth Circuit.
"Hi.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, "Hearing, Nomination of Frank B. Ellis to 
be U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana," (February 23* 1962), p. 7. (Stenographic 
transcript in files of Senate Judiciary Committee.)
io(5
The Politics of Promotion
The possibility that Wright's career would suffer 
from his conscientious application of the principles of 
the Brown decisions first became evident two years 
before he was actually appointed to a higher court. The 
occasion was a debate on voting rights in the United 
States Senate. During the course of debate, Senator 
Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania quoted from one of Wright’s 
opinions, and Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois noted 
that it had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Senator 
Eastland of Mississippi remarked that one could not win 
arguments by quoting candidates, and "Judge Wright wants 
to be a Supreme Court Justice."1 Senator Douglas provoked 
laughter in the Senate chamber when he facetiously 
inquired whether that meant that the Senator from 
Louisiana (Russell Long) and the Senator from Mississippi 
(Eastland) had endorsed Wright. Eastland answered that 
his position on the Judiciary Committee prevented him 
from commenting further except to say that Wright would 
be treated fairly if nominated. Douglas retorted, "All 
I can say is that if he is appointed to the Supreme 
Bench, then, in view of the present composition of the 
Judiciary Committee, he is going to have a very rough 
time."2
■hj.S., Congressional Record. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
I960, CVI, Part 5, 5590.
2Ibid.
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Senator Clark was not yet ready to let the matter 
drop. He wanted proof that Wright was secretly a can­
didate for a Supreme Court seat. Eastland told Clark 
that the proof would come if the nomination were made. 
Until then, he made the statement on his "word as a 
Senator." Eastland did not stop there, however, but said 
that some of Judge Wright's rulings were proof of his can­
didacy.1
The Judge’s political opponents were even more numer­
ous in the Louisiana legislature. At one point, Repre­
sentative W. K. Brown of Grant Parish said on the floor of 
the House, "You are no God, Skelly Wright. You are not 
even a competent judge, Skelly Wright. You are a traitor 
to this state."2
When rumors again circulated that Wright was in line 
for a promotion, this time to the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit,^members of the legislature attempted 
to retaliate against him by opposing any promotion.^ 
Representative Wellborn Jack of Caddo Parish, described 
as "a center of white supremacist opinion within the 
legislature,"^led the attack against Wright. He blamed
^ b i d .. 5591.
2Times-Picayune. November 16, i960, p. 1.
3Ibid.. March 3, 196I, p. 1.
kState-Times. May 19, I96I, p. 9A.
3Pinney and Friedman, p. 12.
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the Judge for everything from disregarding state sover­
eignty to Shelby Jackson's asthma. Jack said of the 
resolution being debated in the Houses
When we pass this resolution, he won't have 
a snowball's chance in Hell of getting promoted.
And I don't want our senators to say he should be 
promoted to get him out of the way of doing harm.
He's the judge, the jury, the executioner—  
the people in Washington are his bosses. Federal 
Judges are supposed to be dignified.1
Jack did not speak for all members of the legisla­
ture. Judge Wright's expressions of antipathy toward 
price-fixing had won a friend for him in the State House 
of Representatives. Representative John Schwegmann, Jr., 
of Jefferson Parish, who claimed to be as much a segre­
gationist as anyone in the House, called attention to 
his numerous appearances in Wright's court. "I honestly 
believe the judge makes the decisions as he sees the law
is written," he said. "I have no animosity against the 
ojudge." But most members of the legislature did not 
share Schwegmann's attitude.
While opposition in the State legislature alone 
could not hurt Judge Wright's chances for advancement, 
the opposition of the United States Senators from 
Louisiana could be very damaging. Senator Russell 
Long, Wright's former student, was up for reelection in
•̂ State-Times. May 19, 1961, p. 9A.
2Ibid.
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1962 and so became accessible to the Judge's opponents. 
Long was said to have warned the Kennedy Administration 
that he would declare a Wright nomination to the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals personally obnoxious. While 
the Senator did not explicitly confirm the rumor, he did 
say that he had worked had for the Administration and 
expected to be consulted on appointments affecting his 
state, and he unequivocally said, "I am not supporting 
Skelly Wright."1
Allen J. Ellender, the senior Senator from 
Louisiana, who was not then up for reelection, merely 
went through the motions of opposing Wright. He pre­
sented the Senate with a memorial from the State legis­
lature urging "the U.S. Senators from Louisiana to 
oppose the confirmation by the U.S. Senate of the nom­
ination of Judge J. Skelly Wright to fill any Federal 
office or position of trust, including that of judge of 
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
pCircuit . . . ." Ellender did not call special atten­
tion to the petition. He presented it at the same time 
that he presented several others from the legislature.-^
^ e w  York Times, June 1, 1961, p. 22.
2Quoted in U.S., Congressional Record. 87th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1961, CVIX, Part 7, p. 9^01.
-Tbid. Other petitions called for imposition 
of a duty on shrimp, the investment of revenue from the 
tidelands off Louisiana's shores, and a commendation to 
the State of Alabama for its defense of states' rights.
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While Louisiana's Senators opposed, with varying 
degrees of intensity, any promotion for Wright, the 
Judge was not without prestigeous sources of support. 
Belying the myth that judges play only a passive role 
in the appointment process, it has been reported that 
Judges Tuttle and Wisdom advised Burke Marshall of the 
Justice Department that Wright would he an excellent 
choice to join them on the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit and that to deny him the promotion would 
seem to he a punishment for his decisions.1 Although 
the Judges did not state the case publicly, the New 
York Times did when it editorialized that if Wright did 
not get the appointment, it would he "a clear case of a 
courageous judge being denied advancement for out-
prageous political reasons." Yale University awarded 
Wright an honorary Doctor of Laws degree at the same 
time that it bestowed a similar award on Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter.-^ The following day, fifteen 
Yale law professors expressed their support for Wright 
in the fight over his promotion. They said that they 
did not support Wright because he rendered decisions
^ e e  Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New Yorkt 
Atheneum, 1971), pp. 272-273.
2New York Times. June 3, 1961, p. 22.
3Ibid.. June 13, 1961, p. 38.
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that they liked hut because he had "a total aggregate of 
judicial achievement” during his eleven years on the 
bench.^
But one intensely motivated United States Senator 
often carries more political weight than two circuit 
judges, fifteen Yale law professors, and the New York 
Times. especially when the Administration is not inclined 
to put up a fight. The Kennedy Administration studiously 
avoided alienating important Southern Senators over
pjudicial appointments, and the nomination of Wright to 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at a time when 
Senator Long faced an election would certainly have been 
displeasing to the Senator. It did not become necessary 
for Long to invoke the privilege of senatorial courtesy 
because Wright did not receive the nomination to the 
Fifth Circuit Court.
Although the Administration hoped to avoid antago­
nizing important Senators, capitulation to segregationist 
interests was no part of the Administration’s plans.
Denial of promotion to Wright would have been tantamount 
to capitulation. As a result, the seat on the Fifth Cir­
cuit remained vacant for a time,^and, in early December
-Hrbid. . June 1^, 1961, p. 18.
2See Navasky, ch. 5t "Southern Justice: The Judges
and the General," pp. 2^3-276.
•̂ The liberally oriented New Republic had considered 
the nomination of anyone but Wright to the Fifth Circuit
Ill
of 1961, Deputy Attorney General Byron White approached 
Wright with the offer of a seat on the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit. Senatorial courtesy 
could not be used to block appointment to that court, but 
it appeared that such an appointment would remove Wright 
from constitutional controversies involving racial dis­
crimination. After a few days of hesitation, he informed 
White that he would accept, and on December 15» 1961, 
President Kennedy announced Wright's nomination. He would 
fill a vacancy created by the retirement of Judge 
E. Barrett Prettyman from the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit.1
When the nomination was announced, there was some
speculation that the Senate Judiciary Committee might make
2the hearings on the nomination difficult for Wright. The 
anticipated difficulties, however, did not materialize. 
Apparently Wright's political opponents were glad to get 
him out of Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit and decided 
against trying to obstruct this promotion.-'
Court as "unthinkable" and advocated leaving the position 
vacant as long as Long and Eastland blocked Wright's 
appointment. See "Standing by Wright," New Republic.
June 12, 1961, p. 7.
W e w  York Times. December 16, 1961, p. 18; Times- 
Picavune. December 16, 1961, P* 1; Washington Post. 
December 16, 1961, p. 1.
Washington Post. December 16, 1961, p. 1.
Wright himself has referred to his having been 
"kicked upstairs" in "Federal Courts and the Nature and
112
A friendly subcommittee composed of Senators John A. 
Carroll of Colorado and Philip Hart of Michigan was 
assigned to conduct the hearing. Senator Carroll, who 
presided, noted that the Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary of the American Bar Association had given Wright 
a rating of "exceptionally well qualified."'*' The
Louisiana Bar Association and the New Orleans Bar Associ-
2ation did not take official positions on the nomination, 
nor did Louisiana's Senators. Leander Perez, arch­
segregationist from Plaquemines Parish, later criticized 
Senator Long for not trying to block Wright's elevation to 
the District of Columbia court.^ No one voiced opposition 
to the nomination, but members of the District of Columbia
Quality of State Law," Wayne Law Review. XIII (Winter, 
1967), p. 32^.
"Hj.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, "Hearing, Nomination of J. Skelly Wright to be 
United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia," 
(February 28, 1962), p. 2. (Stenographic transcript in 
files of Senate Judiciary Committee.) Although Wright 
received the highest rating given by the ABA, that organi­
zation has generally had a conservative influence on the 
judicial selection process. See Grossman, Lawyers and 
Judges. The role of the ABA has been criticized in Walter 
Dean Burnham, "Kennedy's Court Appointments," Commonweal. 
September 7, 1962, pp. ^88-^91.
2This led Judge Wright's younger brother to resign 
his membership in the New Orleans Bar Association. He 
could not resign from the Louisiana Bar Association 
because all Louisiana lawyers are members. Interview: 
James E. Wright, Jr.
•̂ Times-Picavune. April 11, 1962, p. 11.
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bar did speak in support of it.1 None was more compli­
mentary to Wright than the Subcommittee Chairman himself.
He observed that Wright's "quiet courage" in carrying out
his duties as District Judge had "won the respect of
2lawyers from all comers of this country." Senator 
Carroll indicated that he had read some of the Judge's 
opinions, as well as one of his articles on pretrial
conferences, and he commended Wright’s legal scholarship.-^
, kSenate confirmation came on March 28, 1962. It was the 
same day that Wright rendered his decision in the Tulane 
University case.
Before taking up his new post, he received congrat­
ulations and praise from some quarters. At a testimonial 
in his honor held by the New Orleans chapter of the Fed­
eral Bar Association, Wright said, "I leave with no 
regrets. I wouldn’t change a line of it."^ A few days
^"Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, "Hearing, Wright 
Nomination to D. C. Circuit," pp. 4-10.
2Ibid., p. 16.
^Ibid. Wright's articles on pretrial conferences 
are "Pre-trial on Trial," Louisiana Law Review, XIV 
(February, 1954), 391-400; "The Pretrial Conference,"
Federal Rules Decisions. XXVIII (September-October, 1961), 
141-158. See also "Open Forum* Evaluation of a Personal 
Injury Case for Settlement Purposes* Opening Remarks," 
Insurance Counsel Journal. XXIII (July, 1956), 267-269.
4U.S., Congressional Record. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1962, CVIII, Part 4, p. 5294.
Grimes-Picayune. April 3, 1962, p. 14.
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later, the Co-ordinating Council of Greater New Orleans, 
a civil rights group, presented the Judge with a plaque 
describing him as "a distinguished jurist" and a "cham­
pion of d e m o c r a c y . O n e  of the most eloquent testimo­
nials to Wright's service as a District Judge appeared in 
the Negro press during Easter week. In the words of the 
editorial entitled "Judge Wright No Pontius Pilate":
The Christian world, significantly, can this 
week compare Judge Wright with a public official 
who lived some 1900 years ago but who in the most 
critical decision of his career bowed to shouting 
bloodthirsty mob. That official was the "fearless"
Roman procurator, Pontius Pilate, whose "handwashing" 
episode is being related this week.
In modern times, numerous judges have used the 
"Pilate" approach (political expediency) in hand­
ling civil fights"cases. But not so with Judge 
Wright.2
Recognition of his contribution to the cause of black 
civil rights continued in Washington. About a month after 
Wright's arrival in the District of Columbia, Clarence 
Clyde Ferguson, Jr. was sworn in as General Counsel to the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights, and it was 
Wright who administered the oath. According to Ferguson, 
"The reason for Judge Wright's presence was the fact that 
he had been the most imaginative and innovative Judge
^Ibid. . April 12, 1962, p. 20; Louisiana Weekly 
(New Orleans, La.), April 21, 1962, p. 3.
oLouisiana Weekly, April 21, 1962, Sec. 2, p. 6.
11$
sitting in the South during the critical years following 
the decision in Brown vs. Board of Education."'*'
Off-the-Bench Activity
With the move to Washington, there was the possibil­
ity of an abatement in Wright's interest in civil rights. 
While he was a District Judge, he reacted against racial 
discrimination in his official capacity. During the New 
Orleans school desegregation crisis, it was suggested 
that perhaps his actions as District Judge did not repre­
sent his personal convictions at all, but that he was 
simply fulfilling the demands placed upon him by his
poffice, as he understood it.
That the Judge's interest in black civil rights did 
not abate after his move to Washington indicates that he 
is personally committed to racial equality. When his 
role as judge did not involve him in racial discrimination 
cases, he focused his off-the-bench activity in that 
direction. Off-the-bench activity is, of course, assumed 
to be a better indicator of personal conviction than judi­
cial opinions.
■*Hon. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. , United States 
Ambassador to Uganda, Letter of February 2^, 1971 to the 
author.
2See the biographical sketch of Judge Wright 
entitled "Jurist in Racial Dispute," in the New York 
Times. November 16, I960, p. 23. The sketch contains 
factual errors.
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After the move to Washington, Wright's off-the-bench
activity turned from the more technical aspects of law,
such as pretrial conferences and jurisdictional matters,1
to matters of broader public interest. He defended the
Supreme Court's activist approach in various kinds of
civil rights cases, including those involving race. He
described the activist approach as on in which the Court
attempts to act as the people's collective conscience,
calling upon them to live up to the principles which they 
3profess. He defended Supreme Court decisions in the 
field of racial equality as attempts by the Court to 
secure freedom for all Americans: freedom from experi­
encing discrimination for blacks and freedom for whites 
from having to live in a society in which discrimination
kexists. Wright denied that the Court's activism in 
regard to civil rights posed any danger to democratic gov­
ernment. "Even some thinking men," he said,
^ e e  his "Jurisdiction in the Tidelands," Tulane 
Law Review. XXXII (February, 1958), 175-206; "Act 85-55^ 
of 1958 and the Disposal of the Judicial Power of the 
United States," Louisiana Bar Journal. VI (August, 1958), 
1^7-15^, also printed in Phi Delta Delta. XXXVII 
(December, 1958), *1— 13.
^Wright, "The Role of the Courts: Conscience of a
Sovereign People," The Reporter. September 26, 1963* pp. 
27-30. A^later and more thorough defense of judicial 
activismis Wright, "The Role of the Supreme Court in a 
Democratic Society— Judicial Activism or Restraint?" 
Cornell Law Review. LIV (November, 1968), 1-28.
3-̂Reporter. September 26, 1963, p. 27.
^Ibid., p. 30.
llfj
men of good will whose roots in the fight for 
human freedom go very deep, deplore the leader­
ship the current Supreme Court has given in the 
fight for social and political justice. They 
say they fear the role of judges. I say their 
fears are foolish fancies. In expanding human 
freedom, the judges have nothing to enforce their 
rule but the conscience of America. And as long 
as we are ruled by the informed and challenged , 
conscience of America, we have nothing to fear.
Wright believes that an important function of the 
courts is to influence the normative content of law, and 
he denied that the courts are obliged to be neutral in 
relation to competing values. He thinks the courts 
should foster the best inspiration of the time and help 
it to win general acceptance, with emphasis upon the 
highest ideals of the community rather than the ideals 
of the judges. He assumes that decisions which reflect 
only the values of the judges will fail to generate 
support. The pre-1937 Supreme Court performed badly 
not because it was activist, but because it was inac­
curate in its identification of community values. Wright 
has identified political equality as the most important 
of comtemporary community ideals. "The accuracy of this 
perception gives the Court's equal protection pronounce-
pments their legitimacy," he has said.
In his off-the-bench activity, Judge Wright extended 
the Supreme Court's equal protection pronouncements to
1IMd.
2"The Role of the Supreme Court," Cornell Law Review. 
LIV (November, 1968), 1^.
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reach not merely de .jure segregation but also de facto 
segregation. On February 17, 1965, he delivered the 
sixth annual James Madison Lecture at New York University 
Law School and was the first James Madison Lecturer who 
was not a Supreme Court Justice. His lecture, entitled 
"Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De
Facto Segregation," was published in the New York Univer­
sity Law Review.^and a similar article bearing the same 
title appeared in the Western Reserve Law Review. In 
the lecture and articles, Wright argued for the end of 
segregation even when it was not directly imposed by law. 
He considered "the interdiction of all state statutes 
compelling racial segregation . . . but a short first 
step on the road to desegregation."-^ In attacking de 
facto segregation, he made it clear that he considers 
segregation a national, not solely a Southern, problem.
It is appropriate to examine Wright's off-the-bench 
views on de facto segregation because he was soon faced 
with the problem in his official capacity. An important 
part of his approach to de facto segregation was the 
assumption that education is essentially a state function. 
He had first expressed this view in the Tulane University
1XL (April, 1965). 285-309.
2XVI (May, 1965)1 ^78-501.
% e w  York University Law Review. XL (April, 1965),
289.
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case (see pp. 97-100), and he continued to hold that
opinion. Wright expressed his agreement with a Federal
District Judge in Massachusetts that
Education is tax supported and compulsory, and 
public school educators, therefore, must deal 
with inadequacies within the educational system 
as they arise, and it matters not that the 
inadequacies are not of their making. This is 
not to imply that the neighborhood school policy 
per se is unconstitutional, but that it must be 
abandoned or modified when it results in segre­
gation in fact.1
Wright contended that the states had a hand in cre­
ating most situations in which de facto segregation 
exists. The states' housing policies encouraged private 
discrimination and created segregated neighborhoods, or 
the states' permitting job discrimination depressed the 
socio-economic status of blacks, driving them into the 
ghettos. The neighborhood school and the historical 
gerrymandering of school attendance districts then re­
sulted in de facto segregation.2 "Thus," said Wright, "in 
most of the school cases arising from the metropolitan 
areas, it should not be necessary to reach the issue of 
whether adventitious de facto segregation, without more, 
is unconstitutional.
•̂Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm.. 237 F.Supp. 
53^» 5^6 (D. Mass. 19^5), quoted in Western Reserve Law 
Review. XVI (May, 1965)» ^95.
2Ibid., ^83-W .
•̂ Ibid., ^85; New York University Law Review. XL 
(April, 1965), 293.
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According to Wright, the extent to which judges find
unconstitutional state action behind de facto segregation
usually depends upon whether the judge is satisfied with
the status quo. If he is satisfied, he ascribes the
de facto segregation to neutral causes. "As I read
these de facto segregation cases from the North and West,"
commented Wright,
I must confess to a little amusement. After 
watching, from close range, some of my judicial 
brethren in the South twisting and turning and 
reaching for a result in race cases that will 
not upset the status quo or the local power 
structure, it seems that now I may be treated 
to what appear to be similar performances by my 
brethren in other parts of the country.i
Wright was himself capable of doing a bit of reaching 
in order to bring the Fourteenth Amendment into play. He 
indicated that a de facto segregated slum school coupled 
with a compulsory school attendance law was enough to 
constitute denial of equal protection of the laws. His 
reasoning was that the slum dweller is unable to afford a 
private school; therefore, the law which merely requires
him to send his child to school, in reality requires him
oto send his child to a segregated slum school.
Wright’s position was that whenever an otherwise 
legitimate state educational policy, such as neighborhood
“h^ew York University Law Review. XL (April, 1965),29 .̂
2Ibid., 296: Western Reserve Law Review. XVI (Mav.
1965) .“T O .
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schools and compulsory school attendance laws, results in 
segregated schools, the policy cannot he constitutionally 
justified as long as basically the same educational goals 
could have been accomplished by another method which 
would not result in segregation.1 He went so far as to 
suggest that the courts are not helpless to deal with de 
facto segregation even when political boundaries separat­
ing central cities from suburbs are involved. Said 
Wright, "The political thicket, having been pierced to 
protect the vote, can likewise be pierced to protect the 
education of children." While admitting that the final 
word on de facto segregation would have to come from the 
Supreme Court, he pointed out that the first words would 
come from lower courts. "Before the Supreme Court acts," 
he said, "some other federal courts no doubt will take a 
harder look at de facto segregation and will be less 
inclined to accept the suggestion that the state and its
^ e w  York University Law Review, XL (April, 1965),
297.
Ŵestern Reserve Law Review. XVI (May, 19&5)* ^98. 
Some years later, Judge Robert J. Merhige, Jr., attempted 
to pierce the political thicket and ordered into effect a 
desegregation plan which merged the school systems of 
suburban Henrico and Chesterfield Counties with the school 
system of the City of Richmond, Virginia. Bradley v.
School Board of the City of Richmond. 338 F.Supp. 67 
(E.D. Va. 1972). Judge Merhige was reversed by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, ^62 F.2d 1058 (1972), 
and the reversal stood when the Supreme Court divided 
evenly (Justice Powell did not participate) on the issue, 
k lZ U.S. 92 (1973).
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agencies are not, in some degree at least, responsible 
for it and helpless to correct it."'1'
De Facto Segregation in the 
District of Columbia
Through an unusual set of circumstances, only a 
year after the James Madison Lecture and the law review 
articles on de facto segregation, Judge Wright himself 
became one of the lower court judges to take a harder look 
<1® facto segregation, this time in his official capa­
city. Suit was brought by Julius Hobson, a black civil 
rights activist, charging the District of Columbia Board 
of Education and Superintendent of Schools, Carl F.
Hansen, with racial discrimination in the administration
of District of Columbia public schools, including failure
2to comply with the requirements of Bolling v. Sharpe, 
the case in which the Supreme Court banned legally 
imposed segregation in the District of Columbia. The 
alleged means of discrimination were the "track system"
(to be discussed below), gerrymandering of school atten­
dance districts, and preferential treatment for predomi­
nantly white schools in the use of funds. Hobson also 
charged discrimination against black teachers and admin­
istrative personnel.
^New York University Law Review. XL (April, 1 9 6 5 ) #
2 9 5 .
2 3**7 U . S .  4 - 9 7  ( 1 9 5 * 0 .  T h e  C o u r t  r e l i e d  u p o n  t h e  
d u e  p r o c e s s  c l a u s e  o f  t h e  F i f t h  A m e n d m e n t .  T h e  F o u r t e e n t h
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Under normal circumstances, a Federal District Judge
would have presided. The District Judges, however, were
involved in the suit, since it was they who, according
to law, appointed the members of the Board of Education.^
Because of the involvement of the District Judges, Wright
was designated to sit as a District Judge pursuant to 
2federal law.
The law requiring the District Judges to appoint 
school board members was itself under constitutional 
challenge in a separate case. Wright decided that because 
neither side's arguments on the constitutionality of the 
law were frivolous, a three-judge court should be con­
vened to decide the matter.-^
As a member of that three-judge court, Wright's 
initial action against the educational status quo in the 
District of Columbia was aimed at the method of selecting 
school board members. Unlike the majority, who saw no 
conflict with the separation of powers doctrine, Judge 
Wright considered the appointment of school board members
Amendment was inapplicable because it applies only to 
states.
X31 D.C. Code, Sec. 101 (a) (1961).
228 U.S.C., Sec. 291 (c). The law provides that 
"The chief judge of a circuit or the circuit justice may, 
in the public interest, designate and assign temporarily 
any^circuit judge within the circuit, including a judge 
designated and assigned to temporary duty therein, to hold 
a district court in any district within the circuit."
%obson v. Hansen. 252 F.Supp. ^ (D.D.C. 1966).
clearly an executive function. He noted that interest 
groups made recommendations on appointees, and the 
District Court had been commended and rebuked in the 
press for its choices.^ "If selection of the Board of 
Education is to be a responsible act," he observed, "the 
agency charged with appointment must inform itself of the 
positions of the many candidates on the various questions 
of educational policy and at least begin to make its own 
decisions on where educational wisdom lies." Ironically, 
the Judge has himself been criticized for basing judicial 
decisions on his conception of where educational wisdom 
lies.^
It was not long, however, before Judge Wright's dis­
sent bore fruit, although not the constitutional variety. 
His brethren apparently found some merit in his argument 
that even when there is no denial of due process, it is 
"incongruous with the integrity of the judicial process" 
when judges decide controversies involving their own 
appointees, since there should be the appearance of jus-
Ltice as well as the fact. In 196? the Judicial Conference
^Hobson v. Hansen. 265 F.Supp. 902, 923-92*1- 
(D.D.C. 1967).
2Ibid. , 92*1-.
^See comments of Senator Sam Ervin on February 10 and 
March 25» 1970. U.S., Congressional Record. 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess., CXVI, 3107. 928*1-.
^265 F.Supp. 902, 931.
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petitioned Congress to remove the appointing power from
the District Court,^and Congress responded by making the
2Board of Education elective.
Regardless of how the Board of Education was chosen, 
there were still the discrimination issues to be decided. 
Chief Judge David Bazelon denied Hobson's motion that the 
discrimination issues be decided by a three-judge court 
and left the matter to Wright sitting alone as a District 
Judge.^
The trial to decide the discrimination issues was 
a lengthy one. It began in mid-July of 1966 and Wright 
did not render his decision until mid-June of the follow­
ing year. In the intervening period, a tremendous amount 
of testimony and data became a part of the record. Much 
of it came from Carl Hansen, Superintendent of Schools in 
the District of Columbia, and one of the defendants in the 
suit. Hansen was called "the architect of the track 
system," the system of ability grouping used in the public 
schools of the District. He had once described the 
objectives of the track system as twofold: equality of
education and quality education. Hansen explained:
^See Appendix I of Judge Danaher's dissent in 
Smuck v. Hobson. ^08 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
282 Stat. 101 (1968).
^Hobson v. Hansen. 256 F.Supp. 18 (I966).
h,Washington Post. July 20, 1966, p. C 2.
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Equality of educational opportunity and 
quality education are relative rather than absolute 
concepts. They have meaning only in relation to 
the characteristics of the learner and the educa­
tional content he needs to become capable of quality 
performance at his level of ability.1
While no one questioned the theoretical justification 
for ability grouping, Julius Hobson argued that the track 
system of Washington was in practice a device for insuring 
the physical separation of blacks and whites, since most 
of the children in the lower tracks were black. Elimina­
tion of the track system and optional zones, districts
which provided students with alternative schools to 
2attend, would be a way of eliminating de facto segregatioa 
It might also result in an exodus of whites from the pub­
lic schools of the District of Columbia, since Hansen 
expressed the belief that there is a tendency for whites 
to flee to the suburbs when black enrollment reaches forty 
or fifty per cent. Harold Howe, United States Commission­
er of Education, testified that he believed Hansen cor- 
rect.^ In the midst of the trial, the defense moved that 
Wright disqualify himself on grounds that his New York
■̂ Carl F. Hansen, The Four-Track Curriculum in Today's 
High Schools (Englewood Cliffs, N.J . t Prentice-Hall, 
1 # ) ,  p. 50.
2For trial testimony on optional zones, see 
Washington Post. October, 7, 1966, p. A 12, and 
October 11, 1966, p. B 1.
-̂Ibid.. August 5» 1966, p. A 1.
University Law Review article was evidence of prejudice.
He denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals sustained 
his decision.^
The trial ended on October 25, 1966, and Wright
2took the discrimination issues under advisement. Before 
he rendered his decision, even before the conclusion of 
the trial, Julius Hobson's suit had begun to bear politi­
cal fruit. The Board of Education, with three new mem­
bers, ordered school administrators to adopt different 
methods of classroom organization "with all possible 
speed." The Board called for innovative teaching methods, 
as well as the bussing of entire classes from overcrowded 
de facto segregated schools to underutilized schools, and 
the integration of the children into other classes at the 
destination schools. How expeditiously and effectively 
the new policy would be implemented depended to a consid­
erable extent on the cooperation of Carl Hansen, who was 
not used to having the Board tell him what to do.^ Hansen 
later indicated that he considered the Board's resolution 
ambiguous, and that he had no intention of dismantling the 
track system until ordered to do so in clear, unmistakable
^See Smuck v. Hobson. 4-08 F.2d 175» 182-183 
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
^Washington Post. October 26, 1966, p. B 2.
^Ibid., August 11, 1966, pp. A 1, F
12$
1terms. In any case, Julius Hobson was unwilling to rely 
upon voluntary changes and indicated that he would not 
drop his suit. He wanted a legal ruling on the track 
system and other alleged discriminatory practices because 
of the effect that a decision in his favor might have on 
de facto segregation in other areas of the country.
When the decision came on June 19, 1967* it was in 
Hobson's favor. If the trial was lengthy, so was Judge 
Wright's opinion. In it he concluded that the Superin­
tendent of Schools and the Board of Education had 
deprived black children and poor children generally of 
equal educational opportunity with white and affluent
r>children, J The opinion was in many respects similar to 
his James Madison Lecture and law review articles.
Wright did not say that de facto segregation was, 
of itself, unconstitutional. But he did say, "Once nearly 
complete segregation is shown in a school system in which 
de jure segregation had formerly been the rule, when chal­
lenged the burden falls on the school board to show that 
the observed segregation stems from the application of
Warl F. Hansen, Danger in Washington: The Story
of My Twenty Years in the Public Schools in the NationKs 
Capital (West Nvack. N. Y . t Parker Publishing Co., 1968), p . 2 04-.
Washington Post. August 16, 1966, p. C 2.
^Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F.Supp. ^01 (D.D.C. 196?).
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racially neutral policies."'5' Superintendent Hansen and 
the defendants in the suit attributed the existing segre­
gation to the racially neutral neighborhood school policy, 
which had been adopted for its educational value. Al­
though the plaintiffs asserted that it had been adopted 
for an unconstitutional purpose, Judge Wright noted that 
they had no proof of this and conceded that the neighbor­
hood school policy had indeed been adopted in good faith 
for its assumed educational value. But he also found evi­
dence of another policys that whites should not be com­
pelled to attend predominantly black schools. When this 
policy conflicted with the neighborhood school policy, the 
latter often, although not always, yielded.
Evidence of this second policy— that whites need not 
attend predominantly black neighborhood schools— was the 
existence of "optional zones." Students living in these 
optional zones were permitted to attend their neighborhood 
school or another specified school, often located far from 
their neighborhood. The avowed purpose of optional zones, 
to give all students in such zones the opportunity for an 
integrated education, left Wright completely unconvinced. 
"Since 1954 the administration has carved optional zones 
for race-oriented reasons," he observed, "only where 




neighborhoods which lack white enclaves, never . . .  in
the almost exclusively Negro neighborhoods . . . .1,1
It was obvious that these optional zones were not
instruments of integration as claimed, but rather were
instruments of resegregation. The remedy was to abolish 
2them. The neighborhood school policy itself, Wright left 
untouched. "Because of the 10 to one ratio of Negro to 
white children in the public schools of Washington and 
because the neighborhood school policy is accepted and is 
in general use throughout the United States, the court is 
not barring its use here at this time," said the Judge.3
While accepting the neighborhood school policy, he 
did find that there was faculty segregation in the 
staffing of the neighborhood schools. Racially homo­
geneous schools had faculties that matched the racial com­
position of the student bodies. The burden of proving 
that this resulted from racially neutral policies was 
placed upon the defendants, but they were unable to fur-
I Inish the requisite proof.
As for the allocation of resources among the schools, 
Wright found that schools attended by blacks, particularly 
poor blacks, usually received less. To reach this conclu­
sion, he simply followed the approach used by the courts
^Ibid., k l 6 . 2See the Decree at Ibid.. 517-518.
3Ibid.. 515. ^Ibid., ^22-^31.
X3m
in pre-Brown segregation cases and considered the actual 
distribution of quantifiable things.^ In focusing specif 
ically on the availability of kindergarten, he noted that 
it was dependent upon available space, and that there was 
space in underutilized white schools but not in over­
crowded black schools. To remedy this, school author­
ities permitted a child to go to any school in the city 
with available space, but the parents had to provide 
transportation. As a result, many black children did not
get to attend kindergarten at all or, if they did, went
oin two-hour shifts.
Wright might have excused the inequality on the
grounds that there was no deliberate racial or economic
discrimination, but he is no defender of the status quo
and considers effect a more important factor than intent.
In his words:
The causes of the inequalities are relatively 
objective and impersonal. School officials can 
be faulted, but for another reason: that in the
face of these inequalities they have sometimes 
shown little concern. It is one thing, to be 
precise, when crowded residential conditions shut 
Negro children, and them alone, out of kinder­
garten in the nearby schools? it is something 
else when school authorities acquiesce in the 
situation once it arises by standing passively 
by, circulating promises of more adequate school 
buildings years hence.3
The Judge's remedy was not the same as that of the school
-̂Ibid.. ^32-^39. 2Ibid.. ^39.
3Ibid.. k k l - k k 2 .
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authorities. In order to alleviate overcrowding in black 
schools and provide integrated education for those who 
wanted it, he required the school system to provide 
bussing for those who chose to use it.'*’
The most controversial part of Judge Wright's 
lengthy opinion concerned the "track system," the system 
devised by Carl Hansen for grouping students according 
to ability. Wright conceded that Superintendent Hansen 
had not devised the track system as a mere subterfuge for 
circumventing the requirements of the Bolling decision 
but had attempted to cope with the real problem of 
bringing numerous educationally retarded black children 
into a unitary school system.^ Nevertheless, Wright
kordered the track system abolished and received strong 
criticism for that decision.^
^Ibid., 514. 2Ibid.. 442-492. 3Ibid.. 442.
^See Decree at Ibid., 517-518*
^Professor Philip Kurland of the University of 
Chicago asserted that the decision would only "assure 
that the brighter students receive no better education 
within the system than the other students." "Equal 
Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined," University of Chicago Law 
Review. XXXIV (1968), 583* quoted in Burger dissent,
Smuck v. Hobson. 408 F.2d 175. 197 (1968). Similarly, 
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina criticized Wright 
for reading into the Constitution a prohibition on 
school boards offering to teach bright and diligent 
students more than they teach dull and lazy students.
See U.S., Congressional Record. 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
CXVI, 3107, 928*1-.
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The criticism would have been well taken had Judge 
Wright held all systems of ability grouping unconstitu­
tional; however, he did not do so. He merely held uncon­
stitutional systems of ability grouping which do not pro­
vide compensatory education to disadvanteged children and 
thus deny them equal educational opportunity.^
He specifically attacked the track system of 
Washington because it was weighted against poor blacks. 
Placement tests were administered to children in the first 
grade, yet many poor blacks had never had an opportunity 
to attend kindergarten, which put them at a distinct 
disadvantage. Even if a black child scored high, many 
black elementary schools had no "honors track." As a 
result, the bright black child might be denied an educa- 
tion equal to that of the gifted white child. "Conse­
quently," said Wright, "the court is persuaded that the 
prevalence of disadvantaged Negroes in the lower tracks 
and the prevalence of the white and more affluent students 
in the upper tracks is to a significant extent linked to 
these disparities in course offerings."3 One of the 
Judge's major objections to the track system was that once 
children were placed in the lower tracks they ordinarily 
did not receive the remedial education that they should
Ithave received.





Judge Wright considered that the track system of 
Washington denied poor blacks equal protection of the 
laws, binding in the District of Columbia through the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In eluci­
dating the requirements of equal protection, Wright said*
Orthodox equal protection doctrine can be encap­
sulated in a single rule* government action which 
without justification imposes unequal burdens or 
awards unequal benefits is unconstitutional. The 
complaint that analytically no violation of equal 
protection vests unless the inequalities stem from 
a deliberately discriminatory plan is simply false. 
Whatever the law was once, it is a testament to our 
maturing concept of equality that, with the help of 
Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now 
firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of 
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to 
private rights and the public interest as the 
perversity of a willful scheme.1
A possible effect of Wright's equal protection 
interpretation was the flight of white students to private 
schools. The Judge did not overlook that possibility, but 
he denied that discriminatory treatment was an acceptable 
means of keeping them in the public school system. His 
position received some support from within the civil 
rights movement.^
^Tbid., 4-9?. 2Ibid.. 501.
^Robert L. Carter, General Counsel of the NAACP, 
agreed that an exodus of whites did not justify refusal 
to apply the law. Carter said, "In practical terms, the 
presence of white students in the system in isolated 
enclaves of educational affluence does nothing to further 
the educational advantages of Negro children." "The Law 
and Racial Equality in Education," Journal of Negro 
Education. XXXVII (Summer, 1968), 208.
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In addition to commentary on the abolition of the 
track system, Judge Wright was criticized in more general 
terms for treading beyond the bounds of judicial compe­
tence by usurping the function of school officials and 
making a decision which courts lacked the resources to 
enforce.^ But as Justice Robert Jackson pointed out long 
before Hobson's case, judges act in these matters not by 
virtue of their educational competence but by virtue of 
their commissions. Nor was it necessary for the court 
to have resources for implementing the decision alone.
As one political scientist has observed, the courts are 
not alone as they once were. Other agencies of govern­
ment have shown a willingness to cooperate with the courts 
in desegregation cases.^
See Alexander M. Bickel, "Skelly Wright's Sweeping 
Decision," New Republic. July 8, 1967, pp. 11-12, Sim­
ilar to Bickel's article and relying heavily on it is that 
of Aaron Cohodes, "Who Can Perform What the Courts 
Promise?" Nation's Schools. LXXX (August, 1967)* 31* For 
the position of the American Association of School Admin­
istrators, see "The Courts: Appeal of De Facto Segrega­
tion Decision," School & Society. XCV (November 11, 1967), 
4-0 6, 14-08.
2See Robert J. Steamer, "The Role of Federal District 
Courts in the Segregation Controversy," Journal of 
Politics, XXII (August, i960), 14-38.
3-'See Clement Vose, "School Desegregation: A Politi­
cal Scientist’s View," Affirmative Desegregation: Efforts
to Overcome De Facto Segregation in Urban Schools, eds. 
Roscoe Hill and Malcolm Feeley (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage Publications, 1968), p. 147.
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While Judge Wright's decision was unquestionably con­
troversial, ̂ he did not stand alone. Since the school 
board had begun to make changes even before he rendered 
his decision, he knew that he would not be facing a recal­
citrant school board. Far from being recalcitrant, the 
Board of Education registered its acceptance of the 
decision by voting not to appeal and ordering Superinten- 
dent Hansen not to appeal in his official capacity.
Even though the school board did not appeal the con­
troversial decision, Judge Wright made no attempt to avoid 
review, with the possibility of reversal. He permitted 
Carl Hansen, after his resignation as Superintendent df 
Schools, to intervene in the suit along with a dissenting 
member of the school board and a number of parents. He 
did this although he denied that either Hansen or the 
school board member as individuals had a strong enough 
interest in the decision to warrant intervention, and even 
the parents did not show how their interests were affected. 
He permitted them to intervene in order to give the Court 
of Appeals an opportunity for review.3 Subsequently, a
^Besides being criticized for what he did, he was 
also criticized for what he did not do. One law review 
faulted him for failing to order the abolition of the 
neighborhood school policy. Comment, "Constitutional 
Law— Equal Protection— Discrimination in Public School 
Education," Iowa Law Review. LIII (August, I968), 1184— H88.
2See Hobson v. Hansen. 4-4- F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 1968).
3Ibid.
closely divided Court of Appeals left Judge Wright's
decree intact."*' By that time, Julius Hobson was an
elected member of the Board of Education, and from that
position he worked to correct deficiencies in the District
2of Columbia school system.
The Gaston County Case
As Judge Wright interpreted the Constitution to
require equal educational opportunity, so he interpreted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965-̂ as prohibiting literacy
tests when equal educational opportunity had been denied.
The occasion was a case entitled Gaston County v. United 
ItStates. It arose when Gaston County, North Carolina, 
sought to have the Voting Rights Act's ban on literacy 
tests lifted by securing a declaratory judgment from the 
District Court for the District of Columbia that no "test 
or device" within the meaning of the Act had been used 
during the previous five years for the purpose or with the 
effect of denying the right to vote because of race.
The three-judge District Court refused to lift the 
ban, and Wright, for the majority, reasoned that blacks
1Smuck v. Hobson, 4-08 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). One 
of the dissenters was Judge Burger, later to become Chief 
Justice of the United States.
Ŵashington Post. May 28, 1969, p. C 2; May 29, 1969, 
p. A 1; May 31» 1969* p. E 1.
% 2 U.S.C., Secs. 1973 ©"t seq.
^288 F.Supp. 678 (D.D.C. I968).
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in the county were educationally disadvantaged. Under 
the circumstances, even without discriminatory intent, 
the Judge considered that literacy tests would have a 
discriminatory effect.^ The legislative history of the 
Voting Rights Act revealed that Attorney General Nicholas 
Katzenbach had advocated suspension of literacy tests 
because to do otherwise "would produce a real constitu­
tional irony— that years of violation of the l^th Amend­
ment right to equal protection through equal education 
would become the excuse for continuing violation of the
p15th Amendment right to vote."
Judge Gasch, in a concurring opinion, argued that 
the Government had merely shown the potentially discrimin­
atory effect of unequal education and literacy tests but 
had not shown that the actual effect of the relatively 
simple literacy test of Gaston County would be discrim­
inatory.^ Judge Wright’s answer was that the Government 
had met its obligation by showing even a potentially 
discriminatory effect. The burden of proving that the 
potential effect was not actual rested on Gaston County, 
which did not meet its obligation.1'*'
^ b i d .. 686-687.
2U.S., House of Representatives, Hearings Before 
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), P. 16, quoted at Ibid., 686.
3Ibid., 692.
^Ibid.. 688, n. 16.
139
Although the Gaston County case did not receive as 
much notice as Hobson v. Hansen, it did not completely 
escape criticism. The Greensboro (North Carolina) Daily 
News criticized Wright's "far-fetched reasoning." He was 
also accused of being "result-oriented" and willing to 
bend the law to reach a desired result. Senator Sam 
Ervin had the Greensboro newspaper's editorial reprinted 
in the Congressional Record.1
But to many judges, Supreme Court approval outweighs 
the disapproval of a newspaper or even of a United States 
Senator. The Supreme Court approved of Judge Wright's 
opinion and affirmed it by an eight to one vote. That 
Justice Harlan, one of the leading proponents of judicial 
restraint, was spokesman for the Supreme Court majority 
attests to the persuaveness of Wright's opinion. Harlan's 
reasons for affirmance were "substantially the reasons 
given by the majority of the District Court."3 He looked 
to the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act,
kquoting Katzenbach as Wright had done. Harlan also took 
notice of substantial evidence of the inequality of edu­
cational opportunity afforded blacks in Gaston County.-*
■‘■U.S., Congressional Record. 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 
CXV, Part 13, (June 30, 19^9), 17,705.
2Gaston County v. United States. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
3Ibid.. 288. ^Ibid.
-*Ibid., 291.
The language of Harlan's opinion was said to be "as 
sweeping as the Constitution itself."* But his language 
was virtually a paraphrase of Wright's. In spite of 
the blocked promotion to the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, Judge Wright was still able to influence 
the direction of the law in regard to racial equality.
He promoted equal access to the ballot and was in the 
vanguard of the judicial attack on de facto segregation. 
However, the bulk of his work in the District of Columbia 
pointed in other directions.
^Washington Post. June 3, 1969, p. A 1.
CHAPTER V
COURT OF APPEALS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
After Judge Wright cleared the political hurdles 
obstructing his promotion, he found that the nature of 
his work was considerably changed. Besides assuming a 
new function— that of appeals court judge— he found the 
change reflected in the nature of the cases which required 
his attention. An increased amount of his time and energy 
had to be channeled in the direction of criminal pro­
cedure. He had had experience with criminal procedure as 
a District Judge, but after his promotion, it became the 
major part of his work.
One of the reasons for the heavy criminal case load 
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is 
that the court and the courts which it supervises are not 
located within a state. In other circuits, most criminal 
offenses are violations of state laws. Trials for those 
offenses take place within state judicial systems, and 
appeals are directly to the United States Supreme Court, 
thus bypassing the lower federal courts. In most circuits, 
criminal cases are confined to habeas corpus proceedings 
and violations of federal laws.
1*U
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However, since the national government is responsible 
for governing the District of Columbia, all criminal 
trials in the District take place within the federal judi­
cial system. Besides performing the normal functions of a 
Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia also performs functions which in other circuits 
are performed by the highest court of a state. In this 
respect, Wright's position on the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit may be compared with that of 
an associate justice on a state supreme court. It is a 
position which has required him to devote himself to crim­
inal law and procedure to a greater extent than in the past.
In addition to the unusual jurisdiction of the court 
on which Judge Wright sits, the heavy criminal case load 
has also reflected the high crime rate. Judge Wright has 
viewed the high crime rate as a product of poverty com­
pounded by discrimination— conditions which have bred dis­
respect for law. In his off-the-bench writing, he has 
exposed bias against the poor within the legal system 
which has contributed to this disrespect. Slumlords are 
usually permitted to take long periods to make repairs to 
their property but do not spend as much as a day in jail 
for violating building codes.1 Yet the poor are arrested 
on such charges as public drunkeness and vagrancy and
1J. Skelly Wright, "The Courts Have Failed the Poor," 
New York Times Magazine (March 9* 19^9)» P*
1^3
experience the assembly-line justice of police courts, but 
are denied adequate police protection for their neighbor­
hoods. "This is why the criminal law is perceived by the 
poor," says Judge Wright, "not as protection for life and 
property, but as the establishment's tool of oppres­
sion . . . ."■*■ He points out that even Supreme Court 
decisions securing the rights of indigents in criminal 
proceedings provide no help for individuals who are 
harassed by illegal searches and arrests unless actually 
tried for a crime and found guilty.
If the crime rate is to take a downward turn, Wright 
believes that wide-ranging social reforms are necessary.
He calls for nothing less than the elimination of slums.^ 
That, of course, is beyond his power. In his role as 
appellate judge, however, he can and has attempted to pro­
tect the constitutional rights of all persons accused of 
crime. As he put it in another of his many off-the-bench 
writings:
The Bill of Rights protects all of us or 
none of us. There is no middle ground. And the 
sooner the "nice people" realize this, the sooner 
the police will also, since they merely reflect
1IMd. , p. 100.
2Ibid.. p. 26.
Ibid. Also see his "Crime in the Streets and the 
New McCarthyism," New Republic. CLIII (October 9, I965), 
10-11; "Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law," Duke 
Law Journal. CMLXX (June, 1970), ^25-^51.
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the community consensus. When the community 
wants law enforcement according to law, it will 
have it.1
The Fourth Amendment
Judge Wright believes that one of the functions of
2the appellate process is to curb official lawlessness; 
therefore, it is hardly surprising that he has vigorously 
enforced the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unrea­
sonable search and seizure and has used the exclusionary 
rule to that end. The normal method for protecting 
against unconstitutional intrusions is for law enforce­
ment officials to secure a search warrant by convincing 
a judicial officer that the contemplated search is 
reasonable. Under the terms of the Fourth Amendment, the 
warrant is to describe "the place to be searched, and the 
person or things to be seized." To Judge Wright, devia­
tion from this procedure is not necessarily unconstitu­
tional but is highly suspect.
Although Wright has participated in decisions sus­
taining the admission at trial of evidence obtained with­
out a search warrant but incident to lawful arrests,-^he
^■"Criminal Law and the Bill or Rights," The Reporter. 
June 3, 1965» p. 24.
^J.Skelly Wright, "Judge's Views The News Media 
and Criminal Justice," American Bar Association Journal.
L (December, 1964), 1129.
3̂See for example Staples v. United States. 327 F.2d 
860 (D.D. Cir. 1963) cert, denied, 376 U.S. 957 (1963); 
United States v. Cunningham. 424 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1970).




at a different time and place than the arrest of its occu­
pants was prohibited. In Harris v. United States,^he 
relied on Preston to reject a government argument that a 
car used in a robbery was a instrument of the crime and 
could be treated like any other evidence seized at the 
time of the arrest; that is, it could be examined later. 
Wright's counter argument was
If an automobile used as an instrumentality 
of crime can be subjected to a general search 
without a warrant at the pleasure of the police, 
a home said to be so used could be subjected to 
the same treatment. The automobile, like the home, 
is a repository of the "papers and effects" of 
"the people" as contemplated in the Fourth Amend­
ment. Both may be used as instrumentalities of 
crime, but both may be searched only after 
obtaining a search warrant or at the time2and 
place of a lawful arrest of the occupant.
The Harris case represented one of the rare occasions 
when Wright was reversed. On rehearing, the Court of 
Appeals en banc avoided the government's instrumentality 
theory and merely decided that there had been no search, 
only an inventory.-^ Since the rehearing had been granted
^ V O  F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2Ibid., 483.
% h e  situation was that the appellant's car was 
identified as the getaway car in a robbery. Some hours 
after the robbery, the car was found in front of the 
appellant's home, and he was arrested as he was getting 
into the car. He was taken to the police station, and 
his car was towed there. After its arrival at the sta­
tion, the arresting officer, pursuant to a police regula­
tion, went out to inventory the car for valuables and to 
roll up the windows because it had begun to rain. When 
he opened one of the doors, he found a registration card 
belonging to the robbery victim on the door jamb. It was 
later used in evidence.
1^7
because of the government’s instrumentality theory, Wright 
protested the court’s disposal of the case without taking 
it up. When the issue was not considered, he thought 
that the order granting the rehearing should have been 
vacated as improvidently granted and the panel opinion—  
his opinion— reinstated.'1' Like other judges, he obviously 
dislikes being reversed, and to Wright, it does not happen 
often.
But reversal is an essential part of the judicial 
process, and Judge Wright's trenchant dissents were aimed 
at having his brethren reversed when he thought they 
failed to protect the privacy which the Fourth Amendment 
was intended to safeguard. While he objected to the 
search of an automobile without a warrant, he objected to 
the search of a home even with a warrant, if the warrant 
were issued without probable cause. When police deviated 
from the usual procedure of establishing the presence 
of narcotics and relied upon the unsubstantiated word of 
an informer, Wright took the position that the United 
States Commissioner had erred in issuing the warrant. 
Although his brethren would not "second-guess” the
1370 F.2d 477, ^79.
2The procedure is outlined in Jones v. United States. 
353 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam). It consists 
of the police searching the cooperating informant for 
money or narcotics. After establishing that he has neither 
on his person, he is goven money to make a purchase. When 
he returns with the narcotics, he is again searched to be 
sure that the money is not still on his person.
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Commissioner, "For me," said Wright,
there is not here the kind of trustworthy showing 
which should he made before a home is invaded.
The protective wall around the home erected by 
the Fourth Amendment may not so easily be breached.
The temptation to relax constitutional safeguards 
when dealing with sordid dope offenders is great.
But, in my judgment, it is a temptation that must 
be resisted lest the Fourth Amendment become a 
rubber yardstick in the hands of the police.1
The Fourth Amendment relates to the seizure of
persons as well as of things, and many arrests are made
without warrants but with probable cause. On numerous
occasions, Judge Wright has voted to affirm convictions
following arrests without warrant either because the issue
owas not raised in the court below, or because there had 
been probable cause for arrest. J
Although Wright has been willing to sanction arrests 
without a warrant, it is clear that he would prefer to 
have arresting officers secure an arrest warrant when it 
is practical for them to do so, even if the law does not 
require it. A warrant is necessary to search a building, 
but an arrest on probable cause may be made without a war­
rant, even if there is time to get one. In Ford v.
United States, Wright expressed his disapproval of this
~*~Irbv v. United States, 314 F.2d 253t 256 (D.C. Cir. 
1963) (dissent’H
2Gray v. United States. 311 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
-̂ Williams v. United States. 308 F.2d 327 (1962)?
Ford v. United States. 352 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Hagan v. United States. 364 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1966)5 
Bailev v. United States. 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
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dichotomy between search and arrest. It was his view 
that the law was in flux and might very well change, thus 
discouraging a practice which he considers both disrepu­
table and unconstitutional— making arrests simply for 
investigative and interrogative purposes.'*' He was opti­
mistic that "before too long personal liberty will be 
accorded the same protection under the Fourth Amendment as 
the ownership and possession of property now enjoy." The 
year after the Ford decision, Wright silently joined an 
opinion by Chief Judge Bazelon reaffirming the constitu­
tionality of arrests without a warrant, but discouraging 
such arrests when there is opportunity to secure an arrest
3warrant. J
While accepting the constitutionality of probable
cause arrests without a warrant, Judge Wright, true to his
liberal principles, has demanded that there actually be
4probable cause. After his appointment to the Court of
United States v. Curtis. 427 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
1352 F .2d 927# 934-935 (concurring).
2Ibid.. 936.
•̂Hagan v. United States. 364 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir.1966).
4His msistance on a judicial determination of prob­
able cause has extended to both adult and juvenile 
arrests. Jackson v. United States. 336 F.2d 579 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (per curiam): Cooley v. Stone. 414 F.2d 1213 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
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Appeals, it did not take him long to develop stringent 
standards.1 An investigative arrest made solely as a pre­
text for a search of the person fell far short of his
pstandards, even if the search turned up evidence.
Wright's insistence that arrests be made only upon 
probable cause extended to arrests in extradition pro­
ceedings, and in that he was not alone.^ As spokesman 
for a unanimous panel, he explained that the Supreme Court 
had made the whole of the Fourth Amendment, including the
federal standard of probable cause, binding on the states
h,through the Fourteenth Amendment. In extradition pro­
ceedings, the jurisdiction in which an individual is 
apprehended is to make its own determination of probable 
cause. "For it would be highhanded," he thought
to compel that jurisdiction to lend its coercive 
authority, and the processes of its law, against 
even its own citizens in aid of an enterprise the 
key details of which remain in the dark. If as 
here, it turns out that the prosecution against 
the fugitive is unfounded, the asylum state will 
have expended its resources and given the
Cf. Tindie v. United States. 325 F.2d 223 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), in which he participated in a unanimous 
decision that information gained from the unlawful 
arrest of another did provide probable cause for an 
arrest, and Oliver v. United States. 335 F.2d 724 
(D.C. Cir. 1964), in which he took the opposite position 
in dissent.
2See Jackson v. United States. 353 F.2d 862 
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
^Kirkland v. Preston. 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. I967). 
In an earlier case he had been alone. See his dissent in 
Moncrief v. Anderson. 353 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
^385 F.2d 670, 674.
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l e g i t i m i z i n g  s t a m p  o f  i t s  j u d i c i a r y  t o  a  c a u s e  
w h i c h  i s  a t  b e s t  f u t i l e ,  a t  w o r s t  a r b i t r a r y .1
I f  J u d g e  W r i g h t  w a s  l o a t h  t o  l e n d  t h e  l e g i t i m i z i n g  
s t a m p  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a r y  t o  a r r e s t s  w i t h o u t  p r o b a b l e  
c a u s e ,  h e  w a s  e q u a l l y  r e s i s t a n t  t o  l e g i t i m i z i n g  t h e  u s e  
o f  d a m a g i n g  s t a t e m e n t s  g a i n e d  f r o m  a c c u s e d  p e r s o n s  i n  
v i o l a t i o n  o f  R u l e  5  ( a )  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  R u l e s  o f  C r i m i n a l  
P r o c e d u r e  o r  t h e  s e l f  i n c r i m i n a t i o n  c l a u s e  o f  t h e  F i f t h  
A m e n d m e n t  o n  w h i c h  i t  i s  b a s e d .
T h e  F i f t h  A m e n d m e n t
T h e  j u d i c i a l  m e t h o d  f o r  e n f o r c i n g  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
o
g u a r a n t e e  a g a i n s t  s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n  a n d  R u l e  5  ( a )  h a s  
b e e n  h i g h l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  w i t h i n  t h e  j u d i c i a l  e s t a b l i s h ­
m e n t .  T h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y  i s  d r a m a t i c a l l y  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  
s h a r p  d i s a g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  J u d g e s  W r i g h t  a n d  B u r g e r .
W h i l e  W r i g h t  a c t i v e l y  p r o m o t e d  a  l i b e r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  a c c u s e d ,  B u r g e r  m a d e  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
h i s  p o l i c y  p r e f e r e n c e s  w e r e  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  M a l l o r y  
R u l e ^ a s  a  m e a n s  o f  e n f o r c i n g  R u l e  5  ( a ) .
1I b i d . ,  6? 7 .
2
R u l e  5  ( a )  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a  p e r s o n  a r r e s t e d  f o r  a  
f e d e r a l  o f f e n s e  b e  b r o u g h t  w i t h o u t  u n n e c e s s a r y  d e l a y  
b e f o r e  t h e  n e a r e s t  c o m m i t t i n g  m a g i s t r a t e .  R u l e  5  ( b )  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  c o m m i t t i n g  m a g i s t r a t e  t o  a d v i s e  t h e  a c c u s e d  
o f  h i s  r i g h t s  a n d  i n f o r m  h i m  t h a t  a n y t h i n g  h e  s a y s  c a n  b e  
u s e d  a g a i n s t  h i m .  S e e  18 U . S . C . A . ,  F e d e r a l  R u l e s  o f  
C r i m i n a l  P r o c e d u r e .
% a l l o r v  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s . 3 5 ^  U . S .  4 4 - 9  ( 1957).
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Wright, from his very first year on the Court of
Appeals, showed that he would vigorously apply the Mallory
Rule that evidence obtained in violation of Rule 5 (a) was
inadmissible at trial. He wrote the majority opinion for
a divided panel that held that a confession and weapon
found with the help of the accused during a twenty-four
hour period of unnecessary delay were inadmissible.^ But
during the same year, both Burger and Wright agreed that
Mallory did not exclude a confession given within thirty
2minutes after arrival at the police station.
Initially, Wright did not question the judicial rule
that violation of Rule 5 (a) could not be raised on appeal
if it had not been raised at trial.^ By 196*1-, however,
Wright was suggesting a way to circumvent that rule. In
hthe case of Leigh v. United States, a panel on which 
Burger and Wright both sat affirmed a conviction over 
claim of double jeopardy, with Wright concurring only in 
the result. In his concurring opinion, he noted that the 
police had violated Rule 5 (a) but that the Mallory Rule 
had not been invoked below. He agreed that under the
^Jones v. United States, 307 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 
1962). Burger was not on the panel.
hughes v. United States. 306 F.2d 287 
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
Ŵilliams v. United States. 308 F.2d 652 
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
^329 F.2d 883.
circumstances, the court was not required to consider 
application of the Mallory Rule. Then, however, Wright 
used the discretion of his office in a conscious attempt 
to influence the development of the law. He introduced 
the possibility that failure to raise the Mallory issue 
below could have been the result of ineffective assis­
tance of counsel.1 While he admitted that the court 
could not consider the question of ineffective counsel 
because it had not been raised or briefed, his very 
introduction of the issue can only be read as an invita­
tion. Judge Burger, on the other hand, was silent.
The Killough case3afforded both Burger and Wright 
opportunity to explore the contours of the Mallory Rule 
and to exercise their own brands of activism. Because 
Wright has considered the Mallory Rule a way of elimina­
ting the "unequal contest of oaths between policemen and 
lonely defendant,"^he joined the majority in holding a 
confession inadmissible. Burger wrote a dissent for 
himself and two other judges.
^ e  cited a case in which the California Supreme 
Court had held that failure to invoke the exclusionary 
rule amounted to ineffective counsel. The case was 
People v. Inbarra. J>k Cal.Reptr. 863, 386 P.2d U-87 (1963)
2329 F.2d 883, 885.
3Killough v. United States. 315 F.2d 2^1 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc).
LWright, "Criminal Law and the Bill of Rights,"
Reporter. (June 3» 1965)* 2k. He also refers to the Unequal swearing contest in Leigh v. United States.
329 F.2d 883, 885, n. 3.
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T h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  d i s a g r e e m e n t  w a s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
w h e t h e r  a  s e c o n d  m u r d e r  c o n f e s s i o n  g i v e n  a f t e r  a r r a i g n ­
m e n t  c o u l d  h e  u s e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  a p p e l l a n t .  T h e  f i r s t  c o n ­
f e s s i o n  h a d  a l r e a d y  b e e n  h e l d  i n a d m i s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  o f  
v i o l a t i o n  o f  R u l e  5  ( a ) .  A  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  c o u r t  
d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  s e c o n d  c o n f e s s i o n ,  w i t h o u t  a  l a w y e r ,  c a m e  
s o  s o o n  a f t e r  t h e  i n a d m i s s i b l e  c o n f e s s i o n  a s  t o  b e  
" i n a d m i s s i b l e  a s  t h e  f r u i t  o f  t h e  l a t t e r .
J u d g e  B u r g e r  w a s  n o t  a t  a l l  i n c l i n e d  t o  e x p a n d  t h e  
M a l l o r y  R u l e .  H e  a g r e e d  t h a t  R u l e  5  ( a )  h a d  b e e n  v i o l a t e d  
a n d  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  c o n f e s s i o n  w a s  p r o p e r l y  s u p p r e s s e d ,  b u t  
h e  d i d  n o t  a g r e e  o n  t h e  s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  c o n f e s ­
s i o n .  I t  c a m e  a f t e r  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  h a d  b e e n  t a k e n  b e f o r e  
a  c o m m i s s i o n e r  p u r s u a n t  t o  F e d e r a l  R u l e s  a n d  c o u l d  b e  s u p ­
p r e s s e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  B u r g e r ,  o n l y  i f  i t  w a s  c o e r c e d .  H e  
d i d  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  w a s  c o e r c e d  b u t  w a s  c o m p l e t e l y  
v o l u n t a r y .  A p p a r e n t l y  i t  i s  n o t  o n l y  t h e  a v o w e d  a c t i v ­
i s t s  w h o  g o  b e y o n d  t h e  b o u n d s  o f  j u d i c i a l  c o m p e t e n c e ,  
b e c a u s e  J u d g e  B u r g e r ,  a l t h o u g h  l a c k i n g  t e c h n i c a l  c o m p e ­
t e n c e  i n  p s y c h i a t r y ,  b a s e d  h i s  j u d g m e n t  o f  v o l u n t a r i n e s s  
o n  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  r e a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  k i l l i n g  " w h i c h  w o u l d  
t e n d  t o  i n d u c e  a  ' c o n f e s s i n g *  s t a t e  o f  m i n d . " 3  H e  
e x p r e s s e d  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  s u p p r e s s i o n  d o c t r i n e  h a s
1 3 1 5  F.2 d  2 ^ 1 ,  Zkk. 2 I b i d . . 2 5 * K
3I b i d . , 255.
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been a failure in checking police misconduct and, as an 
alternative, suggested that a copy of the trial transcript 
be sent to the superior of every officer whose conduct re­
sults in a motion to suppress evidence.^ He concluded by 
accusing the court of rewriting a statute rather than 
interpreting it. "But," said Burger, "if Congress permits
judges to distort by 'interpretation' and to rewrite its
2statutes, it should not be heard to complain."
The majority did not let what it termed Judge 
Burger's "unusual dissenting opinion" go unanswered. The 
majority rebutted his arguments in nine points.'* The 
ninth point was a retort to Burger's plea for congres­
sional action. According to the majority, Congress could 
reverse the decision only by taking matters of evidence 
away from the judiciary or by positively granting the 
police the power to isolate suspects and interrogate them 
until they get a confession. The latter, they said, would
h,not meet Bill of Rights standards.
While Wright concurred in the majority's expanded 
interpretation of the Mallory Rule, he chose to deal more 
thoroughly with the problem of the voluntariness of con­
fessions following suppressed confessions. He rejected 
what he considered the two extreme positions on second
1Ibid.. 257-258, n. 5- 2Ibid.. 260.
3Ibid., 2^5-248. ^Ibid.. 2^7.
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confessions: (1) after a magistrate advises an accused
of his rights, any confession is valid, or (2) once there 
has been one inadmissible confession, no subsequent con­
fession may be untainted by it.1 "Thus," he said,
no one suggests that because a suspect has been 
illegally detained and has confessed, he must be 
let free, immune from all further prosecution for 
the offense. Doubtless, this would be a most 
effective deterrent to illegal interrogations, 
but the cost to the public is too great.2
Wright suggested that after a confession is suppressed, 
the court presume that a second confession is involuntary. 
Judge Burger's position was that after presentation before 
a United States Commissioner, the statement of rights is 
fresh in a defendant's mind.3 While indicating no attempt 
to belittle the Commissioner or his advice of rights, 
Wright took the position the presumption of involun­
tariness should remain because Rule 5 (a) assumes a 
freshly arrested defendant, not one whose mechanisms of 
resistance have been weakened by a prior confession.
1Ibid. , 24-8-2^9 •
pIbid., 2^9. In fashioning police deterrents, Wright 
has never been unmindful of cost to the public. In a 
later case, he suggested that the responsible administra­
tion of justice might require reversals when there had 
been police brutality at the time of arrest, but, in the 
case before him, there was overwhelming proof of guilt, 
and he considered it an inappropriate time to break newf round. See Gilliam v. United States. 323 F.2d 615,16 (D.C. Cir. 1963)» cert, denied 375 U.S. 850 (1963).
3315 F.2d 2*H, 25*K
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The Judge gave no rule for determining the kind of evi­
dence necessary to rebut the presumption of involuntar­
iness, but suggested that it might at least be necessary 
to show that the defendant had sufficient time, while free 
of police control, to absorb the information about his 
rights and to have the advice of counsel who knew about 
the first confession. Even if this should not be required 
by the Mallory Rule, Wright pointed out that the court had 
power to fashion rules of evidence for the District of 
Columbia.
One of the best examples of Wright's activism in
support of the Mallory Rule came in a case, Veney v.
2United States, in which he voted not to reverse but to 
affirm a conviction. His reason for affirmance was that 
the defendant had been identified by four witnesses. But 
Wright also noted that the defendant was alleged to have 
made a "spontaneous apology" to his robbery victim during 
an in-custody confrontation. The Judge admitted to some
•̂Ibid. , 2^9-251. The Killough case did not end 
there. In a later proceeding, the same defendant sought 
to suppress damaging statements made to a graduate student 
who was a part-time employee at the jail. The defendant 
did not have assistance of counsel, and the interview in 
which the statements were made took place before the first 
appeal, so Killough did not know that his first confession 
could not be used against him. In Judge Wright's opinion, 
these statements too were inadmissible as fruit of the 
first confession. See Killough v. United States.
336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 196 k ) .
23̂  F.2d 5^2 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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curiosity about reports of spontaneous apologies, since 
he doubted that the word "apologize" was a part of the 
vocabulary of the poorly educated defendants or, if it 
was, that they would express contrition so soon.
His curiosity, and the research it stimulated, led 
him to Frederickson v. United States.^a case decided some 
years earlier, in which an appeals panel unanimously held 
that a damaging statement was properly admitted over a 
Mallory objection because it was spontaneous and not 
elicited by police. After that, the "spontaneous apology" 
became a recurring phenomenon. Together, the Frederickson 
decision and the trial transcript of the case before 
Wright solved the mystery. The testimony of an identify­
ing witness left no doubt that the "apologies" were the 
result of police "coaching." Wright used his concurring 
opinion to expose and condemn the practice, even while 
voting to affirm the conviction. He considered it time 
"for some soul searching in the prosecutor's office before
pit offers any more 'spontaneous' spologies in evidence.
1266 F.2d ^63 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
23 ^  F.2d 5^2, 5^3. Wright does not, however, oppose 
the admission of damaging statements that are truly spon­
taneous. Although he wrote no opinion, he joined an 
opinion by Judge MacKinnon affirming the admissibility of 
a damaging statement made by a defendant immediately after 
police informed him that he was under arrest and the 
charge against him, but before they had a chance to give 
him the Miranda warning. Bosley v. United States.
UrZ6 F.2d 1957 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The constitutional guarantee against self incrimina­
tion which the Mallory Rule supported was further streng­
thened by the Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. 
Arizona.1 According to Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in 
that case, prior to any in-custody interrogation the 
police must advise the accused of his right to remain 
silent, of his right to have counsel (appointed, if neces­
sary) present during interrogation should he choose to 
answer questions, and that anything he says may be used 
against him at trial. If the accused begins to answer 
questions, he may reassert his right to silence at any
time. The individual may waive his Miranda rights, but
2he must waive voluntarily and intelligently. Wright con­
sidered that Miranda, like Mallory before it, attempted 
to insure that the real trial took place in the courtroom, 
not in a police interrogation room.^ Consequently, he
Aapplied Miranda as vigorously as he had the Mallory Rule.
Judge Wright did not simply apply Miranda, he exten­
ded it even to statements elicited by the police but not 
as a part of interrogation about the crime itself. When a
u.s. 1+36 (1966).
2The procedures required by Miranda are briefly sum­
marized at Ibid.,
•̂ See Wright, "The New Role of Defense Counsel Under 
Escobedo and Miranda." American Bar Association Journal.
LII (December, 1966), 1118.
^See Blair v. United States, ^01 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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defendant testified at trial regarding his employment
status, Wright considered that Miranda "barred the
arresting officer from testifying against him regarding
contrary information given during the routine filling out
of forms following arrest. Wright's rationale was that
Even innocent questions asked of a suspect in the 
inherently coercive atmosphere of the police sta­
tion may create in him the impression that he must 
answer them. His answers then cannot be considered 
voluntary in the sense required by Miranda. Where 
such answers turn out to be damaging to the suspect, 
they cannot be used against him at trial, absent a 
valid waiver of the Miranda rights.
Wright's colleague, Judge Tamm, rightly objected
that such.an interpretation of Miranda would free the
defendant from the threat of a perjury prosecution if
he testified falsely, thus placing upon "an overburdened
Providence the sole responsibility for insuring the
2credibility of a witness." Judge Wright's answer was 
that Miranda explicitly states that no distinction could 
be made between inculpatory and exculpatory statements.-*
He saw no reason for treating differently a statement 
which was intended to be neither inculpatory nor exculpa- 
tory. But there is reason for treating it differently. 
Miranda was intended to enforce the Fifth Amendment guar­
antee against self-incrimination. There is no way that a
•̂Proctor v. United States. ^0^ F.2d 819, 821 
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
2Ibid., 823 (dissent). 338^ U.S. 436, ^77.
F. 2d 819, 821.
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truthful answer to a question unrelated to the crime can 
incriminate one. Undoubtedly the real problem for Wright 
was that the defendant denied the police version of the 
form-filling episode, thus producing another "uneven 
swearing contest."
The problem of self-incrimination does not arise if 
the defendant is extended immunity from prosecution. That 
a congressional grant of immunity is not in conflict with 
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination 
has long been established by the Supreme Court.^ It also 
specifically upheld the constitutionality of the Immunity
pAct of 1954. That, however, has not prevented Judge 
Wright from disliking immunity statutes. He has referred 
to the Immunity Act of 19543as more properly called the
k"Compulsory Testimony Act." He dislikes immunity legis­
lation because it protects solely against criminal prose­
cution while leaving the individual vulnerable to civil 
and economic disabilities. Consequently, in attacking 
the Immunity Act of 1954, Wright became a strict construc­
tionist. Through his narrow interpretation of the
1B£own v. Walker. 161 U.S. 591 (I896).
2Ullmann v. United States. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
318 U.S.C., Sec. 3486.
**In re Bart. 304 F.2d 631, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
5Ibid.. 635.
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statutory language, an order to testify and a contempt 
commitment for refusal to testify were both vacated.
Wright did not limit himself to a narrow construc­
tion of the statute as he might have done. He partici­
pated in the continuing dialogue between courts and 
suggested a way to protect individuals who are compelled 
to testify from some non-criminal sanctions, such as 
prohibitions on granting government employment to admitted 
Communists. He raised the question of whether the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment might insulate 
persons compelled to testify from such sanctions, even if 
the self-incrimination clause did not. Although he 
framed the issue in terms of an admission that it was 
premature for the court to consider that question, he had 
planted there a possible course of action for the future. 
One of the judges who joined the opinion was Judge Burger, 
who often disagreed with Wright in other kinds of cases.
His dislike of immunity statutes, without more, was 
not enough to induce Wright to vote for reversal of a 
judgment of contempt when an individual refused to testify 
in spite of a grant of immunity from prosecution.3 But 
when he had some flexibility, he made use of it. He par­
ticipated in a decision by a divided panel holding that
h l a i d .. 636. 2Ibid. . 63^.
3In re Flanagan. 350 F.2d 7^6 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(per curiam).
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when an individual was compelled to testify regarding a 
crime for which he was already convicted, but before his 
appeal was decided, the grant of immunity shielded him 
from the penalty if his conviction were affirmed. If the 
conviction were reversed, immunity prevented retrial.'*' 
Wright's dislike of compelled testimony led him to
pan extreme position in Ellis v. United States. In that 
case, a witness waived his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and voluntarily testified 
before a grand jury. At the trial, at which he was not a 
defendant, he attempted to reassert his Fifth Amendment 
privilege. The trial judge agreed that he had a right to 
do so, but granted immunity and compelled him to testify. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the defendants were 
convicted.
On appeal, each member of the court had a different 
view of the witness' rights, but a majority agreed that 
justice did not require a reversal of the convictions. 
Judge Wright, in dissent, argued that the witness' consti­
tutional rights had been violated. "I believe the Fifth 
Amendment not only protects against the risk of prosecu­
tion on evidence extorted from the defendant," he asserted, 
"but also establishes a right to abstain from the
^Frank v. United States. 3^7 F.2d ^86 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
2 k l 6 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
demeaning ritual of public self-accusation.""*" There was, 
however, a glaring omission in his brief but spirited dis­
sent. He failed to explain why the defendants were enti­
tled to have their convictions reversed when it was a 
witness, not the defendants, who was forced to testify.
He simply ignored the problem in his defense of Fifth 
Amendment rights.
The Sixth Amendment
The most effective way of safeguarding Fifth Amend­
ment rights, or any other constitutional rights, particu­
larly in the context of adversary criminal proceedings, 
is through the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment. To Judge Wright that has always meant 
more than just the right to have a lawyer present at a 
trial. The right to counsel exists before trial and means
the right not to be secretly questioned during a contin-
2uance granted for the purpose of securing counsel. It 
also means the right to counsel at arraignment and pre­
liminary hearing, although the absence of counsel at 
those proceedings results in reversal of conviction only 
if the trial is prejudicially affected.-*
1Ibid.. 808.
20ueen v. United States. 335 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir.196*0 (per curiam).
^Shelton v. United States, 3*1-3 F.2d 3*1-7 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (per curiam)s Anderson~v. United States. 352 F.2d 
9*J'5 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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To Wright, the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel
extends even into the grand jury room. In Jones v. United 
1States. the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed a
criminal conviction because, among other things, the
defendant, who had only a third grade education and could
not read, did not have the assistance of counsel when he
appeared before the grand jury and confirmed an earlier
confession. But not all members of the majority agreed
that there was a constitutional right to counsel before
the grand jury. Judges Washington and McGowan would have
disposed of the matter on the basis of the court's super- 
ovisory power. Since there could be no majority for 
reversal without Washington and McGowan, Wright and the 
other three who would have based the decision the the Con­
stitution were forced to compromise and rely on the super­
visory power. If one assumes, however, that Wright is a 
policy-oriented judge, then he was giving up little. Even 
if the decision had been based on the Constitution, it 
would not have been binding on other circuits absent a 
decision of the Supreme Court. By agreeing to base the 
decision on the supervisory power in spite of his belief 
that the Constitution required reversal, he got the 
desired result— the right to counsel at a critical stage 
in the proceedings— for the area under the court’s 
jurisdiction.
13^2 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964-). 2Ibid. , 873.
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To Judge Wright, it is extremely important that the 
defendant have the assistance of counsel as soon after 
arrest as possible. This is particularly true in the 
case of poor and uneducated defendants. In such cases, 
defense counsel can require the prosecution to prove 
probable cause and can seek out defense witnesses and run 
down leads while they are fresh. In Wright's opinion, 
defense counsel can also perform the therapeutic function 
of convincing the defendant that his side of the story is 
being heard and that he is being treated fairly. If legal 
defense is not likely to be successful, the defendant's 
lawyer can assist him in plea-bargaining. Wright sees no 
impropriety in this as long as it is voluntary. In fact, 
when an indigent has no adequate defense, Wright believes 
that defense counsel should try to keep him out of court. 
Even a fair trial often serves only to encourage false 
hopes and perjured defenses. Convictions result in sen­
tences longer than if there had been a guilty plea, and 
the defendant becomes even more anti-social, whereas 
voluntary plea-bargaining is more likely to convince the
^See his concurring opinion in Scott v. United 
States. 419 P.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969) in which he assigns 
the judge the role of overseeing the fairness and volun­
tariness of the process.
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defendant that he is being treated fairly and induce him 
to cooperate with rehabilitative programs.1
If the defendant choses not to plead guilty, he
punquestionably has the right to counsel at trial. Of 
course, the Constitution is not satisfied unless there is 
effective representation of counsel, nor is Judge Wright 
satisfied with anything less.-^ He has high regard for 
lawyers who conscientiously defend their clients’ interest 
and has rejected claims of ineffective counsel when not
h,supported by the record. But he has also suggested that 
an appellant raise the issue of ineffective counsel 
because the Mallory Rule had not been invoked although
See Wright, "The New Role of Defense Counsel Under 
Escobedo and Miranda." American Bar Association Journal. 
LII (December,1966), 1117-1121} "The Need for Education 
in the Law of Criminal Correction," Valparaiso University 
Law Review. II (Fall, I967), 84— 93; "Criminal Correction 
and the Law," Trial. V (February-March, 1969), 28, 4-6.
2To Wright, this includes the right to have counsel 
present during the resolution of questions raised during 
a poll of the jury, since that is a critical stage in 
the proceedings. See United States v. McCoy. 4-29 F.2d 739 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
3̂He has expressed his regret that law schools devote 
such little time to teaching trial advocacy and has whole­
heartedly endorsed legal internship programs that would 
give law students and recent graduates needed experience 
in^trial advocacy. See his "Law School Training in 
Criminal Laws A Judge's Viewpoint," American Criminal 
Law Quarterly. Ill (Summer, I966), 166-172.
4.Smith v. United States. 304- F.2d 4*03 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (per curiam); Harried v. United States. 389 F.2d 281 
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
had been violated.1
The problem of the effectiveness of counsel can arise 
when two defendants share a lawyer. It is the respon­
sibility of the trial judge to see that the decision to 
proceed with one lawyer is an informed one. To Judge 
Wright, the economic status of the defendants was irrel­
evant to the trial judge's responsibility. He saidj
Z-toT7e see no reason why in assigned counsel cases 
the responsibility to advise defendants of their 
rights and the potential problems of joint repre­
sentation should be any less than where counsel is 
retained. Not only does the Criminal Justice Act 
indicate otherwise, but the indigent is entitled 
to assume that the court, in actively aiding him 
in obtaining counsel, will advise him of all 
rights and matters relevant to appointment of 
counsel.3
Because of the seriousness of a criminal prosecution, 
Wright has insisted upon extending the indigent's right 
to counsel to its fullest extent.
A relatively new aspect of the right to counsel was 
engrafted onto the Constitution in 1967 by bhe Warren 
Court. At that time, the Court decided that the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed the right to counsel
1Leigh v. United States. 329 F.2d 883 
(D.C. Cir. 1964-) (concurring).
^Campbell v. United States. 352 F.2d 359 
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
^Dollar v. United States. 376 F.2d 2^3 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Ford v. United States. 379 F.2d 123 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) in which Wright, under the court's 
supervisory power, announced guidelines for District
at confrontations, such as lineups, for the purpose of 
identification.*" Since Wright believes that the individ­
ual should have the assistance of counsel at the earliest 
possible time, he obviously approved of this interpreta­
tion of Sixth Amendment rights, and a unanimous panel on 
which he sat decided that effective assistance required 
that defense counsel be informed of the description of 
the suspect given to the police. As might be expected, 
convicted criminals, in the hope of having their convic­
tions reversed, attempted to stretch the Wade decision 
to the ridiculous length of requiring a reversal because 
counsel had not been present at an identification at the 
scene of the crime. Judge Wright would not be led down 
that path.
Yet he did approve of the new development is the con 
stitutional law of the Sixth Amendment, interpreted it
h.liberally, and even displayed an inclination to go beyond
Judges in regard to joint representation.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218; Gilbert v. 
California. 388 U.S. 263.
2Snriggs v. Wilson. 419 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(per curiam).
^Solomon v. United States. 408 F.2d 1306 
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
United States v. York. 426 F.2d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 
1969) (per curiam), Wright was a member of a panel major­
ity that remanded the case for a hearing to determine 
whether an in-court identification was tainted by pre­
trial identification techniques in violation of the 
Supreme Court’s Wade decision. Judge Robb, the dissenter 
accused the majority of stretching Wade too far.
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it. In Stovall v. Denno.̂ the Supreme Court decided that 
its holdings regarding the right to counsel at identifi­
cations would not he retroactive. When Rule 5 (a) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had been violated, 
Judge Wright would have circumvented the nonretroactivity 
holding in Stovall by using the Mallory Rule to suppress 
identifications at which counsel had not been present.
But the majority of the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
decided that it had never before applied the Mallory Rule 
to lineup identifications and, since the right to 
counsel at lineups was not retroactive, it would not use 
the Mallory Rule to make it so. Wright had to be content
with writing a dissent for himself and two of his like-
2minded brethren.
1388 U.S. 293 (1967).
^Williams v. United States, *H9 F.2d 7^0 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). When ore-Stovall identifications were attacked on 
due process grounds, Wright was no more inclined than his 
colleagues to reverse convictions. He participated in 
many unanimous decisions rejecting claims that the circum­
stances surrounding identification required reversal. 
Cunningham v. United States. 391 F.2d ^57 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 
(per curiam); Macklin v. United States, 409 F.2d 17^ (D.C. 
Cir. 1969); Gregory v. United States, 4l0 F.2d 1016 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969)? Jackson v. United States. k l2  F.2d lk 9  (1969); 
Tavlor v. United States, 4l4 F.2d 11^2 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 
Stewart v. United States, A-18 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1969)j 
United States v. Hamilton, 4-20 F.2d 1292 (D. C. Cir.1969); United States v. Williams. ^21 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1969). In two cases, Mendoza-Acosta v. United States,
408 F.2d 129^ (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), and 
Clemons v. United States. 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. I968) 
(en banc), he would have required the lower court to con­
duct a hearing to determine whether circumstances sur­
rounding identification were so suggestive as to require a 
new trial, but only in Clemons was he not with the major­ity.
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Because of his expansive view of the right to coun­
sel, one may speculate that Judge Wright will resist the 
Burger Court's interpretation of Wade and Gilbert as 
requiring counsel only at confrontations which take place 
after the indictment which initiates adversary proceed­
ings.'*’ Before that case was decided, Wright considered 
that Wade extended the right to counsel to identification
pconfrontations even when there had been no formal arrest. 
Since the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted 
Wade and Gilbert in a contrary manner, Wright is left with 
the alternatives of passive acquiescence or of attempting 
to convince his fellow members of the Court of Appeals to 
exercise their supervisory power to require more than the 
Burger Court's interpretation of the constitutional right 
to counsel. As a policy oriented judge, one might expect 
him to opt for the latter alternative.
The Sixth Amendment, of course, embraces more than 
the right to counsel. It also guarantees the accused a 
speedy trial. But how speedy must a trial be in order 
to comply with the constitutional demand? There is no
1Kirbv v. Illinois. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
2United States v. Greene, ^29 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir.
1970). Wright did not write an opinion of his own but 
joined the majority opinion. Attesting to the reasonable­
ness of their interpretation of Wade is the fact that even 
Judge Robb, a conservative member of the court, wrote a 
separate opinion in which he reluctantly concurred in that 
interpretation.
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easy answer to the question, nor has Judge Wright attemp­
ted to provide one. Nevertheless, he has attempted to 
give some meaning to the constitutional guarantee— more 
meaning than some of his brethren would give it.
Only a month after the Senate confirmed Wright's nom­
ination to the Court of Appeals, he was a member of the 
panel that heard arguments in the case of Mann v. United 
States.^ In the Mann case, Wright did not think that 
there had been a denial of speedy trial, but he gave a 
clear indication that he would not be unresponsive to such 
a claim in other circumstances. While admitting that 
there was some case law to the contrary, he used a foot­
note to express the opinion that even if formal trial 
should be held promptly after indictment, the Constitution 
could still be violated if there should be a purposeful
and oppressive delay between the offense and the bringing
2of formal charges.
Judge Burger specifically rejected that position in 
Nickens v. United States.3 Wright, who was also on the 
panel, agreed that there had been no denial of the Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial, but he concurred only 
in the result, not in Judge Burger's opinion. He wrote
130^ F.2d 39^ (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert, denied 
371 U.S. 896 (1962).
2Ibid., 396-397, n. 4.
3323 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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a separate concurrance in which he expanded on the view
expressed in his Mann footnote. "Indeed," he said,
a suspect may be at a special disadvantage when 
complaint or indictment, or arrest, is purposefully 
delayed. With no knowledge that criminal charges 
are to be brought against him, an innocent man has 
no reason to fix in his memory the happenings on 
the day of the alleged crime. Memory grows dim 
with the passage of time. Witnesses disappear.
With each day, the accused becomes less able to make 
out his defense. If, during the delay, the Govern­
ment's case is already in its hands, the balance of 
advantage shifts more in favor of the Government the 
more the Government lags. Under our constitutional 
system such a tactic is not available to police and 
prosecutors.1
Judge Wright has refused to break criminal prosecu­
tions down into artificial segments. He considers that 
any unreasonable delay in governmental action which is 
prejudicial to the defendant or denies him his liberty 
constitutes a denial of constitutional rights. He has 
considered each case on its merits. In a complex mail 
fraud case, he conceded the possibility that a delay of 
four years between the original indictment and the trial 
might not have been unreasonable and remanded the case 
for further proceedings. On another occasion, he dissen­
ted from the full Court of Appeals' affirmance of the
Ibid., 813. Judge David Bazelon, Chief Judge of 
the Circuit, agrees with Wright. He quoted from Wright's 
Nickens opinion.when he dissented from the court's denial 
of a rehearing in Wilson v. United States. 335 F.2d 982 
(D.C. Cir. 19&I0.
^Hanrahan v. United States. 3^8 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 
1965).
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conviction of an individual who could not raise bail and 
spent six months in jail awaiting trial, with all of the 
delay at the Government's request. In justification of 
his dissent, Wright said:
Some may think the Sixth Amendment "right to 
a speedy and public trial" is a legal term of art 
which does not mean what it seems to say. I find 
no basis in either the terms or the history of the 
Sixth Amendment for any such conclusion. There is 
no indication that the Framers of the Amendment 
used the word "speedy" in other than its dictionary 
meaning.^
Reasonably enough, he agrees with the other judges that 
there is no constitutional violation when the delay is at 
the defendant's request. But when delay comes between 
offense and arrest and is due solely to lack of a diligent 
effort to make the arrest, the conviction must be 
reversed. J
Judge Wright concedes that the Government may some­
times have a valid reason for delaying an arrest when it 
is necessary to prevent the exposure of an undercover
Smith v. United States. 331 F.2d 78^, 793 
(D.C. Cir. 196^7^ The Judge was particularly irate 
because the defendant spent the period of delay in jail 
due to his inability to make bail. Elsewhere, he has 
referred to bail as "a barnacle on the back of the crim­
inal law." Wright, "Renaissance of the Criminal Law: The
Responsibility of the Trial Lawyer," Duauesne University 
Law Review. IV (Winter, 1965), 215.
^edffeneth v. United States. 36** F.2d 68^
(D.C. CTr. 1956). -------------
^Godfrey v. United States. 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1966)} Jones v. United States. ^02 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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agent or informer. He has taken the position that when 
the defendant has made no plausible claim that he was 
prejudiced by the delay, the conviction must be affirmed.^ 
He has not, however, been consistent in that position.
When a narcotics arrest was delayed five months to pro­
tect an undercover agent, the Judge noted that persons 
from a slum subculture have no "desk pads and social cal­
endars" to remind them where they were several months 
before. After a long delay, the police may make mistakes 
and the "mistakes would very likely wind up in the Lorton 
Reformatory serving five-, ten- or fifteen-year sentences.
This spectre apparently does not disturb the majority of
2this panel. I find it frightening," he declared. Yet 
the defendant himself made no plausible claim that his 
trial was prejudiced by the delay. In fact, he attempted 
to establish his whereabouts at the time of the offense 
through the testimony of a defense witness whom the jury 
apparently disbelieved.^
^Jackson v. United States. 351 F.2d 821 
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
2Powell v. United States. 352 F.2d 705, 711 
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
^Ibid., 709. Acting as a District Judge, Wright 
presided over a trial in which the issue of delay in 
prosecution was raised. The trial resulted in a convic­
tion, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. See 
Hardv v. United States. 3^3 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 196*0, 
cert, denied 38O U.S. 984 (1965). Also see Hardy v.
United States. 38I F.2d 9*H (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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Most trials, in fact, are by jury, and this too is a 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. Everett v. United 
States,1a case which involved the right to trial by jury, 
gave Judges Burger and Wright another opportunity to 
exhibit their conflicting approaches to criminal justice. 
The crux of the dispute was whether Everett could withdraw 
a guilty plea and go to trial even though he continued to 
admit having performed the robbery for which he was 
charged. The District Judge would not permit him to with­
draw his plea and imposed a nine-year sentence. Judge 
Burger, writing for the majority of the appeals panel, 
agreed with the District Judge and would "not encourage
accused persons to 'play games'" with the already over-
2burdened courts.
Judge Burger appealed to the head; Judge Wright 
appealed to the heart— with supporting legal citations 
and historical material, to be sure. Wright found that 
the poverty of the accused provided a fair and just 
reason for permitting withdrawal of the guilty plea. As 
he put it:
On allocution, he stated that he stole because he 
was poor, in order to provide necessary medical 
care for his pregnant wife. The defendant is not 
articulate, but his claim seems to make him out as
1336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 196*0.
2Ibid., 98*1-.
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a modern Jean Valjean, who was convicted of burglary 
for stealing bread for his starving children.1
Judge Wright did not even consider the problem of court 
congestion. He thought Everett ought to be permitted to 
take his case to a jury for a determination of culpa­
bility. "The mitigating circumstances the defendant here 
claims may not be enough to convince the jury that his 
crime is excusable, but to my mind his desire to raise 
the issue of culpability for jury decision may be suf­
ficient cause to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty 
and go to trial," said Wright.2
The Eighth Amendment
If he was moved by the plight of an admitted robber, 
one might expect him to be similarly responsive to claims 
of cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment, especially since Wright had himself advanced 
a cruel and unusual punishment argument in the first of 
his two appearances before the Supreme Court as a lawyer.-^
He has indeed been responsive to such claims, as have his
Zlcolleagues. In such cases, it was not unusual for Judges 
Burger and Wright to vote together, since most cruel and 
unusual punishment cases were decided by unanimous vote.
1Ibid. 2Ibid., 987.
•'See Ch. 1 pp. 10-15 above.
^See Smith v. Anderson. 317 F.2d 172 (1963), in which 
Burger wrote the opinion. For a similar case in which 
Wright, but not Burger, participated, see Hudson v. Hardv. 
412 F.2d 1091 (1968) (per curiam).
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But whenever there was more than one opinion written, 
Judge Wright was always less restrained than Judge 
Burger.^
oIn Castle v. United States, a panel on which they 
both participated unanimously affirmed a conviction for 
purchasing narcotics without a tax stamp. Assigned coun­
sel for the indigent defendant argued that since 
Robinson v. Califomia^held it was cruel and unusual 
punishment to make the condition of drug addiction a 
crime, then it was also cruel and unusual punishment to 
make the addict’s purchase, possession or concealment of 
his daily dosage a crime. Wright considered that the 
"argument, although neither remote nor insubstantial, is 
one which, in the light of the great weight of the cases
which have imposed punishment, is more properly to be
Amade to the Supreme Court." While Judge Burger con­
curred in the result, he objected to implications by the 
majority that addiction could be equated with insanity.-*
lrrhis was true even when they themselves did not 
write opinions. See Easter v. District of Columbia.
361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1 9 6 6 ) (en banc).
23^7 F.2d ^92 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert, denied 
381 U.S. 929 (1965).
3370 U.S. 660 (1962).
**3^7 F.2d ^92, ^95.
-*Ibid.
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But the criticism of another judge hardly deterred 
Wright in his approach to the Constitution. His liberal 
reading of Bill of Rights protections relating to criminal 
procedure did, of course, reflect his own values, but it 
was largely made possible by changes in the state of the 
law since he left the District bench. As a District 
Judge, he had regretted that a defendant had not received 
"all the constitutional protection a court sworn to uphold 
the Constitution would have liked him to have received," 
but he dismissed the petition for habeas corpus because 
the defendant had had due process as it was then being 
interpreted. When the Supreme Court liberalized its 
interpretation of Bill of Rights protections relating to 
criminal procedure, it changed Judge Wright from a reluc­
tant follower and sometime critic into an avid supporter 
of Supreme Court policy. Moreover, he attempted to 
influence the further liberalization of the law, either 
directly or by planting in his opinions suggestions for 
future action.
CHAPTER VI
COURT OF APPEALS: FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENT
AND THE LANDLORD-TENANT CONFLICT
Less numerous than his judicial ventures into the 
realm of criminal law and procedure, "but no less impor­
tant, are Wright's attempts at solving First Amendment 
problems. The First Amendment stakes out a number of 
spheres in which government is not free to roam at will. 
The Amendment guarantees that
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish­
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.
As its language clearly indicates, the First Amendment
may be invoked in a wide variety of situations.
In some situations, the First Amendment provides an 
independent source of protection. In other situations, 
particularly (although not exclusively) those arising 
out of congressional investigations, First Amendment 
rights are often bolstered by strict enforcement of pro­
cedural rules. Failure by a congressional committee or 
subcommittee to adhere to proper procedure when inquiring
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into a witness' group memberships may constitute a denial 
of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Although the First and Fifth Amendments are often 
intertwined, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due 
process of law may also stand-independently. It is fre­
quently the basis of constitutional attacks on adminis­
trative actions deemed by some to be arbitrary, unreason­
able, or unfair. While Wright's approach to the due 
process clause has often been characterized by consider­
able deference to administrative agencies, he has shown 
less respect for them than for the rights of their 
employees.
This chapter examines Judge Wright's approach to the 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, 
press, and "association;" the extent of his deference to 
administrative agencies; and his approach to the legal 
relationship between landlord and tenant. The latter is 
treated separately because, although the Constitution 
plays only a minor role, this area of law provides an 
excellent illustration of Judge Wright's liberal ideo­
logical bent.
The First Amendment and Religion
The First Amendment assumes that religious practices 
are a matter of conscience and commands that Congress 
shall make no law prohibiting the individual's free
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exercise of his religion. In spite of the absolute 
language of the First Amendment's denial of governmental 
power over religious practices, the courts have not 
interpreted the words to mean that in the name of 
religion anything goes. The problem for Judge Wright, 
and for courts in general, has been to give broad judicial 
protection to religious freedom without denying govern­
ment the power to protect society from injuries that 
might result if the exercise of religion were absolutely 
unfettered.
A statement of the problem is not difficult, but the 
solution of cases often is. In a particularly difficult 
case^especially in view of his liberal values, Judge 
Wright issued an emergency order authorizing blood trans­
fusions for a hospital patient who, on religious grounds, 
would not consent to the needed transfusions. Wright's 
order was intended to maintain the status quo and prevent 
legal questions from becoming moot through the patient's 
death. In explaining his decision, he said:
The final, and compelling, reason for granting the 
emergency writ was that a life hung in the balance. 
There was no time for research and reflection.
Death could have mooted the cause in a matter of 
minutes, if action were not taken to preserve the 
status quo. To refuse to act, only to find later
^Application of the President and Directors of 
Georgetown College. Inc.. 331 F.2d 1000 (196^). The case 
was particularly difficult because Wright was the only - 
Circuit Judge at court that evening and had to act alone.
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that the law required action, was a risk I was unwill­
ing to accept. I determined to act on the side of 
life.1
When not faced with the specter of imminent death, 
Wright has required that government exercise extreme care 
in the application of even general legislation, when it 
has the effect of interfering with the free exercise of 
religion. He has taken the approach usually, but not 
always, followed by the Supreme Court. It is an approach 
that accords to freedom of religion, like freedom of 
speech, a preferred position. When general laws interfere 
with religious liberty, the former must yield, unless com­
pelling considerations of public policy require their 
2enforcement.
In Wright's opinion, proper care had not been exer­
cised in the condemnation of electrical devices called 
"E-Meters," which, according to the Founding Church of 
Scientology, could confer spiritual benefits, as well as 
cure a number of physical ills, some quite serious. In 
establishing a case of false labeling, the Government had 
relied upon a mass of Scientological literature without
^Ibid.. 1009-1010. The Court of Appeals, en banc. 
denied rehearing without giving reasons, but there were 
some dissents. 331 F.2d 1010 (196*0, cert, denied 
377 U.S. 978 (196£).
2See Paul G. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution 
(Baton Rouge* Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 
pp. 37-^.
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distinguishing the religious and the purely secular.
Wright found that much of the literature upon which the 
government had relied was not labeling within the meaning 
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act^when considered in
pthe light of the First Amendment. Consequently, a new 
trial became necessary. At the subsequent trial, at which 
the Government did distinguish false scientific claims 
from religious teachings, the "E-Meters" were again con­
demned. Because the devices were not in themselves harm­
ful, the District Court authorized their return to the 
Founding Church upon execution of a bond guaranteeing that 
they would be properly and prominently l a b e l e d .^ Thus 
religious liberty was protected to the extent that it was 
not inconsistent with public health and safety.
The First Amendment and "Pure Speech"
To a liberal such as Wright, "pure speech," that is,
the spoken word when not linked with action, is beyond
4the legislative pale. However, in the case of a Vietnam
121 U.S.C., Sec. 301 et seq. (1964).
2Founding Church of Scientology v. United States.
409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
^United States v. An Article or Device. 333 F.Supp. 
357 (D.D.C. 1971).
4Wright was a member of a Court of Appeals majority 
that saved the constitutionality of a District of Columbia 
ordinance prohibiting cursing and profane language in pub­
lic places by reading into it a requirement that the pro­
scribed language be linked to action in order to be punish­
able. Williams v. District of Columbia. 419 F.2d 638 
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
war critic named Watts, it was not the constitutionality 
of a statute, hut rather the application of a statute, 
that Wright attacked. Watts said, "If they ever make me 
carry a rifle, the first person I want in my sights is 
L.B.J." For making that statement, Watts was convicted 
of violating a 1917 statute prohibiting knowing and will­
ful threats against the life of the President. The con­
viction was affirmed, with Judge Wright dissenting. He 
considered the application of the 1917 statute to Watts an 
unreasonable limitation on speech and inconsistent with 
congressional intent, since the statute was aimed at real 
threats and not crude rhetorical devices.^ Wright was vin­
dicated when the Supreme Court, reversing the Court of 
Appeals, decided that the 1917 statute must be interpreted 
in the light of a national commitment to free speech.
The First Amendment and the 
Communications Media
While Judge Wright's approach to the First Amendment 
has been clearly libertarian in that he has promoted the 
free and open dissemination of controversial opinion, it 
has also been non-absolutist in that he has not inter­
preted the words "Congress shall make no law . . . "  
literally. For example, Congress has charged the Federal
■Htfatts v. United States. ^02 F.2d 676, 686-693 
(D.C. Cir. I968T
2Watts v. United States. 39^ U.S. 705 (1969).
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Communications Commission (F.C.C.) to regulate the air­
waves in the "public interest, convenience, or neces­
sity, '^and the judges, including Judge Wright, have gener- 
ally given the Commission a free hand in the grant and 
denial-^of licenses, even in the face of First Amendment 
challenges.
Wright's handling of challenged F.C.C. decisions 
could have been as much the result of judicial deference 
to an administrative agency engaged in technical regula­
tion as to his approach to the First Amendment. His 
thoughts on defamation and related problems, however, 
clearly establish that he has taken a non-absolutist 
approach to the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of 
speech and press. Far from interpreting the First Amend­
ment as an absolute ban on congressional regulation of the 
media, Wright has argued that "we need a national law of 
defamation— a law that goes beyond establishing limita­
tions on state actions for defamation and extends to the
kelements of the tort itself." Since newspapers and
^The Supreme Court has held that the F.C.C.'s "public 
interest" standard is not unconstitutionally vague. 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States. 319 U.S. 190 
(19^3).
2Anti-Defamation League v. F.C.C.. ^03 F.2d 169 
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert, denied 39^ U.S. 930 (1969).
•̂Blumenthal v. F.C.C., 318 F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
kWright, "Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right 
to Knowi A National Problem and a New Approach," Texas 
Law Review. XLVI (April, 1968), 6^3.
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magazines are constantly crossing state lines, he has no 
doubt that Congress has adequate constitutional power to 
enact such legislation. He finds this power in the com­
merce clause and thinks that congressional legislation 
would be preferable to the case by case approach of the 
courts.1
It was, however, the Supreme Court rather than 
Congress that took the first step in the direction of a 
national standard of defamation. That first step occurred 
in 1964, when the Court held in New York times v.
Sullivan, that a public official could not collect damages 
by showing that statements about his official conduct were 
false, even if the publisher had been negligent in check­
ing the facts. He could not recover unless he could show 
that the false statement was "made with 'actual malice'—  
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not."-^
Although he has expressed some reservations about
the application of the New York Times rule in other kinds
of situations, Wright has been quite willing to apply it
to situations involving published criticisms of public
officials and their official conduct. In Washington
kPost Co. v. Keogh, writing for the majority of a divided
•̂Ibid.. 6^3-6^6. 2376 U.S. 25 .̂
3Ibid., 279-280.
^365 F. 2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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panel, he extended the New York Times rule to summary 
judgments. The case originated when the Washington Post 
published a Drew Pearson column containing allegations 
that a New York Congressman had accepted bribes. In the 
resulting libel suit, the District Judge denied the 
newspaper's motion for summary judgment, even though the 
Congressman was unable to make even a preliminary showing 
of malice. In reversing the lower court, Wright noted 
that summary judgments play an important part in prevent­
ing harassment by long and costly litigation where there 
is no real issue. He found it especially important when 
the First Amendment is involved because the ability to 
harass inhibits free debate. He explained:
The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit 
by a popular public official may be as chilling to 
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of 
the outcome of the lawsuit itself, especially to 
advocates of unpopular causes. All persons who 
desire to exercise their right to criticize public 
officials are not as well equipped financially as 
the Post to defend against a trial on the merits.1
But this application of the New York Times rule does not
imply that the Judge would use it in other kinds of cases.
In arguing for a national standard of defamation, he 
has suggested that such a standard should distinguish 
classes of cases based upon the subject matter of pub­
lished statements and the person who is the plaintiff. 
Based upon subject matter, there could be three categories
1Ibid., 968.
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of statements* (1) political; that is, directly related 
to elections or government; (2) public interest, a broad 
category including anything that would contribute to the 
development of understanding and sensitivity; and (3) 
private matters; that is, matters affecting only one 
person or a small group and in which there is no general 
interest until the publication itself creates curiosity. 
Based upon the plaintiff in the defamation suit, there 
could also be a threefold categorizations (1) public 
officials; (2) public figures; that is, persons who are 
by choice in the public spotlight and have access to the 
media to rebut statements about them; and (3) private 
individuals who do not voluntarily attract publicity and 
lack access to the media. The news media’s First Amend­
ment protection would be greatest when publication con­
cerns political matters and the plaintiff is a public 
official or a public figure.1
Although in real situations there may be disagree- 
ment as to which category is applicable, a case that 
would fit easily into the political matter-public figure
bright, "Defamation . . . New Approach," Texas Law 
Review, XLVI (April, 1968), 636-637.
2A case which illustrates this is Afro-American 
Publishing Co. v. Jaffe. 366 F.2d 6^9 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(en banc).The case involved a white man who operated 
a drugstore in a black neighborhood. He sold the Afro 
in his store until he decided that the paper had become 
too inflamatory and cancelled his subscription. The 
editor of the Afro published an article on the cancel­
lation, in which he called the druggist a bigot with
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category did come before a panel on which Wright sat. The 
case involved a public relations man who had taken active 
part in the District of Columbia presidential primary. He 
filed a libel suit against the Evening Star newspaper for 
calling him the "chief local spokesman of Malcolm X and 
his Black Muslim Mosque" and for accusing him of appealing 
to racist prejudice. The District Court granted summary 
judgment for the newspaper on grounds that the plaintiff, 
a public figure, had failed to show any fact from which 
malice could be inferred. The appeals panel on which 
Judge Wright sat unanimously affirmed the lower court's 
decision.1
Judge Wright has not had occasion to participate in 
a public figure-public interest case, but he has indica­
ted that he would not favor applying the rule of New York 
Times v. Sullivan to such a case. He agrees with Justice 
Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts that
a low opinion of the intelligence of black people. The 
druggist won a libel and invasion of privacy suit, which 
the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court considered the 
druggist a private individual and the cancellation a pri­
vate matter. But to Judge Bazelon, it was a matter of 
public interest— a white man determining how militant 
Negroes should be. Apparently Judge Wright's thoughts on 
the problem of defamation had not yet crystallized, for 
he expressed no opinion on the merits. He noted that the 
case had been tried before New York Times v. Sullivan and 
would have reversed and remanded for a new trial in the 
light of that decision.
1Thomnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
39^ F.2d 77^ (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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the plaintiff should be able to recover damages if he can 
shows "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme 
departure from the standards of investigation and report­
ing ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."3' 
From the plaintiff's standpoint, this would be somewhat 
less stringent than the New York Times rule, since he 
would not have to prove malice, only extreme negligence.
Judge Wright's behavior on the bench, however, has 
not been entirely consistent with the preferences he has 
expressed off the bench in relation to defamation and to 
the right of privacy. He participated in a per curiam 
decision reversing and remanding a summary judgment in 
favor of Time magazine in a libel suit. The suit was 
brought by an attorney who appeared in a Time photograph, 
seated at a restaurant table with six other men. The 
accompanying article referred to them as having a delayed 
lunch due to an earlier interruption when the District 
Attorney attempted to bring them before a grand jury in 
connection with an investigation of organized crime. But 
the attorney was not one of the people called before the 
grand jury. Time admitted to that knowledge but made an 
editorial decision that the attorney's attendance at the 
luncheon put him in the same category with the others.
1Ibid., 155» quoted at Wright, "Defamation . . . New 
Approach," Texas Law Review. XLVI (April, 1968), 64l.
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Based upon these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed 
the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial on 
the issue of malice.1
Although Judge Wright has indicated a preference for
Justice Harlan's position, which would permit a private
individual to collect damages if a publisher printed
false statements through extreme negligence, even without
malice, he wrote a concurring opinion in which he set
forth his view of the proper procedure for handling the
malice issue under New York Times v. Sullivan. Since the
Supreme Court had extended the New York Times rule to
oprivate individuals, it might appear that Wright was sim­
ply applying the law as it then existed, even though it 
conflicted with his own preferences. But that explanation 
is not satisfactory because Wright not only applied the 
New York Times rule, he applied it with a vengeance. He 
indicated that he would institute a two-step procedure in 
which the trial judge would have to find actual malice 
before the issue could go to a jury. If the judge finds 
actual malice, the issue would then be decided by the 
jury, and the jury would not be informed of the judge's 
prior decision. "This two-step procedure in which both
Vasserman v. Time. Inc., ^24 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), cert, denied 398 U.S. 9^0 (1970). Justices Black 
and Douglas, the First Amendment absolutists, would have 
granted certiorari.
2Time. Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 37^ (1967).
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the trial judge and the jury must find actual malice 
before there can be a judgment for the plaintiff provides 
the protection of the First Amendment freedom that Times 
sought to make secure in areas of public concern," said 
Wright.'1' He was speaking dnly for himself? therefore, the 
other two judges on the panel did not think Times required 
this two-step procedure. Since the two-step procedure 
would make it more difficult for the attorney to win a 
judgment, it is difficult to reconcile with Wright's 
stated preference for lowering the constitutional bar- 
riers somewhat where private individuals are concerned.
The problem for Wright, or for anyone who values 
both freedom of the press and the right to privacy, is 
that the two often come into conflict. The Judge, of 
course, recognizes this. In dealing with the conflict of 
values in the abstract, he has recommended the balancing 
test. One should balance the society's right to know, 
not against the individual's interest in privacy, but 
against the society's interest in the privacy of its 
members.-^ In concrete cases, however, Wright has usually 
found freedom of the press to weigh heavier on the scale.
F.2d 920, 923.
2It might be reconciled if Wright did not consider 
the attorney to be a private individual, but he did not 
discuss that issue.
-'"Defamation . . . New Approach," Texas Law Review.
XLVI, 633-63 .̂
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This has been true not only when the substance of printed 
matter has been challenged, as in defamation cases, but 
also in cases involving the manner in which the press 
gained its information.
Neither Wright nor the judges with whom he sat were 
willing to inhibit columnist Drew Pearson, in spite of 
his questionable methods. When Liberty Lobby, an ultra­
conservative group, sought to enjoin publication of 
material from its files, copied without the organization's 
consent, Judge Burger pronounced the words of the bal­
ancing test but added that "the balance is always in 
favor of free expression . . . ,"1 Judge Wright agreed 
and noted that lobbying, also a First Amendment right, 
usually promotes special interests. For that reason, it 
is "imperative that the freedom of speech and the press 
provisions of the First Amendment are not paralyzed while 
the right to petition by lobbying is being exercised."
Except for being aware of how the material was 
obtained, Pearson apparently was not involved in the 
invasion of Liberty Lobby's files. However, in a similar 
case, two members of Pearson's staff secretly copied 
material in the private files of Senator Thomas Dodd.
When Pearson used the material for articles on Dodd, the




Senator countered with a suit, not for libel, but for 
invasion of privacy. Again the court was reluctant to 
curb the press. According to Judge Wright's majority 
opinion, the published material "clearly bore on appel­
lee's qualifications as a United States Senator, and as 
such amounted to a paradigm example of published speech 
not subject to suit for invasion of privacy.
Judge Tamm, one of Wright's colleagues on the panel, 
raised the very valid point that there should be some 
legal recourse against such invasions of privacy. Judge 
Wright's opinion, however, does not foreclose the possi­
bility of recourse. His opinion, in fact, approvingly 
recognizes development of the common law in some juris­
dictions to protect citizen against citizen, just as the 
Fourth Amendment protects citizen against government.3 
His opinion is completely devoid of any approbation of 
newsgathering techniques that include breaking into a 
person's home or office in order to gain access to papers. 
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press 
guarantees the right to publish information, but it does 
not immunize against all sanctions the actions by which 
the information is gained.
1Pearson v. Dodd. *U0 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 




Peace Demonstrations and the First 
And Fifth Amendments
There is a clear distinction between what Drew 
Pearson published and the actions which secured his 
information. But peace demonstrators protesting United 
States involvement in Vietnam often used their actions as 
a means of communicating their message. They sometimes 
attempted to blur the distinction between speech and 
action. However, even First Amendment absolutists have 
not said that the First Amendment protects all actions 
associated with speech.
Judge Wright, who is not a First Amendment absolu­
tist, has participated in cases involving the prosecution 
of peace demonstrators for breach of the peace. The dem­
onstrators engaged in such activities as singing and 
speech-making, while blocking walkways on the Capitol 
grounds and corridors in the Capitol itself. Since they 
were never informed which of several possible breach of 
the peace statutes they were supposed to have violated, 
they could not properly make out their defense, and the 
Court of Appeals would not permit the convictions to 
stand.*1" Judge Wright subscribed to Judge Prettyman's 
opinion that the demonstrators
Neeley v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 216 (1967); 
Jalbert v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 233 (1967);
Smith v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 233 (1967).
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were entitled to a definite reference to the law 
which they allegedly violated. In view of the 
confusion apparent in the enforcement of these 
and related statutes, we commend to executive and 
legislative authorities a review of this entire 
area of law.l
When peace demonstrators raised what was clearly a 
First Amendment issue, Judge Wright made no attempt to 
circumvent it and would have gone beyond the other members 
of the panel. He would have required the National Park 
Service immediately to permit an organization called 
Women Strike for Peace to erect a large visual display on 
the Ellipse, an area near the White House. While he would 
not compromise his opinion, the practicalities of the 
situation required him to compromise his vote.
All three members of the appeals panel would have
disposed of the matter differently. At one extreme was
Judge Robb, who simply denied that the First Amendment
gave people the right to clutter public parks with bill- 
2boards. At the other extreme was Judge Wright, who would 
have ordered issuance of a permit immediately. Wright 
noted that government may enact regulations on conduct 
that incidentally restrict speech, but only if there is a
Smith v. District of Columbia. 387 F.2d 233, 237 
(D.C. Cir. 196771 Later, Judge Wright authored a similar 
opinion in a case involving not anti-war demonstrators but 
an attorney involved in a disturbance before the House Un- 
American Activities Committee. Kinnoy v. District of 
Columbia. ^00 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Ŵomen Strike for Peace v. Hickel. ^20 F.2d 597,606 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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compelling government interest, and the burden of proving 
a compelling interest rests on the government. "In this 
case," he said, "the Park Service has not only failed to 
meet this burden, it has been unable to articulate any 
policy in support of its action beyond its general judg­
ment that appellant's display is not 'appropriate.'
Judge Leventhal took a position between the extremes, but 
closer to Judge Wright. Leventhal noted that a private 
group customarily erected a visual display on the Ellipse 
in conjunction with the annual Christmas pageant. In 
refusing to permit the anti-war display, the Park Service 
had not made it clear whether the refusal was due to the 
size of the display or its theme. While the former might 
pass constitutional muster, the latter was constitutionr- 
ally forbidden. Leventhal thought the matter should be 
remanded, so the National Park Service could draft a clear 
set of guidelines.
Had the judges voted as their opinions indicated 
they were inclined, the panel would have been deadlocked, 
and the National Park Service’s order would have stood. 
That, to Judge Wright, would have been an unacceptable 
result. Although he did not think that the anti-war group 




he cast his vote with Judge Leventhal in order to get the 
least objectionable decision. The liberal rhetoric of 
Wright's opinion did not stand in the way of an opportu­
nity to influence the result.
Freedom of Association and Congressional 
Investigations
Not everyone is as eager as the anti-war activists to 
publicize his political beliefs. This is particularly 
true if one’s political beliefs induce him to join unpopu­
lar groups, such as the Communist Party or the Ku Klux 
Klan. In investigating organizations of this type, con­
gressional committees have compelled persons to appear at 
hearings and have sought to compell testimony regarding 
their organizations and activities. The task of protec­
ting the constitutional rights of such persons against 
violation by investigating committees has fallen to the 
courts.
As in controversies involving anti-war demonstrators, 
procedural irregularities have sometimes been more impor­
tant than the application of the First Amendment in the 
disposition of appeals from the actions of congressional 
committees and subcommittees. Two cases involving dif­
ferent men named Robert Shelton indicate that Wright is 
willing to protect the right of freedom of association on 
either procedural or constitutional grounds. The first 
Robert Shelton, an employee of the New York Times, refused 
to answer certain questions put to him by a Senate
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subcommittee investigating Communist infiltration of the 
press. In writing for the majority of a divided panel, 
Judge Wright observed that the court was being asked to 
balance the right of Congress to know against the rights 
of individuals to be let alone. "We shrink from this 
awesome task," he said, "and adopt a narrower disposition 
of this case which will not require resolution of the 
constitutional problem presented."'*' The contempt convic­
tion was reversed because of a procedural irregularity. 
Wright was quite willing to avoid a constitutional def­
inition of the relationship between the First Amendment 
and Congress' investigatory power if he could reach the 
desired result on procedural grounds.
In the case of the second Robert Shelton, who was 
the Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, Wright did indi­
cate that certain limitations on Congress' investigatory 
power emanates directly from the First Amendment. Since
Shelton v. United States. 327 F.2d 601, 605 
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
2For a similar case which Wright decided on pro­
cedural grounds, see Liveright v. United States. 3^7 F.2d 
M-73 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Judge Burger, also on the panel, 
was much more the constitutional activist. He thought "it 
would make more sense to face the constitutional questions 
than to indulge in the strained rationalizations which 
underlie much of the law in this field." Ibid., ^77. For 
a justification, from a libertarian viewpoint, of judicial 
activism in this field of law, see Martin Shapiro, Law and 
Politics in the Supreme Court: New Approaches to
Political Jurisprudence (New Yorkt The Free iPress of 
Glencoe, 19^*0 » pp* <39-70•
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Shelton denied the committee all cooperation whatsoever, 
Wright concurred in the court's affirmance of his contempt 
conviction. The Judge did, however, write a concurring 
opinion indicating that he was as willing to protect 
privacy in the association of Klansmen as he was to pro­
tect N.A.A.C.P. members' rights to privacy in their asso­
ciations when he was a District Judge.1 He explicitly 
disavowed any implication that the House Un-American 
Activities Committee had power to subpoena the membership 
lists of any political organization. Although congres­
sional committees have legitimate authority to seek infor­
mation on which to base legislation, "few objects of 
investigation are more useful for purposes of exposure 
and punishment, while having less relevance as a factual 
background for legislative deliberation, than membership 
lists of unpopular groups," he said.
Thus has Judge Wright defended the exercise of free­
dom of speech and freedom of association. He has defended 
these rights through direct application of the First 
Amendment, as well as through insistance on procedural 
regularities. He has not said that the First Amendment 
exempts mass demonstrators from the consequences of ille­
gal behavior, but he has supported their right to due
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P.,
181 F.Supp. 37 (E.D. La. I960).
Zk0b F.2d 1292, 1307.
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process of law. He has not denied that congressional com­
mittees and subcommittees have the power to subpoena 
witnesses and records, other than membership lists, but 
he has insisted that such committees comply with their own 
rules.
Due Process and Administrative Agencies
In addition to its use as a buttress for First Amend­
ment rights, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law has often been used in a non­
criminal context to challenge actions of administrative 
agencies. When these actions have involved technological 
regulation or the regulation of economic interests, Judge 
Wright and the courts in general have shown reluctance to 
second-guess the decisions of administrators who must 
apply the law to situations in which statutory words 
often provide no firm guidance. Judge Wright and his 
brethren have not abdicated their power of judicial review 
over administrative agencies and have sometimes cautioned 
administrators while sustaining their decisions.
■̂ In some situations, the law is clear, yet adminis­
trators are blamed for enforcing it. A panel on which 
Judge Wright sat had no difficulty supporting the Com­
missioner of Patents against a due process challenge by 
an individual who was given proper notice but forfeited 
a patent because, through a clerical error on his part, 
he did not pay a fee on time. Brenner v. Ebbert,
398 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Exercising the restraint of a typical post-New Deal 
liberal in such matters, Wright has been unwilling to 
void administrative orders simply because they were not 
preceded by an administrative hearing.^ But he has warned 
that in some situations a hearing is required. In his 
words, "It is implicit in the concept of due process that 
where government action, which directly affects protected 
private interests, depends on findings of fact, the person 
whose interests are affected must be given an opportunity
pto disprove the evidence relied on by government."
In effect, he gave clear notice of procedure which 
the courts would not be likely to tolerate. Other warn­
ings, however, have been so vague as to leave the adminis­
trative agency completely unfettered. In the anonymity of 
a per curiam opinion, Wright joined in sustaining a Fed­
eral Communications Commission decision, made without a 
hearing, that political candidates were only entitled to 
equal opportunity to answer other announced candidates.
The court cautioned against a mechanical application of 
the rule that could result in constitutional difficulties, 
but it offered no guidelines as to what would constitute
^See Railway Express Agency v. Civil Aeronautics 
Board, 3^5 F.2d kb5 (D.C. Cir. 1965)5 Lawrence Typograph­
ical Union v. McCulloch. 3^9 F.2d 70^ (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23^9 F.2d 70^, 709 (concurring).
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"mechanical" application of the rule or what kind of 
constitutional difficulties might arise.^
Procedure is not the only grounds on which the due 
process clause is invoked in relation to administrative 
actions. While an agency's procedures may not he ques­
tioned j the substance of specific decisions are sometimes 
challenged on grounds that they are arbitrary and unrea­
sonable , and thus in violation of the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. It is a rare occasion when such 
a challenge results in the revocation of an administrative 
decision. When a bus company challenged the reasonable­
ness of a Department of the Interior regulation, Judge 
Wright advised the company to "seek a political, rather 
than a judicial, solution to its problem."
As a result of the Supreme Court's broadening of the 
concept of standing,-^administrative decisions have become 
increasingly subject to challenge in the courts. Follow­
ing the Supreme Court, a panel on which Judge Wright par­
ticipated unanimously reversed a District Court decision 
that poor people lacked standing to challenge a figure 
computed by the Department of Agriculture and which played
1McCarthv v. F.C.C.. 390 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2Udall v. Washington. Virginia and Maryland Coach 
Co., 398 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1968)7
3Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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an important part in the distribution of food stamps. The 
Court of Appeals noted that there was sufficient nexus 
between poor people and the claim the raised to give 
them standing.'*' But this decision and the Supreme Court 
decision from which it flowed have only provided easier 
access to a judicial forum. While administrators may be 
required to justify publicly more of their decisions, 
courts will not reject administrative economic decisions 
as long as they can be shown to have some reasonable 
basis.
The Court of Appeals has been somewhat more demand­
ing in its review of administrative decisions with civil 
rights overtones, but even then it has tread lightly.
Judge Wright was spokesman for a unanimous panel which 
acknowledged that an alleged racketeer had a right to 
judicial review of his deportation by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. Shortly after taking office, 
Attorney General Kennedy announced a drive to convict or 
deport one hundred persons said to be underworld figures, 
and the appellant's name was on the list. Consequently, 
he argued that Immigration and Naturalization Service 
officials had not exercised any discretion in his case 
but had simply tried to please the Attorney General. 
Through Judge Wright, the court unanimously agreed that
1Peonles v. United States Department of Agriculture.
F.2d 5^1 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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there should he an opportunity to prove prejudgment, hut 
it also observed that prejudgment would be difficult to 
prove.1
In recent years, protesters of the Vietnam war have 
been instrumental in narrowing the administrative discre­
tion of local draft boards. Through Judge Wright, a 
unanimous panel asserted that a local draft board had no 
power to deny a protester the fatherhood deferment to 
which he was entitled under a presidential regulation. 
Even so, the court did not lightly abandon its customary 
role of restraint in relation to administrative agencies. 
It cautiously withheld decision pending Supreme Court 
disposition of a number of similar cases, and then simply 
followed the path of the Supreme Court.^
In defending the rights of civil servants, Judge 
Wright has remained a thoroughgoing libertarian. He has 
not always been alone in his libertarian stance and wrote
^Bufalino v. Kennedy. 322 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
While the decision acknowledged that some activity of the 
Attorney General might be within judicial reach, neither 
Wright nor the other judges have considered inactivity by 
the Attorney General to be within the purview of the 
courts. They acknowledged that whether or when to prose­
cute is solely within the discretion of the Attorney Gen­
eral. Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. I965)
2Shea v. Mitchell. ^21 F.2d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3-'The Supreme Court decisions cited by Judge Wright 
were Oestereich v. Selective Service System. 393 U.S. 233 
(1968)} Gutknecht v. United States. 396 uTs~. 295 (1970); 
Breen v. Selective Service System. 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
for a unanimous panel that the government could not base 
the discharge of a civilian Air Force employee on evi­
dence gained through a general search conducted by 
Japanese officials but initiated by United States offi­
cials. Wright indicated that evidence submitted at dis­
charge proceedings must be "evidence submitted without 
violating the Constitution of the United States."3' Judge 
Wright's opinion was later quoted by the Court of Claims 
when it awarded back pay to a civilian employee whose
pdischarge had been based upon unlawfully seized evidence.
Wright has sometimes been more venturesome than his 
brethren in attacking the arbitrary discharge of civil 
servants from their jobs. In Dew v. Halabv,3 the majority 
of an appeals panel sustained the dismissal of a Civil 
Aeronautics Authority employee who had previously been 
employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. While with 
the C.I.A., he had taken a lie detector test during a se­
curity clearance and admitted to having performed homo­
sexual acts while in his teens and to having smoked 
marijuana on at least five occasions prior to 1952. He 
was given an opportunity to resign and did so. Later, 
after working for the Civil Aeronautics Authority for
T̂owell v. Zuckert. 366 F.2d 63^, 6^0 (D.C. Cir.1966).
2Savlor v. United States. 37^ F.2d 89^, 898 (1967).
3317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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almost two years, he was discharged from that job because 
of the incidents he had admitted to the C.I.A. The Civil 
Service Commission upheld the action. When Dew appealed 
to the judiciary, the Court of Appeals deferred to the 
Civil Service Commission on grounds that the court lacked 
the background and experience to say that Dew’s discharge 
would not contribute to the efficiency of the service.
Although the majority used the language of judicial 
restraint, Judge Wright accused it of improper activism.
His point was that there had been no administrative find­
ing of a connection between Dew's past conduct and his job 
performance. At one of the administrative hearings, a 
personnel officer had, in fact, admitted that there was no 
evidence of incompetence. In rejecting the majority's 
acceptance of the possibility that Dew's past conduct 
could affect the efficiency of the civil service, Wright 
said i
This court's rationalization on the subject can 
hardly serve in the absence of findings. Under 
the law, the court’s responsibility is to review 
administrative findings, not to make them.l
Several years later, in 1969* Wright had the satis­
faction of participating in a decision that required 
administrative agencies to justify an employee's dismissal 
with more than evidence of homosexuality. Chief Judge 
David Bazelon required the agency to show that the
1Ibid., 591
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dismissal would contribute to the efficiency of the civil
service. He specifically alluded to the Dew decision and
noted that it was over strong dissent.’1' But this decision
too was over strong dissent. Bazelon and Wright were
accused of rushing out, "robes flying, into the forbidden
area of administrative discretion to give kind assistance
to the subjects of what it /the majority/ feels to be
highwayman tactics at the hands of the Civil Service Com- 
„2mission.
But Wright would deny that he has entered a forbid­
den area. His opinions indicate that when the rights of 
civil servants are at issue, he considers federal admin­
istrative agencies as vulnerable to judicial intervention 
as local school boards or policemen.
Norton v. Macy, ^17 F.2d ll6l. In this case there 
were no security problems because of the nature of the 
work, the appellant's superior had testified to his com­
petence , his fellow workers were unaware of his homosex­
uality, and his job did not bring him into contact with 
the public.
2Ibid., 1168. The acrimonious debate continued in 
Adams v, Laird. ^20 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969) cert, 
denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970). The facts were somewhat 
different in that the challenged action was the termina­
tion of a security clearance. The composition of the 
appeals panel was also different, which pushed Wright back 
into a dissenter's position, but he continued to argue 
that an individual is entitled to "a decision in which 




In lawsuits in which one of the adversaries is a lone 
individual facing a governmental agency or even the 
"United States" itself, the inequality of the contestants 
is magnified. However, lawsuits involving landlord- 
tenant relations have, for the most part, involved private 
litigants. This does not mean that the litigants have 
been economic or political equals. In the battle of con­
flicting interests between landlords and tenants waged in 
the courts of the District of Columbia, Wright's liberal 
ideology led him to espouse the tenants' cause. In doing 
so, he participated in the alteration of legal relation­
ships. This venture in social engineering required a va­
riety of legal tools* the Constitution, the District of 
Columbia Housing Code, the intent of the District of 
Columbia Commissioners, and judicial rules of contract 
law.
Wright entered the fray during his second year as an 
appellate judge, when he wrote a majority opinion denying 
claims by rooming house and apartment operators that the 
fire safety provisions of the housing code denied them 
due process of law.1 But the existance of a housing code 
containing safety and sanitary provisions is no assurance 
that the code will be observed.
1Jones v. District of Columbia, 323 P.2d 306 
(D.C. Cir. 196371
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The First Amendment was injected into the landlord- 
tenant conflict when a tenant complained to the housing 
authority that the sanitary conditions in her rented 
house did not meet housing code requirements. The land­
lord attempted to evict her, and she argued that the 
eviction was in retaliation for having reported the 
housing code violations, although she had also withheld 
rent. At the preliminary hearing, Judge Harold Greene1 
found that her allegations were substantiated, but a dif­
ferent judge presided at the trial. The trial judge 
accepted the landlord's contention that eviction was for 
non-payment of rent and did not let the tenant's defense 
go to the jury.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia issued a per curiam order staying the eviction 
until the tenant's allegations could be determined in 
court, provided the rent was paid. In addition to 
joining the per curiam stay order, Judge Wright wrote a 
separate opinion in which he expressed his agreement with 
Judge Greene that a landlord may evict for any legal rea­
son, but cannot evict for the illegal reason of punishing
^ e  had previously served in the Civil Rights Divi­
sion of the Department of Justice and had appeared in 
Judge Wright's court during the desegregation controversy 
in Louisiana. See Times-Picavune. August 5» 1961, pp. 1, 
3? Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F.Supp. 649 
(E.D. La. l9£iT
Êdwards v. Habib. 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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a tenant for exercising the constitutional right to report 
violations of law. If the tenant can prove that the evic­
tion was in retaliation, "then a court may not participate 
with the landlord in the implementation of his illegal 
purpose."1 Wright also expressed the belief that the 
tenant would prevail on the merits and that the landlord
would not be harmed by the stay, since it was conditioned
2upon payment of rent. Judge Danaher, in dissent, 
defended the landlord. He noted that the tenant admitted 
withholding rent and knew the condition of the house when 
she moved in. "It would seem that the landlord, too, has 
constitutional rights," protested Danaher, "for the Fifth 
Amendment provides that he shall not be deprived of his 
property without due process of law."3
In the court below, Judge Danaher's position pre­
vailed. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals (a 
part of the municipal court system and not to be con­
fused with the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit on which Judge Wright sits) decided that 
the tenant had a right to report violations of the hous­
ing code, but, since no specific legislation protected the 
right, the courts had no authority to intervene in the 
legal relationship between landlord and tenant. The 
decision, however, did not withstand appeal.
1Ibid., 630. 2Ibid. 3Ibid.
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The same panel that granted the stay reversed the 
lower court and held that when the District of Columbia 
Commissioners, at the direction of Congress, promulgated 
the housing code, there was an implied change in the 
rights of landlords and tenants. As a matter of statu­
tory construction, a majority of the panel decided that 
proof of a retaliatory motive on the part of the landlord 
was a defense against eviction, otherwise the purpose of 
the housing code would be defeated. Whether the land­
lord's motive was or was not retaliatory was to be decided 
by the court or the jury.1
The majority opinion was only part of a longer 
opinion by Judge Wright. In parts I and II of the opin­
ion, he spoke only for himself and discussed the question 
of retaliatory evictions in constitutional terms. He 
explored a number of constitutional paths, all leading to 
the same end— judicial protection for the tenant. Because 
the First Amendment limits government, not individuals 
such as landlords, Wright examined the concept of "state 
action." In Fourteenth Amendment cases, it was determined 
that the states could not act through their courts to give 
effect to private discrimination. He saw no reason for 
giving the concept of "state action" a more restricted 
meaning in relation to the First Amendment right to peti­
tion government. If the First Amendment alone was not
Edwards v. Habib. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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sufficient, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
provided considerable flexibility. He noted that courts 
might also utilize the balancing test or the test of rea­
sonableness. If the balancing test is used, the land­
lord's rights are balanced against the tenant's First 
Amendment rights, and the latter wins because of the First 
Amendment's preferred position. If the test of reason­
ableness is used, the tenant's First Amendment rights are 
protected because the purpose of the housing code is to 
protect tenants.^
In the second part of the opinion, Wright considered 
Judge Greene’s less orthodox approach to the question of 
retaliatory evictions and made a number of approving 
references to Greene's "thoughtful opinion." Rather than 
rely on specific constitutional provisions, Wright agreed 
that one can make a persuasive argument that "the right 
to petition government for redress of grievances and the 
right to inform the government of violations of law 
/are7 rights of federal citizenship arising from our con­
stitutional system as a whole, not just from the First 
Amendment or from any other particular constitutional 
clause or provision." But he concluded that it was not
^ b i d . , 690-696.
pIbid., 697. Constitutional lawyer Charles L. Black 
has advocated this type of approach in Structure and 
Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton Rouges 
Louisiana State University Press, 1969).
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necessary to decide any of these constitutional argu­
ments, since a majority of the court was able to resolve 
the controversy by statutory construction.1
Why, then, the lengthy opinion, if more than half of 
it was not necessary to decide the case? For a policy- 
oriented judge like Wright, it was more than an intellec­
tual exercise in constitutional manipulation. He was 
apparently laying groundwork for the idea that irrespec­
tive of legislative intent, there were still ample 
constitutional grounds on which courts could protect 
tenants from retaliatory evictions. Moreover, judges in 
other jurisdictions could use his constitutional argu­
ments should they be so inclined. A handbook for poverty 
lawyers has, in fact, urged that lawyers representing 
tenants in retaliatory eviction cases raise all of the
theories and analysis contained in Judge Wright’s Edwards
. . 2 opinion.
The opinion has indeed been influential. One 
Federal District Court accepted the "state action" argu­
ment and denied that state courts could constitutionally 
aid a landlord in evicting a tenant for exercising his 
right to report housing code violations, even if state
1397 F.2d 687, 698.
2National Institute for Education in Law and Poverty, 
Handbook on Housing Law. II (2 vols.; Chicagot 
Northwestern University School of Law, 1969), p. L-T 
Ch.Ill-4.
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law rejected the retaliatory eviction defense.^ State 
courts in Florida, Michigan, and New York followed 
Edwards without deciding the constitutional questions 
raised. They considered that retaliatory evictions 
would defeat the public policy to be furthered by the 
housing code. Further indication of the influence of 
Judge Wright's Edwards opinion is that it is being 
included in casebooks and taught in the law schools.-*
Although less influential than his Edwards opinion,
Judge Wright authored another opinion on landlord-tenant 
relations that was a model of creative jurisprudence.
The case was Javins v. First National Realty Corporation,̂  
and it arose when some tenants in the District of Columbia 
withheld rent as a means of pressuring their landlord into 
correcting existing housing code violations. The landlord 
attempted to evict for non-payment of rent, and the ten­
ants sought to defeat the landlord's action.
In deciding the controversy, Judge Wright turned not 
to the Constitution but to the law of leases and con­
tracts. He observed that the rules governing leases 
originated during feudal times when society was
'hiosey v. Club Van Courtlandt, 299 F.Supp. 501 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) cited in Ibid.. p. L-T Ch.III-6.
2See Ibid., pp. L-T Ch.III-6-7.
^See Curtis J. Berger (ed.), Cases and Materials on 
Housing (St. Pauls West Publishing Co., 1969), p. 636.
S 28 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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predominantly agrarian. In those days, a lease conveyed 
an interest in land. In most instances, this was no 
longer true, and Wright considered that the courts had 
"a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the light of the 
facts and values of contemporary life— particularly old 
common law doctrines which the courts themselves created 
and developed."^ In our predominantly urban, industrial 
society, the land beneath an apartment building is not of 
prime concern to the apartment lesee. "When American city 
dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today," said 
Wright, "they seek a well known package of goods and ser­
vices— a package which includes not merely walls and 
ceilings, but also adequate heat, light, and ventilation, 
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, 
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance."
Since the rules governing leases were not appropriate 
in this context, Wright would treat leases of urban dwel­
ling units like other contracts. Into the contract, he 
read a warranty of habitability, just as courts have come 
to place responsibility in sellers that goods are fit for 
the purpose for which they are sold.3 In any event, he 
considered that the District of Columbia housing code 
required a warranty of habitability or the purpose of the 
code would be defeated. He assumed that a warranty of
1Ibid. , 107*1-. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. , 1075-1076.
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habitability was not explicitly included in the contract 
because both parties took it for granted.'1’
Once it was established that the leases in question 
were to be treated like other contracts, it became pos­
sible to protect the tenant from eviction for non-payment 
of rent, since the landlord was entitled to collect rent 
only if he fulfilled his part of the contract. Wright 
concluded that the tenant must have an opportunity to show 
that the landlord did not live up to his contractual obli­
gations. This could be done by proving housing code 
violations at trial. Only if the landlord wins the case 
can he evict for non-payment. If the trial result is that 
the tenants are only partly released from their rent, the
landlord cannot evict as long as the tenant pays what is 
2due. The Judge suggested that rent be paid to the court 
pending a decision.-* Although the landlord sought to have 
the matter reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court denied 
certiorari.^
Wright's Javins opinion was influential in the 
District of Columbia. Other panels, on which he did not 
participate, carried the principles of the decision even
1Ibid.. 1080-1081. 2Ibid.» 1082-1083.
3Ibid., 1083, n. 67.
\ o o  u.s. 925 (1971).
219
further.^ Outside the District of Columbia, however, a 
tenant's right to withhold rent because of housing code 
violations depends upon state law. Against a constitu­
tional challenge on due process grounds, the Supreme 
Court has upheld an Oregon law which denies tenants the 
right to offer the landlord's failure to comply with the 
housing code as a defense for nonpayment of rent in evic­
tion proceedings. According to the Court, "The Constitu­
tion has not federalized the substantive law of landlord- 
tenant relations . . . and we see nothing to forbid Oregon 
from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of 
the landlord as independent rather than dependent
pcovenants." It was in Justice Douglas' dissenting opin­
ion that Wright's ideas were most prominent. Douglas 
thought the problem began with Wright's statement in the 
Javins case regarding the expectations of American city 
dwellers when they seek shelter.-^ He also approved of 
Wright's suggestion that withheld rent be paid to the
“4ciine v. Massachusetts Ave. Ant. Corp.. 439 F.2d 699 (1970) made the landlord, under certain circumstances, 
liable for damages resulting from criminal attacks on 
tenants in the common hallways of an apartment building.
In Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669 (1971)» "the court 
required a tenant to pay less than full rent to the court 
pending appeal after an initial decision that the landlord 
was in violation of the housing code.
^Lindsay v. Normet, 92 S.Ct. 862, 87I (1972).
3Ibid.. 880.
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court pending settlement of the dispute.'1' Dissents, how­
ever, have no immediate effect on public policy; therefore, 
there is small satisfaction to be gained by winning the 
approval of a dissenter, and Judge Wright admits that he 
was unhappy with the Lindsay decision.
Although the Supreme Court has not read the prin­
ciples of Wright's Javins opinion into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court has not affected the validity of that 
decision in the District of Columbia because it did not 
rest on constitutional grounds. Neither was Edwards v. 
Habib decided on constitutional grounds. In that case, 
however, Wright did provide an extensive discussion of the 
constitutional issues involved in retaliatory evictions. 
Should the proper case reach the Supreme Court, it may yet 
protect tenants from retaliatory evictions, even though 
the Court has not legitimized rent strikes.-^ Certainly, 
Judge Wright has provided a choice of constitutional 
routes to that end.
•*Tbid. , 882. interview: Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
•^There is some indication that the Chief Justice 
might be unsympathetic to a landlord’s use of his power 
of eviction to penalize the tenant's exercise of the 
First Amendment right to petition government for a redress 
of grievances. While still a member of the Court of 
Appeals, Judge Burger, as well as Judge Wright, joined an 
opinion in which a panel denied that government could 
exercise even its lawful power government employees' 
organizations in a manner that clashed with constitutional 
rights. National Assoc, of Gov't Employees v. White, 
k l 8 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969). There remains, of course, 
the possibility that Burger would not find a private 
individual's actions as restricted as government's.
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In the landlord-tenant controversy, as in controver­
sies involving the First and Fifth Amendments, Judge 
Wright has used the discretion of his office to further 
the volues of political liberalism. This has meant 
defending individual liberty against governmental 
restraint and, in the case of private litigation, being in 
sympathy with the traditionally disadvantaged party or 
group. One significant deviation from this approach was 
his emergency order permitting blood transfusions over 
the religious objections of a critically ill hospital 
patient. His order, however, decided no constitutional 
questions; it merely maintained the status quo. In other 
circumstances, with time for the usual research and 
reflection, he might very well decide that the free exer­
cise of religion clause permits a person to accept death 
rather than violate religious principles.
CHAPTER VII
JUDGE J. SKELLY WRIGHT* RETROSPECT~
PROS PECT--EVALUATION
The public career of Judge J. Skelly Wright has 
spanned thirty-seven years, beginning in 1937 on the 
staff of the United States Attorney for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana, before even the most senior member 
of the present Supreme Court was appointed to that high 
tribunal. Although this study of Judge Wright's career 
and constitutional approach does not yield generalizations 
about lower federal judges as a whole, it does permit one 
to examine and evaluate one judge's approach to the 
Constitution and his place in the American constitutional 
scheme. Such a study also provides certain insights which 
may be useful to an understanding of the judicial process.
Although federal district judges usually come from 
the district in which they serve and have strong local 
ties, Judge Wright's case suggests that local values may 
be weaker in judges whose most significant pre-judicial 
career experiences took place outside the local political 
system than in an individual who has had an active role 
in the local political system. Wright unquestionably had
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strong local ties. He was born, grew up, and was edu­
cated in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and his 
connection with the local political system, through his 
family, made his appointment as Assistant United States 
Attorney possible. At no time was he active in state 
and local politics, and after his appointment to the 
United States Attorney's staff, his position required him 
to represent the interests of the United States, as 
opposed to state or local interests.
Wright's appointment as Assistant United States 
Attorney was apparently the beginning of a growing attach­
ment to the values of contemporary political liberalism.
He entered the United States Attorney's office during 
the Great Depression, a time when most people were looking 
to Washington for help, as evidenced by the 193& election 
returns. Only months before he joined Rene Viosca's 
staff, the Supreme Court had made its well known "switch 
in time"1and began to uphold New Deal legislation. The 
legal, political, and economic atmosphere was hardly con­
ducive to sentiments of state sovereignty. Wright himself 
contributed to the decline of state sovereignty when he
1The reference is, of course, to the change in 
voting position by Justice Roberts and Chief Justice 
Hughes, which resulted in upholding New Deal legislation 
and saving the Supreme Court from Roosevelt's "packing" 
plan. The first important decision reflecting the 
realignment was N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (193 IT -
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assisted in the prosecution of the Classic case, which 
resulted in greater power for the national government in 
the regulation of congressional elections.
Wright's liberal tendencies were further stimulated 
when his experiences during the war years led him to 
question some of the values of the society in which he 
lived. After the war, his private law practice in 
Washington provided the opportunity to appear before the 
Supreme Court, a significant experience for any lawyer, 
and for Wright the experience was in defense of civil 
rights. As United States Attorney, he was made aware of 
attacks on the voting rights of blacks. All these experi­
ences affected his political outlook.
Wright's liberal tendencies came to fruition when he 
put on the judicial robe and was freed from political 
pressures. He expressed his new sense of freedom by 
assuming the role of a liberal, policy-oriented judge.
Like other post-New Deal liberals, he has not obstructed 
governmental economic regulation by either state or 
federal agencies, but even in economic matters, his policy 
orientation has been obvious. When he objected to econ­
omic policy adopted by state government, such as price- 
fixing, he upheld its constitutionality, but he used the 
discretion of his office to write an opinion that was 
highly critical of price-fixing and urged the Supreme 
Court to reconsider the issue. The unorganized consumer
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bore the burden of price-fixing, so it was repugnant to 
his liberal policy preferences. Ordinarily, however, 
Wright has accepted economic regulation by all levels of 
government. When federal administrative agencies met 
opposition from Wright, it was not over their economic 
decisions, but over decisions with civil rights overtones, 
such as the arbitrary dismissal of civil servants.
It is, in fact, in the field of civil rights that 
liberal judges have most sought to influence public 
policy, and Judge Wright has clearly defined his role as 
that of protector of civil rights. During his years as a 
judge, he has responded favorably and with increasing 
force to demands for racial equality. He began modestly 
during the era of "separate but equal," applying that doc­
trine without hint of disapproval, but always finding that 
the facilities in question were separate but unequal and 
ordering a previously segregated facility to admit the 
complaining black. After the Brown decisions, Wright 
used all the powers of his office to enforce them in his 
District, criticizing segregation in moral, as well as 
legal, terms.
The resistance of state authorities to desegregation 
and Wright's response to their opposition attracted 
national attention and ultimately resulted in Wright’s 
elevation to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. Had he not been a policy
oriented judge, he might have enjoyed his "moment in the 
sun," picked up his honory degrees— he received them from 
Yale, Notre Dame, and Howard Universities— and gradually 
lapsed into relative obscurity. Instead, Judge Wright 
grasped every opportunity to influence opinion of public 
policy and used his national reputation to increase his 
off-the-bench activity. In his first major effort after 
his promotion, he used his James Madison Lecture at New 
York University to attack de facto segregation. The 
unusual circumstances of the Hobson v. Hansen controversy 
gave him the opportunity to extend the law in the direc­
tion of the values he promoted off the bench, and he held 
that de facto segregation in the District of Columbia 
denied equal educational opportunity to poor blacks. The 
demographic characteristics of the District of Columbia 
prevented any real integration of the public schools, but 
Wright's order prodded school officials to make greater 
efforts at providing equal educational opportunity for the 
black children who comprise the majority of the public 
school population of the District. He brought this con­
cept of equal educational opportunity even into the area 
of voting rights and refused to lift the literacy test 
ban of the 19^5 Voting Rights Act when blacks were educa­
tionally disadvantaged.
Wright’s tendency to use all the resources of his 
office to promote his liberal policy preferences has been
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as evident in the area of criminal procedure as in the 
area of racial equality. As a District Judge, he com­
plained that the Supreme Court had not gone far enough 
in protecting the rights of the accused. During the 
I960's, however, the Court would give him little grounds 
for complaint, as it actively broadened the rights of 
persons accused of crime and handed down a number of 
landmark decisions.’1' As a Circuit Judge, Wright was very 
much in agreement with the policies of the Warren Court, 
as was a sizeable bloc of judges of the court on which 
he sits. Because of this favorable legal environment 
during most of his years as a Circuit Judge, and because 
he is rule-oriented as well as policy-oriented, he has 
not been a frequent dissenter.-* Consequently, he has 
often relied on concurring opinions to influence policy. 
He has voted to affirm convictions on grounds that the
For example, see Mapx? v. Ohio, 36? U.S. 64-3 (1961); 
Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. *+78 (196*0; Miranda v. Arizona,
38*1 U.S. *+36 (1966).
2See Sheldon Goldman, "Politics, Judges, and the 
Administration of Justices The Backgrounds, Recruitment, 
and Decisional Tendencies of the Judges on the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 1961-*+" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1965), p. I87. See 
also, "Rigging of Judicial Panels in Court of Appeals 
Denied— Attorneys Suspicious of System," Washington 
Post, June 15, 19&9, printed in U.S., Congressional 
Record, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., CXV, Part 12, p. 160*1-3.
3-'The Watts free speech case, however, indicates that 
he can be effective in that role. See pp. 183-18*+ above.
228
Mallory Rule may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal. Yet, he has used his concurring opinion to sug­
gest that failure to invoke the Mallory Rule below may 
have been due to ineffective counsel, which would not 
satisfy the Sixth Amendment.1 For all practical purposes, 
he was inviting defense lawyers to test the theory. In 
the "spontaneous apology" case, he agreed that affirmance 
of the conviction was proper, but he used his concurring 
opinion to expose improper criminal procedure and warn 
against its continuance. The very frequency of his 
concurring opinions testifies to his efforts to influence 
the development of law even when he agrees that the court 
has decided correctly according to existing law.
Judge Wright's policy orientation toward liberal 
values is particularly evident in his willingness to 
compromise his vote in order to get the least objection­
able result, without compromising his opinions. He voted 
to give the National Park Service opportunity to draw 
guidelines on permissible displays on national park land, 
but, at the same time, he aired his objections to requir­
ing anti-war demonstrators to delay the exercise of their 
constitutional rights.-^ When it boiled down to a choice
1Leigh v. United States. 329 F.2d 883 (196*0.
2Venev v. United States, 3*^ F.2d 5^2 (1965).
%omen Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 1+20 F.2d 597 
(1969).
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between voting against a right to counsel in the grand 
jury room or voting to base the right on the court's 
supervisory power over the Circuit, he had no difficulty 
choosing the latter, although he would have preferred to 
base the right on the Constitution.1
Judge Wright's liberal interpretation of constitu­
tional rights often brought him in conflict with his 
colleague, Judge Burger, particularly in the area of 
criminal law and procedure. One of the major points of 
conflict was the application of the Mallory Rule, 
fashioned by the Supreme Court to enforce the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against self-incrimination. In the Killough
2case, the Court of Appeals, en banc, ratified Wright's 
preference for an expanded interpretation of the Mallory 
Rule and rejected Burger's attempt to confine it within 
narrow limits.
Burger now sits in the Chief Justice's chair, and, 
as a result of President Nixon’s Supreme Court appoint­
ments, Burger's policy preferences are now ascendant. In 
a 5-^ decision, the Court extracted the teeth from the 
Warren Court's Miranda decision. The Chief Justice wrote 
the majority opinion holding that a confession obtained
1Jones v. United States. 3^2 F.2d 863 (196^).
2315 F.2d 2 k l (1962).
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in violation of the Miranda rules could he used to im­
peach the credibility of the defendant. Burger took 
the opportunity to insert a footnote rejecting extrava­
gant extensions of the Constitution, specifically citing 
the Killough decision as just such an extravagant 
extension.^
Criminal procedure has not been the only area of 
law to feel the impact of the Burger Court. In 1973» the 
Supreme Court sanctioned a system of public school finance 
whereby individual school districts might supplement the 
state's contribution through local taxation, thus result­
ing in greater educational expenditures in affluent dis­
tricts than in poor districts. The Court held that the
system was not in conflict with the equal protection
2clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Judge Wright's 
judgment, it was "a very unfortunate result. From the 
standpoint of anyone who would be interested in equal 
educational opportunity, it was a terrific setback— a 
terrific setback when there was reason for great hope."-^ 
The California Supreme Court had already granted relief
kin a similar situation, and the Federal District Court
^Harris v. New York. *J-01 U.S. 222, 226, n. 2.
2San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, foil U.S. 1.
-^Interview: Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
^Serrano v. Priest. ^87 P.2d 12*H (1971).
in Texas had followed the decision.'*' Judge Wright con­
sidered the law ready for the next step, hut he was 
disappointed when the step was in the wrong direction.
The changed legal environment obviously affects 
Wright as a judge. "Instead of trying to be creative in 
the development of the law," he explains, "the effect of 
present Supreme Court opinions is to make one look back­
ward, to contract rather than to develop further the 
principles with which I have been associated in the past. 
And he admits that he finds the situation depressing.
One suspects, however, that he will not be inca­
pacitated by depression but will continue to make efforts 
within the limits of his discretion, to influence public 
policy. He is not lacking in professional skills, and, 
as Walter Murphy has pointed out, professional skills 
are a valuable aid to a policy-oriented judge. They help 
him to reach Justices who are open to persuasion on the 
merits of a case.-^ The logical targets for Wright's 
efforts at persuasion appear to be Justices Stewart and
White, and Justice Powell, the most flexible of the Nixon
kappointees to the Supreme Court. If Wright can win over
^Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School 
District. 337 F.Supp. 280 (w.D. Tex. 1971).
2Interview* Hon. J. Skelly Wright.
Êlements of Judicial Strategy, p. M>5.
k rSee Philip B. Kurland, "1971 Terms The Year of the 
Stewart-White Court," Supreme Court Review (1972), 
pp. 182-187.
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two of the three, his policy preferences are likely to 
prevail, since three of the holdovers from the Warren 
Court are, like him, attuned to the values of political 
liberalism. Although he has already experienced some 
success in this regard,1the legal environment of the 
1970's is such that he must also expect failure, and, 
since the completion of research for this study, he has 
experienced that in the form of reversal by the Supreme 
Court.2
Before bringing this study of Judge Wright's 
career and constitutional approach to a close, an evalu­
ation of his more than twenty years of judicial service 
is in order. Has Wright been a good judge? This question
He dissented from a Court of Appeals decision 
holding that the issuance of a public document printed 
under congressional authorization and containing the names 
of District of Columbia school children who were disci­
plinary problems, was protected from suit by the congres­
sional immunity clause of the Constitution. Justices 
White and Powell were among the five Justices who voted 
to reverse in part. See Doe v. McMillan, ^59 F.2d 103^ 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) rev'd in part, IflFuTsT 306 (1973).
Radio and television stations were permitted by 
F.C.C. order to refuse to sell time for all "editorial 
commercials." Organizations which attempted to purchase 
time for anti-war statements and were refused challenged 
the F.C.C. order on First Amendment grounds. Business 
Executives Move for Peace v. F.C.C. and Democratic 
National Committee v. F.C.C. were consolidated and dis­
posed of with a single opinion in which Judge Wright 
ordered the F.C.C. to set guidelines for the acceptance 
of paid, non-commercial messages by radio and television 
stations, ^50 F.2d 6k2 (D.C. Cir. 1971). He was reversed 
by the Supreme Court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting 
System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 
(1973).
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can be approached from at least three directions: his
technical competence, his interpretation of the judicial 
function, the values he has promoted.
In terms of technical competence, Wright must score
high. One can find one of Wright's economic decisions
from the Eastern District of Louisiana cited in Barron
and Holtzoff's Federal Practice and Procedure as a very
careful opinion.^ When he was elevated to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the American
Bar Association, generally considered a conservative
organization, gave him its highest rating, "exceptionally
well qualified." The ability of a judge's decisions to
withstand appeals has also been considered a measure of
2technical competence. By this criterion, Wright has 
indeed been a competent judge. Rarely have his opinions 
been reversed by a higher court. He had been on the 
bench for over twenty years before experiencing his first 
Supreme Court reversal, although his opinions had often 
been affirmed by that Court. The success of his decisions 
has not been entirely due to the fact that the legal
■̂ The case was Pan American Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Revere. 188 F .Supp. ^7^ (19^0). See p. 36 above.
2Although more was involved, Judge G. Harrold 
Carswell's extremely high reversal rate was considered 
an indication of judicial incompetence and played an 
important part in the Senate's rejection of his nomina­
tion to the Supreme Court. See Richard Harris,
Decision (New York: Ballentine Books, 1971), pp. 107-tof:
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environment was congenial to his values. His decisions 
include a number of reluctant ones, made because he 
interpreted the law as requiring them.
When Wright was dissatisfied with the state of the 
law, he used the discretion of his office to try to bring 
about change. If the constraints of his office limited 
him to criticism of existing practice or suggesting new 
approaches, his interpretation of the judicial function 
made such tactics acceptable. Wright believes that an 
important function of the courts is to influence the 
normative content of law. He believes that courts should 
foster the best inspiration of the time and help it win 
general acceptance, with emphasis always upon the highest 
ideals of the community rather than the ideals of the 
judges.1
Is this a valid approach to the judicial function? 
Obviously, it is not without problems. Judges are always 
faced with competing values. Unless judges can identify 
the community's highest ideals, they cannot determine 
which of the available options best represent those ideals.
The basic problem is that the judges' own values and 
beliefs will color their perception of community ideals.
One aspect of this problem is that the judges may 
perceive the community's highest ideals to be identical 
with their own, when in fact they may not be. Wright
^ e e  pp. 115-116 above.
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recognizes the problem and leaves its solution to the 
dynamics of the American political system. He assumes 
that decisions which reflect merely the values of the 
judges will fail to generate support, and the judges will 
be forced to reverse themselves, just as the Supreme 
Court did in 1937* when it was under attack. Because of 
the dramatic circumstances of a major depression, Wright 
perhaps overestimates the significance of the Court’s 
1937 "switch," since unpopular decisions ordinarily do 
not evoke responses as strong as the "court-packing" 
plan.
While Wright may perhaps overestimate the signifi­
cance of the Court's 1937 reversal, he does not over­
estimate the significance of the political process. 
Judicial pronouncements are not automatically translated 
into public policy, but usually experience modification 
in the course of implementation, which minimizes the 
threat of policy-oriented judges like Wright to democratic 
government. Moreover, judicial rules and structure limit 
the freedom of even the most active lower-court judges. 
Wright's professional reputation is evidence that he has 
generally remained within those limits. For him, fos­
tering the best inspiration of the time has, in reality, 
amounted to doing what he thinks is right, within the 
bounds of his office.
One may argue that the limited freedom of the judge 
and the difficulty of identifying the highest community 
values make Wright's approach a valid one. If he were 
to compromise his own values out of a belief that the 
community would reject them, he could quite possibly 
underestimate the community, and thus contribute to a 
deterioration in the normative content of the law at a 
time when the community might have responded favorably 
to a clear judicial pronouncement.
Finally, there is the matter of the values to which 
Wright has subscribed and read into the Constitution. 
Political equality, which he has identified as the most 
important of contemporary community values, is obviously 
central to his own values. It permeates his approach to 
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend 
ments. Far from being a threat to democratic government, 
Wright's judicial activism has promoted democratic govern 
ment by defending equal access to the ballot and the free 
dom to disseminate ideas and opinions, both by the press 
and by less conventional means. Democratic government 
depends upon the freedom of the citizenry to hear com­
peting ideas, including the unorthodox, and to register 
their choice through equal access to the ballot.
Wright's commitment to equality is also evident in 
his liberal reading of Bill of Rights procedural guaran­
tees. While his defense of the rights of the accused has
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occasionally led him to untenable positions, disagree­
ment with particular decisions does not invalidate the 
principle that persons accused of crime, persons who very 
often are poor and uneducated, may not be deprived of 
their liberty without being informed of what their rights 
are and having those rights fully respected. Wright 
does not underestimate the seriousness of the crime 
problem; he simply denies that the deprivation of consti­
tutional rights is either a valid or an effective way to 
solve the problem.
Wright's defense of equal educational opportunity 
is perhaps more troublesome than defense of First Amend­
ment rights or the procedural guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights. It is more difficult because neither judges nor 
educators are certain what it takes to overcome the cul­
tural disadvantages of ghetto children and provide them 
with educational opportunity equal to that of their 
middle class peers. To reject the principle of equal 
educational opportunity, however, is to deny that the 
society has any obligation to seek solutions to this 
admittedly difficult problem. It is to Wright's credit 
that he has refused to take that course.
During his years on the bench, and particularly 
during his later years, Judge Wright has been an articu­
late spokesman for the interests of disadvantaged 
individuals and groups. By the ways in which they have
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used the discretion of their offices and taken advantage 
of the public visibility conferred by their offices,
J. Skelly Wright and judges like him have brought a 
humane quality to the law.
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